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On war and political radicalization

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Abstract. This paper illustrates how a historical shock to political preferences can translate into observable electoral support as the political landscape evolves. During World War II, the Third Reich annexed the French eastern borderlands and their inhabitants were forcibly conscripted into the Wehrmacht. In the first stage, survey data is used to show how this forced conscription reduced political trust. Municipality-level data and political discourse data are then combined to estimate the impact of conscription on support for radical candidates and on abstention in elections during the 1965-2017 period. Identification exploits the fact that different birth cohorts were affected in each annexed region by using eligible births as an instrument for conscription. In earlier elections in which platforms were more similar, both radical and moderate candidates were penalized in municipalities where more men were conscripted, resulting in higher abstention. In more recent elections, which were more polarized, conscription increased support for radical candidates.

Keywords: War, political trust, polarization, radicalization

JEL classification: D72, N44, F51, Z13

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1 Introduction

The recent electoral success of parties that fall outside the traditional, bipolar Social-Democrat/Christian-Democrat divide that has dominated European politics through the second half of the 20th century has attracted considerable attention in public and academic discourse. This success has coincided with the economic downturn which has focused attention on short-run determinants, such as social and economic insecurity.[1] Indeed, parties labeled as radical have emerged recently from little or no previous electoral success to prominence in several countries (for instance, AfD in Germany and UKIP in the UK).[2]

Yet, certain regions in countries such as France and Austria have proven to be particularly fertile ground for radical candidates since the 1980s. These early regional successes have contributed to making such candidates relevant alternatives at the national level and illustrated the potential gains from campaigning on platforms that are critical of the political system, thus encouraging the formation of similar parties in other countries.[3] This early and sustained electoral success cannot be attributed to short-run fluctuations in the economic and social conditions, particularly in prosperous regions. The explanation must be sought in slow-changing attributes of the electorate, such as political preferences.

This paper illustrates how a historical shock to political preferences can translate

[1] See among others, Couttenier et al. (2019); Drago et al. (2016) for crime and voting; Barone et al. (2016); Facchini and Mayda (2009); Halla et al. (2017); Mayda et al. (2016); Otto and Steinhardt (2014) for immigration; Algan et al. (2017); Autor et al. (2016); Colantone and Stanig (2018); Dehdari (2018); Dippel et al. (2017) for unemployment and trade exposure.

[2] Such parties are also often referred to as populist, anti-establishment, or anti-system. Radical parties/candidates are defined here as the ones that "*radically criticize the existing social and economic order*" (Backes, 2009). Backes' definition is also close to that of Capoccia (2002) who defines anti-system parties as "*parties or groups that exert a radical form of opposition*".

[3] The French case is considered of particular interest in view of the remarkable electoral achievements of the National Front since the 1980s (Bréchon and Mitra, 1992). A recent example illustrating how regional success might make some parties relevant at the national level is the emergence of the VOX party in the 2018 Andalusian regional election in Spain.

into observable electoral support as the political landscape evolves. The setting used is Alsace and Moselle which were annexed by the Third Reich during WWII and whose inhabitants were forcibly conscripted into the Wehrmacht.[4] In the early post-WWII elections, in which the radical right was either absent or marginal, the forced conscription during the war is associated with high levels of abstention. Since the emergence of the radical right and the accompanying anti-establishment discourse in the mid-1980s, forced conscription correlates with support for such candidates (see Figure 1). Building on a hypothesis in social psychology that links conscription to political alienation, I argue that this voting behavior reflects reduced political trust due to the effect of WWII conscription.[5]

The identifying variation emerges from the fact that while conscription into the Wehrmacht was introduced in both Alsace and Moselle, different cohorts were conscripted in each. In Alsace, which was integrated within the neighboring German Baden region, the relevant cohorts were born between 1908 to 1927; in Moselle, which was integrated within the neighboring German Saar-Palatinate region, the relevant cohorts were born between 1914 and 1927. The reasons for the diverging conscription rules remains unclear even today; nonetheless, it is generally though that the administrators of these two German regions had broad discretionary powers which allowed them to choose different policies when it came to ideological and cultural assimilation.[6]

[4]Alsace is a region that consists of two *departments* (Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin) while Moselle is a *department* in the Lorraine region. Regions are the second level of administrative division in France (NUTS-2) while *departments* are the third (NUTS-3). In 2014 there were 27 regions and 101 *departments* in France. Restricting the analysis to subregions has the additional advantage of political supply being exogenously determined, thus make it possible to identify variation in political demand, as long as changes in local preferences do not move hand-in-hand with national changes.

[5]Following Gamson (1968), political trust is defined here as "*the probability [...] that the political system [...] will produce preferred outcomes even if left untended*". See Stouffer et al. (1949) who studied the political behavior of U.S. WWII veterans; Finifter (1970), Gillingham (1972); Browne (1973); Lifton (1973); Levy (1974); Polner (1971) who studied Vietnam veteran maladjustment and Fendrich and Axelson (1971); Johnson (1976); Jenning and Markus (1977) who studied Vietnam veteran political behavior.

[6]Robert Wagner, the Alsace administrator, was appointed *Gauleiter* of the Baden region in 1933; Josef Bürckel, the Moselle administrator, was appointed *Gauleiter* of the Saar-Palatinate region in 1935.

Figure 1: Conscription and voting behavior



Notes: Conscription and abstention and radical right-wing vote in Alsace and Moselle. The left panel presents average abstention in earlier elections (1965-1974) by conscription percentile. The right panel presents radical right-wing support in later elections (1995-2017) by incorporation percentile. The pairwise correlation coefficients are $\hat{\rho}_L = 0.637$ and $\hat{\rho}_R = 0.716$.

I start by presenting a theoretical framework that introduces war mobilization as a negative shock to voters' political trust based on the Glaeser et al. (2005) expressive voting framework. This twist to the model yields the following testable predictions: In the same election (1a) political candidates with a more radical program should have larger shares of the vote in municipalities where a higher proportion of men were conscripted as long as platforms are not "too" similar; (1b) moderate candidates should get smaller shares of the vote in localities where a higher proportion of men were conscripted; (1c) abstention should be higher in places where a higher proportion of men were conscripted. Across elections (2) both radical and moderate candidates should have, all else held equal, lower shares of the vote in elections where policy platforms are similar, and this effect should be larger in places where a higher proportion of men were conscripted. These predictions are then empirically tested.

As a preliminary exercise, I exploit survey data to test the foundations of the framework, i.e. whether war mobilization has an impact on political trust. Inference in this section relies on the fact that individuals born in similar years but different regions

(Alsace vs Moselle) have different likelihoods of being affected, both directly and indirectly (through their fathers/grandfathers). Identification can therefore be achieved by exploiting the draft rule to estimate the causal impacts of mobilization, as first proposed in Angrist (1990). The findings indicate that individuals affected by WWII conscription display lower political trust, as in Grosjean (2014). No other aspect of radical discourse (immigration, security, or traditional values) correlates with conscription. Moreover, in line with imperfect vertical transmission of values and beliefs, the effect diminishes across generations.

The second part of the paper is the heart of the analysis, namely the effect of war on municipality-level electoral outcomes for the 1965-2017 period. I first estimate the effect of conscription on abstention and on support for candidates commonly classified as belonging to the radical right-wing. Identification is achieved using the number of eligible births by municipality while simultaneously controlling for local birth rates and a wide range of covariates (including pre-war voting). In other words, identification fixes the compliance rate (through the first-stage estimation) while controlling for variation arising from fertility. Results confirm the descriptive evidence: in the earlier elections, when the radical right is a marginal force, abstention is higher in places more affected by conscription, while in more recent elections, there is increased support for radical right-wing candidates in these locations.

I then exploit content-analytic data to measure a candidate's degree of radicalism and overcome traditional party labels. Following Backes (2009), I use the fraction of a candidate's discourse that has a negative tone to construct the measure. Apart from capturing both sides of the political spectrum, this approach also makes it possible to disentangle changes in participation rates in order to identify vote gains and losses of radical and moderate candidates. Indeed, I find the vote share of moderate candidates to be decreasing in conscription, while the vote share of radical candidates to be in-

creasing, resulting in a narrowing of the moderate-radical gap in election outcomes. I use the same procedure to construct measures for a candidate's nationalist and authoritarian tendencies; conscription rates do not predict vote share along these dimensions.

The final part of the paper tests the theoretical predictions of the model regarding the transition from abstention to radical support. To accomplish this, I exploit variation in political discourse across candidates (in the same election), and across time (in different elections). The latter variation makes it possible to test the effect of conscription as policy platforms converge. The results indicate that conscription affects candidates asymmetrically, such that in highly polarized elections the effect of conscription is captured by more radical candidates, while when platforms are similar, both radical and moderate candidates are penalized, resulting in higher abstention.

Literature review – A recent strand of the literature has focused on short-run fluctuations in economic conditions and the social environment as drivers of support for populist parties and policies. Couttenier et al. (2019) focus on media coverage of crime and the populist vote in Switzerland, while Barone et al. (2016), Halla et al. (2017), Mayda et al. (2016), and Otto and Steinhardt (2014) focus on immigration to Europe and the US. A separate strand looks at economic determinants such as unemployment (Algan et al., 2017; Dehdari, 2018) and trade exposure (Autor et al., 2016; Colantone and Stanig, 2018; Dippel et al., 2017).

In contrast, the analysis presented here focuses on long-run determinants of support for radical politicians which has roots in deeper and slower-changing attributes of the electorate. From this perspective, it is closer to the literature that exploits historical accidents, and more precisely wars, to identify sources of political support. Fontana et al. (2018) concentrate on the Nazi occupation of Italy and its effect on the Communist vote in 1946-1948, while Koenig (2015) links WWI to support for the right-wing DNVP

party in the Weimar Republic. Ochsner and Roesel (2016, 2017) focus on the roots of recent support for the FPÖ, by exploiting Austria's post-WWII division and the Ottoman Sieges of Vienna, while Schindler and Westcott (2015) look at stationing of American troops in Britain during WWII and membership in the British National Party. My main contribution to this literature is that I focus on a series of electoral outcomes over a 50-year period, thus making it possible to exploit variation in the political discourse in order to capture the dynamics of the voter's decision, whether in the direction of support for a particular party or abstention. From this perspective, the paper conceptually relates to Cantoni et al. (2019) that link NSDAP vote with support for the AfD party in Germany, but only when this party changed its political platform and turned more nationalistic. The effects of war on abstention were also examined by Alacevich and Zejcirovic (2018) in the case of Bosnia.

A vast literature has explored the impact of war on political behavior using survey data. Blattman (2009) and Bellows and Miguel (2009) show that witnessing violence had a positive impact on political participation in Uganda and Sierra Leone.[7] By exploiting variation in conscription rules, my identification strategy is similar to that used to analyze political attitudes by Erikson and Stoker (2011), and Grossman et al. (2015) in the U.S. and Israel, respectively. My findings on war and political trust can be compared to those of Grosjean (2014) who shows that conflict lowers political trust, especially in the case of a defeat. The analysis presented here bridges between the use of survey data and the use of aggregate data by directly linking war, political attitudes, and voting outcomes. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that historical micro-data has been combined with content-analytic data over a long period in order to investigate the interplay between voter attitudes and politicians' discourse.

[7] Voors et al. (2012) and Gilligan et al. (2014) find similar evidence in Burundi and Nepal. Bauer et al. (2016) provide a detailed review of this literature.

By exploiting the historical developments in Alsace and Moselle, the analysis is also similar to work done by Dehdari and Gehring (2018) on regional identity and by Chemin and Wasmer (2009, 2012) on labor policies. While these papers exploit variation between the annexed regions and the rest of France, I exploit variation within the annexed regions. Nazi institutions and policies such as Economic Aryanization, the Professional Civil Service, and the Hitler Youth have already been investigated in Huber et al. (2018), Waldinger (2011), and Voigtländer and Voth (2015), respectively. As far as I am aware, Wehrmacht conscription has not been examined before. Finally, by looking at a persistent shock in preferences this analysis is also linked to the literature on intergenerational transmission of values and beliefs, as described theoretically by Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) and empirically tested by Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015), and Fernández and Fogli (2009)

The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the historical background, the identifying variation, and the data. Section 3 presents the main hypothesis and a theoretical framework that yields consistent testable predictions. Section 4 tests the main hypothesis of the model, that war reduces political trust, using survey data. Section 5 tests the main predictions of the model, and primarily the effect of war on municipality-level support for radical candidates and abstention during the 1965-2017 period. Section 6 concludes.

2 Historical background & data

The history of Alsace and Moselle during WWII is exploited for purposes of identification. This section presents the historical background and the source of the identifying variation, as well as the data used in Section 5.

Figure 2: Historical background – The German border in 1938 and 1942



Notes: Map of the western German border in 1938 (left panel) and 1942 (right panel). With the annexation of Alsace and Moselle by the Third Reich in 1940, Alsace consolidated the pre-existing Baden region; Moselle and Saar-Palatinate formed the Westmark region. The Baden capital was moved to Strasbourg while the Westmark capital remained in Saarbrücken.

2.1 Historical background[8]

Wehrmacht conscription – Alsace and Moselle were annexed by the Third Reich following the French capitulation in June 1940. Unlike the previous annexation during the period 1871-1918 during which the regions formed a single administrative unit, in this case the two regions were absorbed into the neighboring pre-existing German districts of Baden (in the case of Alsace) and Saar-Palatinate (in the case of Moselle), as shown in Figure 2.[9] Alsace and Moselle were therefore administrated separately: Alsace by Robert Wagner, the *Gauleiter* of Baden since 1933, and Moselle by Josef Bürckel, the *Gauleiter* of Saar-Palatinate since 1935.

[8]The historical background is taken from Riedweg (1995) unless otherwise specified. Most of the facts regarding the administrators of Alsace and Moselle also apply to Gustav Simon, the administrator of Luxembourg. Further historical information that also provides identifying variation can be found in Appendix Section D.1.

[9]Alsace and Moselle were ceded to the German Empire by the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871 which ended the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. They formed the *Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen* district until the end of World War I in 1918.

In general *Gauleiters* were subject to the authority of the occupying army. However, in August 1940, Hitler issued a decree granting full civil control to the *Gauleiters* of Alsace and Moselle. The Wehrmacht had military authority in the two regions, while the Interior ministry was responsible for coordination between the Wehrmacht and the *Gauleiters*. Therefore, the two administrators of Alsace and Moselle possessed virtually unrestricted civil powers, and essentially were responsible only to Hitler himself.

The two administrators held similar positions but their personalities and methods differed significantly (Iung et al., 2012, p.18). Robert Wagner, a WWI veteran, was of the view that the Wehrmacht and the party would be the means by which the local youth would complete their ideological and cultural assimilation. Josef Bürckel was considered a "nazification" (*Gleichschaltung*) expert after being in charge of nazifying the Saar region and Austria. He believed that assimilation through education was not possible, and therefore openly considered the possibility of deporting part of the population and replacing them with German farmers.[10]

Wagner's plan had to overcome the legal status of the Alsace and Moselle inhabitants who were considered to be racially German (*Volksdeutsche*), though not German citizens (*Reichsburger*). Only the latter could be conscripted into the military service.[11] The course of the war on the Eastern Front greatly facilitated Wagner's plan. The decision to grant German nationality to the populations of Alsace and Moselle was made on August 9, 1942. This made it possible to introduce mandatory military service in Alsace on August 25, 1942, and in Moselle on August 29, 1942.

The administrators' independence gave them broad discretion in implementing

[10] *Latest News of Strasbourg*, April 30, 1942. Approximately 15% of the population of Moselle was eventually deported, as opposed to 3% in the case of Alsace (INSEE, 1956). This aspect of the conscription process is taken into account in the empirical section.

[11] The Nuremberg laws made a clear distinction between Reich citizens and German nationals. Only citizens had full political rights and obligations, such as the military service (Military Obligation Law (*Wehrgesetz*) of 1935). The Alsace and Moselle populations were also protected by the Hague Convention which prohibited conscription in occupied territories.

conscription. Wagner who felt that assimilation could be accomplished through military service, mobilized 20 cohorts in Alsace (1908-1927), while Bürckel only mobilized 14 in Moselle (1914-1927).[12] In total 103,000 men from Alsace and 31,000 from Moselle were drafted into the Wehrmacht (MACVG, 1954). The process was otherwise identical in both regions (Grandhomme, 2013). According to Riedweg (1995, p.99), "*The responsibility falls entirely on Gauleiter Wagner who did everything he could so that a maximum of Alsatians are incorporated in the Wehrmacht*".

The radical right in France – The radical right-wing reappeared on the French political scene in the aftermath of WWII. In the 1956 parliamentary election, a list headed by Pierre Poujade who proclaimed that they "vomit on [traditional] politics", received 2.4 million votes, while in the 1965 Presidential election Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour received 5.2% of the votes on a platform to keep Algeria French. The radical right subsequently went into decline. Jean-Marie Le Pen, the "candidate of public salvation", received only 0.8% of the vote in 1974 and did not run in 1981.[13]

The resurgence of the radical right occurred in the 1984 European election when a list led by Le Pen, who claimed that the policies of both left- and right-wing governments "betrayed the popular trust", received 11.2% of the vote. This success was repeated in the 1988 Presidential election with 14% of the vote. In his campaign, Le Pen wondered out loud "why [mainstream candidates] would do tomorrow what they did not know how to do yesterday".[14] Since then the radical right has had a presence

[12]In Luxembourg only the 1920 to 1927 cohorts were mobilized. *Gauleiter* Simon, who was against the introduction of conscription, refused to mobilize cohorts born before 1920 which did not elicit any response from the German High Command. This provides additional evidence that administrators had broad discretion in the implementation of conscription.

[13]Presidential candidates need to collect 500 signatures from elected representatives in order to run.

[14]Campaign slogans of Le Pen include: "If you think that the problems [...] of the last 20 years will be solved during this election [..], you have a large choice, since the politicians responsible of the situation are present in the election" (1995); "Corruption reigns at the head of the Republic. [...] All we need is to push aside discredited politicians, change policy, and elect a Head of State worthy of the name" (2002); "[...] The parties of the system UMP-UDF-PS-PC have united to maintain their privileges" (2007).

in every presidential election.[15]

Alsace and Moselle have been strongholds of the radical right since the 1980s, where it's share of the vote is well above the national average. In 1988, Le Pen received 21% of the vote in Alsace and Moselle, 50% more than the national average. In 1995, *out of 101 departments he received the highest share of votes in the annexed departments*. In the four elections from 2002-2017, the radical right's share of the vote exceeded the national average by between 4 and 8 percentage points.

2.2 Data[16]

Conscription data – Data on Wehrmacht conscription is taken from the *Index of French Nationals Compelled into German Armed Forces* (MACVG, 1945, 1946). It includes 44,527 individuals which were declared missing in an official census carried out by the Ministry of Veterans and War Victims in October 1945 with the sole purpose of repatriating French prisoners of war held in allied camps. The data was digitalized, and 44,034 individuals were matched to 1,435 contemporary municipalities, which means that 91% of all municipalities have at least one man declared missing. Therefore, in the case of an average municipality, 2.3% of its 1936 population was declared missing (28 men). The key independent variable, namely the fraction of a municipality's 1936 population conscripted into the Wehrmacht, is constructed by multiplying the number of men declared missing by $134,000/44,500$.

[15]Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1995 (15% of the vote), 2002 (16.9%), and 2007 (10.4%); Bruno Mégret in 2002 (2.3%); Marine Le Pen in 2012 (17.9%), and 2017 (21.3%). The *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (CHES) also classifies the Movement for France (MPF) and the Rally for France (RPF) as belonging to the radical right. Their candidate, Philippe de Villiers, received 4.7% of the vote in 1995 and 2.2% in 2007. Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, the president of France Arise (DLF), ran in the 2012 and 2017 elections. Although DLF's slogan is "Neither system nor extreme", Dupont-Aignan endorsed Le Pen in the second round of the 2017 election.

[16]More details on data sources and variable construction, as well as descriptive statistics of the variables and validation tests can be found in the Online Appendix B.

Pre-war birth data – Birth data is taken from the decennial civil status registers, which are available on the websites of the Bas-Rhin (Alsace) and Moselle archives. The data was collected for three decades (1903-1932) for all municipalities within 20km of the Alsace-Moselle border. The instrument for conscription, namely eligible births as a fraction of a municipality's pre-war population, is constructed using this data. The crude birth rate (average annual births per 1,000 inhabitants), a key control variable, is also constructed using this data.

Election data – The 1962 French constitutional reform introduced universal suffrage in Presidential elections. Data for the 1965, 1969, and 1974 elections was obtained from the French National Archives and digitalized. Later election results (1995 to 2017) are available from the data platform of the French Republic (`data.gouv.fr`). Surprisingly, the copying of the 1981 and 1988 results is prohibited.[17] The dependent variables, i.e. a candidate's share of the vote and abstention, are constructed using this data for the 1965, 1969, 1974, 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 elections.

Covariates – The 1936 parliamentary election results are taken from Lachapelle (1936), while other pre-war data come from the 1936 and 1946 census results in INSEE (1956), which are only available at the sub-district level. The populations of the municipalities in 1936 are taken from the Cassini Database. Municipality-level religious affiliation (i.e. Catholic, Protestant, Jewish) is approximated using church data. Municipality-level linguistic makeup (French- or German-speaking) is approximated using 1891 to 1940 family name at birth which is available from the *1891 to 1990 Family Name File*

[17]Data for the 1981 and 1988 elections is available from both the national and local archives, but copying them is prohibited due to comments that are bundled with the results. While municipality-level data is unavailable, aggregate data corroborates the story. In 1981, when there was no radical right-wing candidate, abstention was higher in Alsace (21.4%) than Moselle (20.1%). In 1988 while abstention was almost identical (19.8% vs 19.6%), the radical right-wing vote was higher in Alsace (17.5% vs 16% of registered voters).

of the French National Statistics Institute (henceforth INSEE).[18] Data on contemporary municipality characteristics is taken from the 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2009, and 2014 censuses carried out by INSEE. Following Gentzkow (2006), inter-census years are estimated by linear interpolation.

3 Conceptual and theoretical framework

This section presents the main hypothesis and a theoretical framework which is a modification of that presented in Glaeser et al. (2005). Its predictions are then used as a guide in the empirical analysis.

3.1 Conceptual framework

The hypothesis to be tested is motivated by research carried out on the political behavior of Vietnam veterans. In the social psychology literature, veteran alienation is a phenomenon associated with (i) frustration in readjustment to civilian life, (ii) a sense of political normlessness, (iii) rejection of prevailing social mores, and (iv) distrust of established political authorities (Finifter, 1970).

This estrangement can be manifested either actively, or passively. Active political alienation involves hostility toward the polity, while passive alienation involves withdrawal from political matters (Johnson, 1976). Moreover, more cynical views of the conflict are associated with higher levels of alienation and low levels of political trust with support of radical candidates (Aberbach, 1969; Jenning and Markus, 1977).

This framework seems particularly relevant in the Alsace-Moselle context. At the end of the war, the Wehrmacht veterans from Alsace and Moselle had to integrate into

[18] Both approximations work particularly well. The correlation between the church data and actual census data (at the sub-district level) from INSEE (1956) is $\hat{\rho} = 0.962$ ($N = 17$); the correlation between the name data (1891-1940) and INSEE (1956) is $\hat{\rho} = 0.864$ ($N = 93$) (see Online Appendix B.3 for details).

a French state which they felt had let them down. These veterans went on to form "Against our will" (*Malgré-nous*) associations, a name that indicates their cynical view of the war. As long as there was no political discourse able to capture this resentment, it remained latent and was only observable through abstention. With the emergence in the mid-1980s of the radical right and its anti-establishment discourse, their political distrust could now be channeled into observable support for its candidates. As shown in Figure 1 in the Introduction, conscription rates are strongly correlated with abstention in earlier elections (1965-1974) and support for radical right-wing candidates in more recent ones (1995-2017).

3.2 Theoretical framework

This section presents a modified version of the expressive voting framework in Glaeser et al. (2005) which yields testable predictions that are in line with the conceptual framework.

The candidates – Two candidates $C \in \{M, R\}$ run for office, where M stands for "Moderate" and R stands for "Radical". Policy platforms are uni-dimensional and only refer to the desire of candidates to reform the political system, τ_C, where by definition $\tau_R \geq \tau_M$. Candidates' platforms are taken as exogenous since the empirical analysis focuses on a region that represents only 4.5% of the national electorate.[19]

[19] In France, unlike the U.S., there is no electoral college. What might be an out-of-equilibrium analysis for these regions might therefore be an equilibrium analysis when it comes to the country as a whole, as long as the preferences of this sub-population differ sufficiently from those of the population.

The voters – Each citizen i has a preferred policy τ^i. Military service during WWII acts as a constant (additive) shock to one's favorite policy

$$\tau^i = \bar{\tau} + \beta D^i + \varepsilon^i \tag{1}$$

where D^i is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if individual i was conscripted (with probability α) and 0 otherwise, and ε^i is the idiosyncratic part of preferences that is assumed to follow a uniform distribution with a mean of 0 and a density of 1.[20]

The preferred policies τ^i are thus individual-specific, though they follow a uniform group-specific distribution τ^{iJ}, on the support $\left[\bar{\tau}^J - \frac{1}{2}, \bar{\tau}^J + \frac{1}{2}\right]$, $J \in \{H, L\}$, where H stands for "High distrust" (i.e. conscripted) and L stands for "Low distrust" (i.e. not conscripted). The population shares of group H and L are α and $(1-\alpha)$ respectively. Since β is assumed positive, $\bar{\tau}^H > \bar{\tau}^L$, i.e. group H has, on average, a preference for a more extensive reform of the political system relative to group L.

Individual i in group J gains utility from voting for candidate C which is equal to

$$W^{iJ}(\tau_C) = B - M(|\tau_C - \tau^{iJ}|)$$

where B measures the psychological gain from expressing support for one's favorite policy τ^{iJ}. $M(\cdot)$ captures the fact that citizens derive less utility if they vote for a candidate whose policy proposal τ_C differs from their own bliss point τ^{iJ}. $M(\cdot)$ is assumed to be quadratic, i.e. $M(|\tau_C - \tau^{iJ}|) = \left(\tau_C - \tau^{iJ}\right)^2$. People also gain utility from voting against candidate C', which is equal to $-W^{iJ}(\tau_{C'})$. The benefit from voting is therefore

[20] In the empirical section, $\bar{\tau}$ is municipality-specific. Political attitudes map one-to-one onto preferred policies, which can be relaxed by assuming that mobilization affects an individual characteristic θ^i and that τ^i is monotonically increasing in θ^i, i.e. $\tau^i = \tau(\theta^i)$ with $\tau'(\theta) > 0$. The framework presented is the degenerate case where $\tau(\theta^i) = \theta^i$.

$$V\left(\tau^{iJ},\tau_M,\tau_R\right)=\max\begin{cases}-\left(\tau_M-\tau^{iJ}\right)^2+\left(\tau_R-\tau^{iJ}\right)^2, & \textit{Benefit from voting } M\\ -\left(\tau_R-\tau^{iJ}\right)^2+\left(\tau_M-\tau^{iJ}\right)^2, & \textit{Benefit from voting } R\end{cases}$$

The act of voting involves a cost c^{iJ}. The cost c^{iJ} takes group-specific values $\bar{c}^J$, where $\bar{c}^H \geq \bar{c}^L$, i.e. the cost of voting is higher for the group of individuals with low political trust.[21] Conditional on voting, people will support the candidate that is closer to their ideal platform and since the act of voting imposes a cost $\bar{c}^J$, people will vote as long as

$$V\left(\tau^{iJ},\tau_M,\tau_R\right)\geq \bar{c}^J$$

Voter heterogeneity is group-specific and is expressed by the parameters $\bar{\tau}^J$ and $\bar{c}^J$.

Candidates' vote shares – It is straightforward to show that given the distributional assumptions on τ^{iJ} the overall vote share attained by candidate (π_C) and overall abstention (π_A) are given by

$$\pi_R = \underbrace{\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\tau_R+\tau_M}{2}}_{\beta_{0,R}}+\underbrace{\left(\bar{\tau}^H-\bar{\tau}^L\right)}_{\beta_{1,R}\geq 0}\alpha+\underbrace{\left(\frac{\bar{c}^L-\bar{c}^H}{2}\right)}_{\beta_{2,R}\leq 0}\frac{\alpha}{\Delta\tau_C}+\underbrace{\bar{\tau}^L-\frac{1}{2}\frac{\bar{c}^L}{\Delta\tau_C}}_{\varepsilon_R} \quad (2)$$

$$\pi_M = \underbrace{\frac{1}{2}+\frac{\tau_R+\tau_M}{2}}_{\beta_{0,M}}+\underbrace{\left(\bar{\tau}^L-\bar{\tau}^H\right)}_{\beta_{1,M}\leq 0}\alpha+\underbrace{\left(\frac{\bar{c}^L-\bar{c}^H}{2}\right)}_{\beta_{2,M}\leq 0}\frac{\alpha}{\Delta\tau_C}-\underbrace{\bar{\tau}^L-\frac{1}{2}\frac{\bar{c}^L}{\Delta\tau_C}}_{\varepsilon_M} \quad (3)$$

$$\pi_A = \underbrace{\left(\bar{c}^H-\bar{c}^L\right)}_{\beta_{2,A}\geq 0}\frac{\alpha}{\Delta\tau_C}+\underbrace{\frac{\bar{c}^L}{\Delta\tau_C}}_{\varepsilon_A} \quad (4)$$

[21] One could alternatively assume a cost function monotonically increasing in θ^i, as in footnote 20.

where $\Delta\tau_C \equiv \tau_R - \tau_M$ measures policy divergence. The coefficient signs are derived from the assumptions that $\bar{c}^H \geq \bar{c}^l$ and $\bar{\tau}^H \geq \bar{\tau}^L$.[22]

Testable predictions – This simple framework yields testable predictions both across candidates in the same election and within candidates across elections. Within an election (such that $\Delta\tau_C$ is constant), candidates with a more radical program would have, all else held equal, larger shares of the vote in municipalities were group H is larger (i.e. $\frac{\partial \pi_R}{\partial \alpha} \geq 0$) as long as platforms are not "too" similar.[23] Moderate candidates should achieve lower shares of the vote in localities where group H is larger (i.e. $\frac{\partial \pi_M}{\partial \alpha} \leq 0$). Abstention should be higher in places where group H is larger (i.e. $\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial \alpha} \geq 0$).

Across elections, both radical and moderate candidates would have, all else held equal, lower shares of the vote in elections where policy platforms converge (i.e. $\frac{\partial \pi_C}{\partial \Delta\tau_C} \leq 0$), resulting in higher abstention (i.e. $\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial \Delta\tau_C} \geq 0$). This effect should be larger (in absolute terms) in places where group H is larger (i.e. $\frac{\partial^2 \pi_C}{\partial \Delta\tau_C \partial \alpha} \geq 0$). Equations (2) to (4) also highlight the threats to identification since $\bar{\tau}^L$ and $\bar{c}^L$, which are not observable, might correlate with the conscription likelihood α within a municipality.

4 Political preferences

The purpose of this section is to test the foundations of the theoretical framework, i.e. that having been conscripted during WWII acts as a positive shock to one's preferred policy, formally $\beta > 0$ in Equation (1). To do so, I exploit survey data to evaluate

[22] A voter i in group J whose ideal policy is τ^{iJ} votes for candidate R if $\tau^{iJ} \geq \bar{\tau}_C + \frac{\bar{c}^J}{2\Delta\tau_C}$ and for candidate M if $\tau^{iJ} \leq \bar{\tau}_C - \frac{\bar{c}^J}{2\Delta\tau_C}$; otherwise she abstains. The share of the votes by group and candidate (π^J_C) are thus $\pi^J_R = \frac{1}{2} - \bar{\tau}_C + \bar{\tau}^J - \frac{\bar{c}^J}{2\Delta\tau_C}$, and $\pi^J_M = \frac{1}{2} + \bar{\tau}_C - \bar{\tau}^J - \frac{\bar{c}^J}{2\Delta\tau_C}$. The group-specific abstention rate (π^J_A) is consequently $\pi^J_A = 1 - \sum_C \pi^J_C = \frac{\bar{c}^J}{\Delta\tau_C}$.

[23] The effect of α on π_R becomes negative once platforms become "too" similar, i.e. $\Delta\tau_C \leq \frac{1}{2}\frac{\bar{c}^H - \bar{c}^L}{\bar{\tau}^H - \bar{\tau}^L}$.

whether conscripted individuals exhibit lower political trust. This section also sheds light on the intergenerational transmission of this attitude.

4.1 Data

French Electoral Panel – The *2002 French Electoral Panel* (henceforth FEP) contains information on respondents' individual characteristics, their voting behavior, and most importantly, the municipality of residence. In 2002, a question on Le Pen's views was introduced (Q232d): *Do you approve or disapprove of the position taken by JM Le Pen in his critique of the political class?* The possible answers are: I strongly approve, I somewhat approve, I somewhat disapprove, and I strongly disapprove.[24]

The outcome variable in the analysis, namely "low political trust", is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the respondent answered "I strongly approve" or "I somewhat approve" to this question. Information from the FEP on respondents' political preferences (ideological distance from each candidate), age, gender, education, religion, and parents' origin is also exploited.

Birth distributions – The survey took place in 2002 which means that most of the respondents were not directly affected by WWII conscription. Since the survey data does not contain a question on WWII military service, I use the likelihood that the respondent or her father/grandfather was conscripted and/or eligible to be conscripted.

To calculate a year-of-birth-specific probability that the respondent, her father or her grandfather was eligible for Wehrmacht service (i.e. born in 1908-1927 in Alsace or 1914-1927 in Moselle) I use the censuses carried out from 1962 to 2011 (organized by INSEE and available on IPUMS-I). I then estimate the distribution of father and mother

[24]The formulation of the question demonstrates the importance of criticism in radical right discourse. To disentangle approval of this position from overall sympathy for the party all the regressions control for political preferences. I also perform falsifications on other policy positions.

years-of-birth for individuals born between 1890 and 2012. These probabilities are then cross-matched to obtain year-of-birth distributions for grandfathers, both parental and maternal. For example, an individual born in Alsace (Moselle) in 1957 has a 51.6% (47.4%) probability of having an eligible father, and a 17.1% (1.6%) probability of having at least one eligible grandfather. For an individual born in 1967 these probabilities are 9.7% (9.4%), and 72.3% (36.4%) respectively. Variation in the eligibility probability is therefore generated by the respondent's year-of-birth and the region of residence, and his gender (for individuals born during the 1908-1927 period).

This probability is then combined with municipality-specific compliance rates to construct the likelihood that the respondent, her father, or one of her grandfathers was conscripted during WWII. Variation in the conscription probability is therefore also generated by the municipality in which the respondent lives.

4.2 Approval of radical positions

Estimation strategy – The identification strategy is the same one used in a large body of research that exploits draft rules to estimate the causal impact of conscription, such as Angrist (1990), where the treatment and eligibility status are replaced by the corresponding probabilities. Assuming that the outcome in the absence of treatment is a function of individual and municipality characteristics, i.e. $\bar{\tau} = x_i'\gamma_1 + x_m'\gamma_2 + \mu_{im}$ in Equation (1), I postulate the following Linear Probability Model (LPM): $\tau_i = x_i'\gamma_1 + x_m'\gamma_2 + \beta\mathbb{P}(Cons_i) + \eta_{im}$, where $\mathbb{P}(Cons_i)$ is the likelihood that a relative of i was conscripted, x_i (x_m) are vectors of individual (municipality) characteristics, and $\eta_{im} \equiv \mu_{im} + \varepsilon_i$. The coefficient β is the effect of conscription on political distrust τ_i.

If $\mathbb{P}(Cons_i)$ is correlated with η_{im}, then estimating the LPM by OLS will yield biased point estimates. This might be the case if an individual or her father/grandfather who was more distrustful prior to the war (i.e. had higher values of ε_i) was more likely to

comply. This issue can be overcome by exploiting the eligibility status. To implement this strategy, I postulate the following Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator

$$\tau_i = x_i'\gamma_1 + x_m'\gamma_2 + \rho\widehat{\mathbb{P}(Cons_i)} + \eta_{im} \tag{5}$$

where τ_i is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if individual i answered "I strongly approve" or "I somewhat approve" to the question on Le Pen's views, and $\widehat{\mathbb{P}(Cons_i)}$ is the predicted likelihood that a relative of i was conscripted, using the likelihood that a relative was eligible, $\mathbb{P}(Elig_i)$, as the exogenous instrument.[25] Variation in $\widehat{\mathbb{P}(Cons_i)}$ therefore arises from the administrators' conscription policies (1908-1927 cohorts in Alsace; 1914-1927 cohorts in Moselle) and the respondent's year-of-birth; x_i is a vector of individual characteristics that also includes crucial cohort fixed effects and ideological distance from the two candidates running for office; and x_m is a municipality characteristics vector that also contains a region-of-residence fixed effect.[26]

Identifying assumption – The instrumental variables strategy exploits the difference in draft rules between the two regions. This raises two concerns: (i) that individuals born in eligible years are more distrustful because of cohort effects (e.g. people born in the 1920s might differ from those born in the 1940s), and (ii) that individuals in the region where more cohorts where drafted (i.e. Alsace) are more distrustful altogether. It is therefore important to include cohort and region fixed effects to account for this heterogeneity. Moreover, for political distrust not to be confounded by support for candidates with radical right-wing platforms the respondents' overall political orientation

[25]The corresponding first-stage regression is $\mathbb{P}(Cons_i) = x_i'\pi_{10} + x_m'\pi_{11} + \pi_{12}\mathbb{P}(Elig_i) + \xi_{1im}$. The reduced-form relationship is $\tau_i = x_i'\pi_{20} + x_m'\pi_{21} + \pi_{22}\mathbb{P}(Elig_i) + \xi_{2im}$.

[26]Individual controls are distance from Chirac (left-right scale), distance from Le Pen, birth cohort fixed effects (five groups), gender, education fixed effects (six groups), religion fixed effects (five groups), and parents' origin (four groups). The municipality controls are historical birth rates, log population, foreigners (%), high school graduates (%), unemployment (%), and *department*-of-residence fixed effects.

needs to be taken into account.

The identifying assumptions can thus be summarized as follows: (i) eligibility status should predict conscription, (ii) ideologically similar individuals should not differ with respect to political trust when accounting for cohort effects and aggregate regional aspects, apart from their eligibility status for Wehrmacht conscription, and (iii) eligibility should only affect political trust via conscription when accounting for age, region of residence, and ideological preferences. Several tests are performed to assess the validity of these assumptions.

Baseline results – Table 1 presents the results from estimating Equation (5) using Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS). Columns (1) to (4) present the results when pooling the probability that a relative was conscripted or eligible; Columns (5) and (6) present generation-specific point estimates, i.e. when a respondent is affected directly, via his father, or via his grandfather(s).

Column (1) presents the OLS estimation which shows that conscription has a positive effect on the approval likelihood. Columns (2) to (4) present the 2SLS estimation which shows that an increase in the likelihood of having an eligible relative by 30 pp ($\approx 1sd$) increases by the approval likelihood 15 pp ($\approx 0.25sd$, Column (2)). Conditional compliance is roughly 15%, see Column (3). This implies that an increase of 7 pp ($\approx 1sd$) in conscription likelihood raises the approval rate by 21 pp ($\approx 0.4sd$). Note that the first-stage estimation F-statistic essentially exceeds the conventional threshold.

Columns (5) and (6) present the reduced-form and 2SLS estimations by generation. Two features stand out: first, the effect is positive for all three generations; second, it is decreasing from one generation to the next, as expected, since transmission is imperfect.[27] The coefficients of Column (6) imply transmission of roughly 0.7 ($\hat{\phi}_1 =$

[27] The interpretation of the results in Column (6) should be viewed with caution. A test for the equality of coefficients fails to reject the null that all three coefficients are equal ($p - value = 0.22$).

Table 1: Approval of radical positions – Baseline results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dep. Variable	*Do you approve or disapprove of the position taken by JM Le Pen in his critique of the political classes?*					
Specification	Pooling generations				By generation	
Estimation	OLS	RF	FS	2SLS	RF	2SLS
$P(Conscripted)$	1.443*			2.928***		
	(0.768)			(0.955)		
$P(Eligible)$		0.448**	0.153***			
		(0.173)	(0.016)			
$P(Elig\|Self)$					0.586***	
					(0.129)	
$P(Elig\|Father)$					0.421*	
					(0.238)	
$P(Elig\|Grandfather)$					0.305	
					(0.339)	
$P(Cons\|Self)$						3.793***
						(0.739)
$P(Cons\|Father)$						2.800**
						(1.300)
$P(Cons\|Grandfather)$						1.516
						(1.387)
Ideological distance from Le Pen	–0.530***	–0.549***	–0.000	–0.548***	–0.537***	–0.538***
	(0.138)	(0.131)	(0.017)	(0.134)	(0.137)	(0.126)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep. variable	0.363	0.363	0.143	0.363	0.363	0.363
First-stage F-statistic			88.55			15.06
Observations	146	146	146	146	146	146
Clusters	34	34	34	34	34	34

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on approval of Le Pen's criticism of the political classes. The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Columns (1)-(4): pooling generations (i.e. $\phi = 1$); Columns (5) and (6): results by generation. Column (1): Ordinary least squares estimates; Columns (2) and (4): Reduced-form estimates; Column (5): First-stage estimates; Columns (4) and (6): 2SLS estimates. Individual controls included in all specifications: ideological distance from Jacques Chirac, birth cohort (5 groups), gender, schooling (5 groups), religion (5 groups), parents' origin (4 groups). Municipality controls: log population, proportion of foreign population, proportion with high-school degree, unemployment rate. Region (*department*) fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

2.8/3.8) to the first generation and 0.5 ($\hat{\phi}_2 = 1.5/2.8$) to the second.

Robustness – To assess the validity of the exclusion restriction, I perform two falsification exercises. The first evaluates the likelihood that a coefficient of this magnitude is obtained randomly. If eligibility only affects political trust through conscription, there should be no differential effect of eligibility on trust in regions where conscription did not take place. The distribution of coefficients for all possible region pairs is presented in the left graph of Figure A.1. Of the 1,513 samples with more than 100 observations, 50 coefficients (3%) are larger (in absolute value) than in Column (2). For samples at least as large (i.e. 145 obs), *none of the 375 coefficients is larger*.

The second falsification tests whether the findings of Table A.1 capture overall approval of Le Pen. The right graph of Figure A.1 presents outcome falsifications for 5 other Le Pen positions available in the FEP. All 5 outcome falsification coefficients are much smaller in magnitude than in Table 1, Column (4), and far from statistical significance. In the Online Appendix, I also test the sensitivity of the results using a maximum likelihood estimator (Table C.1). The results remain unaltered both qualitatively and quantitatively.

5 Voting behavior

In this section I estimate the relationship between municipal-level voting outcomes and conscription as described by Equations (2) to (4). In order to do so, I combine historical data on conscription with voting outcomes from 1965 to 2017 and assess the effect of conscription on support for radical candidates. I also exploit content-analytic data in order to test the interplay between candidates' views, abstention, and political support during this period.

5.1 Estimation strategy

Identification strategy – Let us assume that the group means $\bar{\tau}^L$ and $\bar{c}^L$ are municipality specific and can be decomposed into an observable and unobservable component, i.e. $\bar{\tau}^L_m = x'_{1,m}\gamma_1 + \eta_{1,m}$, and $\bar{c}^L_m = x'_{2,m}\gamma_2 + \eta_{2,m}$. The regression equation then becomes

$$\pi_{C,m} = x'_m\gamma_C + \rho_C Cons_m + \eta_{C,m} \tag{6}$$

where $\pi_{C,m}$ is the vote share of candidate $C \in \{R, M, A\}$ in municipality m, $Cons_m$ is the share of m's population that was conscripted (α in the model), and x_m is a column vector of municipality covariates. The coefficient of interest is ρ_C which captures the change in C's vote share when conscription increases by 1 pp.[28]

Variation in $Cons_m$ originates from three sources: demography (i.e. birth rates), the draft rule, and compliance rates. This means that estimating Equation (6) by OLS within regions would primarily capture the effect of compliance on voting.[29] I therefore estimate the following first-stage relationship between eligibility and conscription

$$Cons_m = x'_m\pi_{10} + \pi_{11}Elig_m + \pi_{12}CBR_m + \xi_{1m} \tag{7}$$

where $Elig_m$ is the eligible population in m, i.e. male births during 1908-1927 in Alsace and during 1914-1927 in Moselle, as a fraction of the pre-war population. Since variation in the eligible population also originates from differences in fertility, it is crucial to control for the birth rate in m (CBR_m). The coefficient of interest in the first-stage ($\hat{\pi}_{11}$) captures average conditional compliance. Identification is therefore based on munici-

[28] Note that these coefficients map to Equations (2) to (4) as follows: $\rho_R \equiv \left(\bar{\tau}^H - \bar{\tau}^L\right) + \left(\frac{\bar{c}^L - \bar{c}^H}{2\Delta\tau_C}\right) \gtrless 0$; $\rho_M \equiv \left(\bar{\tau}^L - \bar{\tau}^H\right) + \left(\frac{\bar{c}^L - \bar{c}^H}{2\Delta\tau_C}\right) < 0$; $\rho_A \equiv \left(\frac{\bar{c}^H - \bar{c}^L}{\Delta\tau_C}\right) > 0$.

[29] The draft rule does not change within regions (i.e. Alsace and Moselle); similarly, fertility variation should be small between nearby localities. Within-region variability should thus arise primarily from compliance rates. While the effect of compliance is interesting per se, it is beyond the scope of this paper.

palities that would have had the same fraction of men conscripted had the rule been the same in the two regions. The instrumental variables specification is

$$\pi_{C,m} = x'_m \gamma_C + \rho_C \widehat{Cons}_m + \delta_C CBR_m + \varepsilon_{C,m} \tag{8}$$

The coefficient of interest in Equation (8), namely ρ_C, is similar to a Wald estimator since it re-scales the effect of eligibility by average conditional compliance.[30]

Identifying assumption – Since variation in eligibility ($Elig_m$) originates from fertility and the draft rule it is crucial to control for birth rates (CBR_m) which addresses the concern that fertility might simultaneously affect conscription rates and voting behavior, thus violating the exclusion restriction.[31] Since the two administrators chose different policies, it is also crucial to control for the share of the population that was deported (which was higher in Moselle). The identifying assumption is thus that variation is only due to differences in the administrators' conscription policies, and that these did not reflect particularities of the population which might also affect voting behavior. Recall that Alsace and Moselle were integrated into neighboring, pre-existing German regions whose administrators were already in place before the War.

Moreover, the sample is restricted to municipalities within 20km of the Alsace-Moselle border in all estimations. To ensure geographical and cultural proximity, 15km grid and dialect fixed effects are also included, such that municipalities which are on average 6km apart are compared.[32] The exclusion restriction then holds even if the

[30]The reduced form relationship is an Intention-to-Treat (ITT) estimator obtained by substituting Equation (7) into Equation (6): $\pi_{C,m} = x'_m \pi_{C,20} + \pi_{C,21} Elig_m + \pi_{C,22} CBR_m + \xi_{2m}$, with $\pi_{C,20} \equiv \rho_C \pi_{10}$, $\pi_{C,21} \equiv \rho_C \pi_{11}$, $\pi_{C,22} \equiv \rho_C \pi_{12}$, and $\xi_{C,2m} \equiv \rho_C \xi_{1m} + \eta_{C,m}$.

[31]Fertility decisions have been shown to be endogenous to culture (Fernández et al., 2004; Alesina et al., 2011). If fertility was historically higher in more religious localities and religiosity correlates with voting behavior, this would violate the exclusion restriction.

[32]Local dialects date back to the 5th century C.E., and therefore the fixed effects mean that municipalities that share a very long common history are being compared (Lévy, 1929). Moreover, locations with the same dialect are not separated by large natural obstacles, such as mountains. Comparing neighbor-

policies chosen reflect unobserved regional sentiments, as long as they do not change systematically at the administrative border.

To test the identifying assumption, data was collected from the 1936 population census for 124 Alsace municipalities that border Moselle.[33] This individual-level data includes individual characteristics such as date of birth, religion, nationality and language. Since the conscription data is also at the individual level, individuals can be mapped from the census to the conscription data. This makes it possible to perform direct tests on the effect of individual characteristics on the likelihood of conscription using approximately 7,500 individuals. The individual-level regressions are presented in Table A.1. Eligibility is the most important predictor ($t - stat = 15.85$); only "other nationalities" (primarily Polish) and "other religions" (mainly Jewish) also correlate with conscription. While eligibility alone can explain 10% of the total variation in conscription, including individual characteristics and municipality fixed effects only increases the R^2 from 10 to 13%.

5.2 Abstention and the radical right-wing vote

Model specification – I start by estimating the specification of Equation (8) by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) for the 462 municipalities within 20km of the Alsace-Moselle border for each election separately. $\pi_{C,m}$ is the vote share of the radical right-wing candidates or abstention in municipality m.[34] In accordance with Section 3.2, both out-

ing municipalities has been shown to resolve omitted variable biases (Card and Krueger, 1995). An additional assumption is the exogenous construction of administrative borders. French *departments* were created in 1790, following the Revolution. The authority of these administrative units also matters: while *departments* have gained some administrative power since the 1980s, it remains very limited, as described in the Online Appendix, Section D.3.

[33]Located in the Saverne district. Ideally one would want to sample municipalities on both sides of the border but the Moselle 1936 census was destroyed in 1942. The district chosen nevertheless has two advantages: (i) it borders on Moselle, and (ii) its municipalities are highly heterogenous in terms of religious and linguistic composition. The sampling strategy follows IPUMS as described in Saleh (2013).

[34]Reducing the radical right-wing vote to its protest dimension runs the risk of omitting the other ideological aspects (Schwengler, 2003). The radical right has nevertheless positioned itself as the ulti-

comes are measured as a fraction of registered voters. $\widehat{Cons}_m$ is the predicted fraction of men conscripted from Equation (7), with the share of the eligible population ($Elig_m$) as the exogenous instrument and CBR_m is the average crude birth rate (births per 1,000 inhabitants) for the 1903-1932 period.

The vector x_m is introduced to ensure comparability between municipalities in the cross-section. It consists of historical and contemporary characteristics that might affect incorporation and standard determinants of voting; it also contains 15km grid and dialect fixed effects.[35] Since some pre-war characteristics vary only across sub-districts, standard errors are clustered at this level to correct for potential serial correlation.

Baseline results – The estimation results are presented in Table 2, where each column represents a different election. For ease of interpretation, only the main coefficients are displayed. Panel A presents the first-stage estimation, Panel B presents the 2SLS estimation with radical right vote share as the outcome, and in Panel C abstention is the outcome.

Draft eligibility is a powerful predictor of conscription; approximately 1 out of 4 men born during the relevant periods actually served (Panel A).[36] The first-stage F-statistic is above the conventional rule of thumb level. In earlier elections (1965-1974), conscription has no effect on radical right-wing support (Panel B). Conversely, absten-

mate anti-system party, referring to the political system as corrupt and only benefiting a closed circle of parties (Davies, 2002). The candidates considered as radical right-wing in this sub-section are Tixier-Vignancour (1965), J.M. Le Pen (1974, 1995, 2002, 2007), de Villiers (1995, 2007), Mégret (2002), M. Le Pen (2012, 2017), and Dupont-Aignan (2012, 2017). The classification is endogenized using content-analytic data in the following sub-section.

[35]The pre-war controls are religion (Protestant share, Jewish presence), population, French name and dialect-speaking fraction, vote share of extreme right-wing, and displaced population; the contemporary controls are latitude, longitude, border (binary), access to waterways (binary), elevation (mean, std.dev.), population (total, foreign), gender-age (12 groups), educational attainment (no degree, high-school degree), employment (blue collar workers, unemployment), and income (median, std.dev.).

[36]The eligible population is estimated using birth data as the numerator instead of the number of men in 1942. Moreover, the measure does not account for the proportion of the population (Jewish, Romani, and displaced) that was not eligible (though controls are included in the estimation). Riedweg (1995) reports an average compliance rate of 65%, while INSEE (1956) reports 75% to 90%.

Table 2: Abstention and the radical right-wing vote – Baseline results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
Panel A: First-Stage Estimates. Dep. Variable: Conscripted (%)								
Eligible births (%)	0.252***	0.262***	0.269***	0.210***	0.210***	0.241***	0.241***	0.232***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Crude birth rate 1903-1932 (‰)	–0.122**	–0.130**	–0.138*	–0.118	–0.110	–0.132*	–0.095	–0.086
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.068)
Mean dependent variable	7.74	7.74	7.74	7.74	7.74	7.74	7.74	7.74
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing vote (% of registered)								
Conscripted (%)	0.035		–0.008	1.109***	0.968***	0.379*	0.412	0.322
	(0.087)		(0.022)	(0.357)	(0.306)	(0.208)	(0.347)	(0.268)
Crude birth rate 1903-1932 (‰)	–0.007		–0.001	–0.023	–0.011	–0.006	0.072	0.131**
	(0.014)		(0.005)	(0.069)	(0.090)	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.056)
Mean dependent variable	1.21	0.00	0.31	26.02	22.25	17.04	25.14	34.10
Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Abstention & invalid ballots (% of registered)								
Conscripted (%)	0.961***	1.723***	0.522*	–0.641***	–0.709	0.182	–0.193	–0.009
	(0.359)	(0.462)	(0.313)	(0.248)	(0.446)	(0.174)	(0.286)	(0.228)
Crude birth rate 1903-1932 (‰)	–0.213***	–0.226**	–0.093	0.042	0.018	–0.002	–0.011	–0.081*
	(0.064)	(0.101)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.093)	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.049)
Mean dependent variable	15.29	23.63	17.07	19.79	28.39	16.73	19.41	20.64
Historical controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemp. controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage F-statistic	25.09	27.01	25.72	11.92	13.57	14.45	15.90	15.04
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical right-wing candidates and on abstention. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district (canton) level in parentheses. Panel A: First-stage estimates (Equation (7)); Panels B and C: 2SLS estimates (Equation (8)) with radical right-wing vote and abstention as the outcome, respectively. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. Historical controls included in all specifications: proportion of Protestants, Jewish presence (binary), proportion with french name at birth (1891-1940), proportion speaking a dialect (1936, sub-district level), log population (1936), proportion of displaced (1946, sub-district level), proportion of extreme right-wing (1936, sub-district), latitude, longitude, access to waterways (binary), log mean elevation, log elevation std.dev., bordering municipality (binary). Contemporary controls: log population, proportion of foreign population, age-gender distribution (12 groups), proportion with no schooling, proportion with high-school degree, proportion of blue-collar workers, unemployment rate, log median income, log income std.dev. 15km grid and historical dialect fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation (Panel A). * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

tion is higher in localities where more men were conscripted (Panel C). In later elections (1995-2017), conscription has a positive effect on the radical right vote but not on abstention.

The results imply that in the absence of conscription into the Wehrmacht abstention would be less by 7 percentage points in 1965, 13 pp in 1969, and 4 pp in 1974, an effect representing 56%, 64%, and 26% of mean abstention, respectively. Radical right-wing support would be less by 8 percentage points in 1995 and 2002 and 3 pp in the 2007,

2012, and 2017, representing reductions of 33%, and 35%, 18%, 13%, and 8%, respectively. Extrapolated to the rest of the annexed municipalities, this suggests a reduction of the radical right-wing vote by 7.6 pp, 6.6 pp, 2.4 pp, 2.5 pp, and 2 pp, respectively in the five elections during the 1995-2017 period. These numbers are close to the differences between the annexed regions and the rest of France during this period, which were 7 pp, 5.6 pp, 2.4 pp, 3.4 pp, and 4.9 pp respectively for the five elections.

Robustness – To test whether there are differential cohort effects, i.e. whether the effect for the 1908-1913 cohorts is different than the 1914-1927 cohorts, I estimate the 2SLS specification separately by cohort group. This specification exploits the variation in the eligibility of the 1908-1913 cohorts while controlling for 1914-1927 conscription. As such, it has the advantage of being able to simultaneously capture the effect of differential conscription (via the 1908-1913 conscription), and differential compliance (via the 1914-1927 conscription). The results are presented in Table A.2. Once again, conscription has an effect on abstention in earlier elections, and on radical right-wing support in later elections.[37]

In the Online Appendix, I also test the sensitivity of the results to the candidate classification by presenting the estimates separately for the National Front candidate and other radical right-wing candidates (Table C.3), as well as the sensitivity to the choice of the 15km grid size and 20km distance from the border (Figure C.1). The results do not appear to be driven by these choices.

[37]Note that the coefficients of this specification are not directly comparable with the baseline, since here conscription in the 1908-1913 period is an approximation of overall conscription.

5.3 Radical and moderate candidates

Measuring candidates' degree of radicalism – To overcome traditional party labels, I use political discourse data to classify candidates into radical and moderate. The data is taken from the *Comparative Manifesto Project* and the *Euromanifesto Project* (henceforth jointly CMP). This content-analytic data classifies political discourse by topic (e.g. military expenditures and tariffs), but also by tone (i.e. positive and negative mentions).

Backes (2009) defines radical candidates as the ones that "*radically criticize the existing social and economic order*". Following this definition, I focus on a candidate's discourse that has a negative tone, which has the advantage of being able to capture both sides of the political spectrum.[38] Examples range from negative references to military power (usually a radical left topic), international co-operation (usually a radical right topic), but also the European Union (both radical right and radical left).

The fraction of a candidate's discourse with a negative tone is used to construct the measure of candidate C's degree of radicalism in election t ($rad_{C,t}$). A binary measure ($R_{C,t}$) is also constructed that takes the value 1 when a candidate is more radical than the election-weighted average, formally $R_{C,t} = \mathbb{1}(rad_{C,t} > \overline{rad}_t)$.[39]

To test the validity of the classification I compare the measure of radicalism to the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (henceforth CHES), which contains expert measures of the salience of anti-establishment discourse in 2012 and 2017. The raw correlation (Figure A.2, left graph) is very strong despite the small sample for which data are commonly

[38] In the Version 4 CMP Category Scheme these variables are (variable number): Foreign Special Relationships: Negative (102), Military: Negative (105), Internationalism: Negative (109), European Community/Union: Negative (110), Constitutionalism: Negative (204), Protectionism: Negative (407), National Way of Life: Negative (602), Traditional Morality: Negative (604), Multiculturalism: Negative (608), and Labor Groups: Negative (702). More details on the data and variable construction can be found in the Online Appendix B.6.

[39] Pre-election polls are used as weights rather than vote shares since the vote share is the dependent variable. Note that the binary measure of radicalism is relational as defined in Sartori (2005), i.e. it expresses the ideological difference between a candidate and the other candidates in the same election. The continuous version also becomes relational once election fixed effects are included in the regression.

available ($\hat{\rho} = 0.805$, $N = 17$). I also look at the correlation with the left-right index of the CHES data, which is available since 1999 (Figure A.2, right graph). As expected, there is a U-shaped relationship between radicalism and the L-R index, implying that parties more to the left or the right are more likely to use this type of discourse than parties closer to the center.

Model specification – The candidate classification is then used to estimate the effect of conscription on aggregate radical and moderate support for each election separately. In this case the estimation equation becomes

$$\Pi_{G,m} = x'_m \gamma_G + \rho_G \widehat{Cons}_m + \delta_G CBR_m + \varepsilon_{G,m} \tag{9}$$

where $\Pi_{G,m} \equiv \sum_{C \in G} \pi_{C,m}$, $G \in \{R, M\}$, is the aggregate vote share of (discourse-defined) radical (R) and moderate (M) candidates in municipality m, and $\widehat{Cons}_m$, CBR_m, and x_m are defined as before. This specification has the additional advantage of disentangling increased/decreased participation into aggregate vote gains/losses by radical/moderate candidates.

Baseline results – The results from estimating Equation (9) by 2SLS are presented in Table 3. Each column represents a different election. In Panel A, the outcome is the aggregate vote share of radical candidates (above average negative discourse), in Panel B it is that of moderate candidates (below average), and in Panel C, it is the difference between radical and moderate vote shares. Once again all outcomes are measured as a fraction of registered voters.

A consistent pattern emerges whereby in all but one election the vote share of radical candidates increases with the conscription rate (Panel A), and the effect is statistically significant in 3 out of the 8 elections. The vote share of moderate candidates

Table 3: Radical and moderate candidates – Baseline results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Election	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Aggregate radical vote (% of registered)								
Conscripted (%)	0.205	–0.727**	0.918*	0.674	0.529*	0.386*	0.459	0.161
	(0.204)	(0.329)	(0.507)	(0.429)	(0.273)	(0.209)	(0.343)	(0.224)
Crude birth rate 1903-1932 (‰)	–0.051	0.048	–0.037	0.022	0.063	–0.020	0.069	0.120**
	(0.046)	(0.063)	(0.098)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.051)
Mean dependent variable	6.26	7.53	28.28	32.72	31.69	17.98	25.39	44.02
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Aggregate moderate vote (% of registered)								
Conscripted (%)	–1.160**	–0.997*	–1.439**	–0.034	0.180	–0.568**	–0.269	–0.156
	(0.498)	(0.594)	(0.688)	(0.467)	(0.436)	(0.271)	(0.353)	(0.304)
Crude birth rate 1903-1932 (‰)	0.262***	0.177	0.127	–0.068	–0.083	0.021	–0.060	–0.041
	(0.092)	(0.117)	(0.123)	(0.074)	(0.091)	(0.059)	(0.079)	(0.064)
Mean dependent variable	78.46	68.84	54.66	47.49	39.92	65.29	55.20	35.34
Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Radical - Moderate vote difference (% of registered)								
Conscripted (%)	1.365**	0.270	2.356**	0.708	0.349	0.955**	0.729	0.317
	(0.671)	(0.842)	(1.166)	(0.861)	(0.574)	(0.451)	(0.634)	(0.483)
Crude birth rate 1903-1932 (‰)	–0.314**	–0.129	–0.164	0.090	0.146	–0.041	0.129	0.161
	(0.131)	(0.159)	(0.215)	(0.117)	(0.124)	(0.104)	(0.134)	(0.104)
Mean dependent variable	–72.21	–61.31	–26.38	–14.77	–8.22	–47.32	–29.81	8.68
Historical controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemp. controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage F-statistic	24.88	26.86	25.81	11.97	13.63	14.66	16.14	15.35
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
Polarization index (Dalton, 2008)	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.10	0.13	0.09	0.08

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical and moderate candidates. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district (canton) level in parentheses. Panel A: 2SLS estimates for aggregate radical candidate vote share (above weighted mean negative mentions); Panel B: 2SLS estimates for aggregate moderate candidate vote share (below weighted mean); Panel C: 2SLS estimates for aggregate radical candidate vote share minus aggregate moderate candidate vote share. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. Historical controls included in all specifications: proportion of Protestants, Jewish presence (binary), proportion with french name at birth (1891-1940), proportion speaking a dialect (1936, sub-district level), log population (1936), proportion of displaced (1946, sub-district level), proportion of extreme right-wing (1936, sub-district), latitude, longitude, access to waterways (binary), log mean elevation, log elevation std.dev., bordering municipality (binary). Contemporary controls: log population, proportion of foreign population, age-gender distribution (12 groups), proportion with no schooling, proportion with high-school degree, proportion of blue-collar workers, unemployment rate, log median income, log income std.dev. 15km grid and historical dialect fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation with eligible births as the exogenous instrument. Polarization index (Dalton, 2008) is as constructed in Equation (12). * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

decreases with the conscription rate (except for 2002), which is in line with the theoretical framework (Panel B). Panel C focuses on the difference in vote shares between the radical and moderate candidates, which is predicted to increase with the conscription rate.[40] Indeed, this is found to be the case in *all* elections, and the effect is precisely estimated in 3 of the 8 elections.

In terms of magnitudes, Table 3 implies that, in the absence of conscription, the

[40]Formally, Equations (2) and (3) imply $\Delta\pi \equiv \pi_R - \pi_M = 2(\bar{\tau}^L - \bar{\tau}_C) + 2(\bar{\tau}^H - \bar{\tau}^L)\alpha$.

difference between radical and moderate candidates would be larger (smaller in 2017) by approximately 10 pp ($\approx 0.85sd$), 2 pp ($\approx 0.2sd$), and 18 pp ($\approx 0.9sd$) in the three elections from 1965 to 1974, respectively, and by 5 pp ($\approx 0.5sd$), 3 pp ($\approx 0.3sd$), 8 pp ($\approx 0.75sd$), 6 pp ($\approx 0.5sd$), and 3 pp ($\approx 0.25sd$) in the five elections from 1995 to 2017, respectively.

Robustness – Forced conscription into a foreign army may have led to a need to overcompensate in terms of national identity, thus increasing support for candidates with a strong nationalist discourse. Moreover, as a hierarchically organized authoritarian institution, the military has been shown to socialize its members into authoritarian modes of behavior (Jenning and Markus, 1977). To ensure that the estimates in Table 3 are not capturing the fact that radical candidates are more nationalistic and/or authoritarian, the CMP data is used to classify candidates along these lines.[41] Equation (9) is then estimated using the nationalism and authoritarianism measures. The results are inconclusive (Table A.3). Thus, in 2 (3) elections the vote share of authoritarian (nationalistic) candidates decreases with the conscription rate, see Panel A (B).

The Online Appendix also presents the results of estimations that attempt to fully capture municipality heterogeneity. This is done by interacting the share of men conscripted with the candidate type and by including municipality fixed effects. The results remain unchanged both qualitatively and quantitatively (Table C.4).

5.4 Candidates' radicalism and discourse divergence

Model specification – The pooled specification of Equation (9) only captures variation between groups of candidates, thus treating candidates within a group as perfect

[41] These variables are constructed as follows (CMP variable number): nat_C = National Way of Life: Positive (601) − National Way of Life: Negative (602) + Traditional Morality: Positive (603) − Traditional Morality: Negative (604) + Multiculturalism: Positive (607) − Multiculturalism: Negative (608), and aut_C = Military: Positive (104) − Military: Negative (105) + Law and Order: Positive (605).

substitutes. Moreover, its cross-sectional nature does not make it possible to estimate the effect of policy divergence. Within-group variation and policy divergence can be captured by simultaneously estimating Equations (2) and (3) in a specification of the form

$$\pi_C = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \tau_C + \beta_2 \alpha + \beta_3 \tau_C \alpha + \beta_4 \frac{\alpha}{\Delta \tau_C} + \varepsilon_C \tag{10}$$

where $\beta_0 = \beta_{0,M}$, $\beta_1 = \beta_{0,R} - \beta_{0,M}$, $\beta_2 = \beta_{1,M}$, $\beta_3 = \beta_{1,R} - \beta_{1,M}$, and $\beta_4 = \beta_{2,R} = \beta_{2,M}$. Equation (10) can then be estimated both across political space, exploiting variation in τ_C (across candidates within an election), and across time, exploiting variation in both τ_C and $\Delta\tau_C$ (same candidate or party across elections). This makes it possible to directly test both predictions of the model, i.e. the positive interaction effect of a candidate's degree of radicalism, and the negative interaction effect of discourse convergence. The regression equation in this case is

$$\pi_{C,m,t} = x'_{m,t}\gamma + \rho_1 rad_{C,t}\widehat{Cons}_m + \rho_2 \frac{\widehat{Cons}_m}{\Delta rad_t} + \lambda_{C,t} + \lambda_{m,t} + \varepsilon_{C,m,t} \tag{11}$$

where $\pi_{C,m,t}$ is the vote share of candidate C in municipality m in election year t and $\widehat{Cons}_m$ is the predicted conscription rate from the first-stage estimation; $rad_{C,t}$ is the continuous measure of candidate C's degree of radicalism; Δrad_t is a measure of policy divergence and as such is election specific; $x_{m,t}$ is a vector of covariates that also contains $rad_{C,t} \times CBR_m$ and $\frac{CBR_m}{\Delta rad_t}$; $\lambda_{C,t}$ are candidate $\times$ grid fixed effects, which are introduced to capture candidate-specific characteristics (such as charisma, or leadership) and are grid-specific in order to be consistent with the estimation in the previous sections; and $\lambda_{m,t}$ are municipality $\times$ year (across candidates) or municipality $\times$ party (across time) fixed effects.

Measuring discourse divergence – The polarization index proposed by Dalton (2008) is used to measure policy divergence. The index is constructed as follows

$$\Delta rad_t \equiv PI(rad_{C,t}) = \left(\sum_C \left\{ \hat{\pi}_{C,t} \times \left[rad_{C,t} - \sum_C \hat{\pi}_{C,t} rad_{C,t} \right]^2 \right\} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \tag{12}$$

where $rad_{C,t}$ is the policy position of candidate C in election t, and $\hat{\pi}_{C,t}$ is the candidate's predicted share in the polls that preceded the election.[42]

The index weights the divergence between the position of the candidates ($rad_{C,t}$) and the election-weighted average $\left[\sum_C \left(\hat{\pi}_{C,t} \times rad_{C,t} \right) \right]$ by the expected importance of each candidate ($\hat{\pi}_{C,t}$). It takes a value of 0 when all candidates occupy the same position and 1 when they are all located at either extreme of the scale. Δrad_t is election specific since it aggregates the positions of all candidates in a single election. The polarization index is presented in Figure A.3. The left graph presents a candidate's distance to the election weighted average and her expected importance. In accordance with the anecdotal evidence, in earlier elections there is little divergence compared to the later elections, a feature captured by the polarization index (right graph).

Baseline results – The results from estimating Equation (11) by 2SLS are presented in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) present the results across political space (within a municipality $\times$ election); Columns (3) to (6) present the results across time (within a municipality $\times$ party). The outcome in Columns (1) to (4) is a candidate's vote share; in Columns (5) and (6) it is abstention. Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the reduced-form relationship and Columns (2), (4) and (6), the 2SLS point-estimates. In line with the predictions of Equation (10), conscription has a positive effect on the vote share of

[42]The use of polls rather than vote shares is motivated by the obvious concern that the candidate's vote share is the dependent variable. Alternatively, one could use the vote share of the candidate's party in the previous election; however, not all candidates are representing a party. Pre-election poll data is taken from Wikipedia. Only the polls in the last month preceding the election are used to calculate $\hat{\pi}_{C,t}$.

Table 4: Candidates' radicalism and discourse divergence – Baseline results

Specification	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Across Space		Across Time			
Dep. Variable	Vote share		Vote share		Abstention	
Estimation	RF	2SLS	RF	2SLS	RF	2SLS
Eligible births (%) $\times$ $rad_{C,t}$	0.220***		0.325***			
	(0.069)		(0.097)			
Conscripted (%) $\times$ $rad_{C,t}$		0.700***		1.032***		
		(0.230)		(0.331)		
Eligible births (%) $\times$ $(\Delta rad_t)^{-1}$			–0.006***		0.019***	
			(0.001)		(0.003)	
Conscripted (%) $\times$ $(\Delta rad_t)^{-1}$				–0.018***		0.058***
				(0.004)		(0.012)
Municipality $\times$ election FE	Yes	Yes				
Municipality $\times$ party FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Grid specific candidate FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemp. controls vector			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dependent variable	7.70	7.70	7.70	7.70	20.12	20.12
First-stage F-statistic		27.72		13.93		32.18
Observations	38346	38346	38346	38346	3696	3696
Clusters	462	462	462	462	462	462

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical candidates and abstention across space and time. The unit of observation is a municipality $\times$ election $\times$ candidate. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Columns (1), (3), and (5): Reduced-form estimates; Columns (2), (4), and (6): 2SLS estimates. Columns (1) and (2): 2SLS estimates for candidate vote shares within municipality and election (across candidates); Columns (3) and (4): 2SLS estimates for candidate vote shares within municipality and party (across time); Columns (5) and (6): 2SLS estimates for abstention and invalid ballots within municipality and party (across time). All specifications control for the crude birth rate (1903-1932) $\times$ rad_C. Controls vector in Columns (3)-(6): crude birth rate (1903-1932) $\times$ $(\Delta rad_t)^{-1}$, log population, proportion of foreign population, age-gender distribution (12 groups), proportion with no schooling, proportion with high-school degree, proportion of blue-collar workers, unemployment rate, log median income, log income std.dev. 15km grid $\times$ candidate $\times$ election year fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation with eligible births $\times$ rad_C and eligible births $\times$ $(\Delta rad_t)^{-1}$ as the exogenous instruments. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

radical candidates (see Columns (2) and (4)). This effect is mitigated by policy convergence, as shown in Column (4). Moreover, and as expected, policy convergence leads to greater abstention in localities where more men where conscripted (see Column (6)).

The results indicate that conscription affects candidates asymmetrically. This can be seen more clearly from the marginal effects presented in Figure 3. The left graph corresponds to Column (4); the right one to Column (6). In the left graph, the upper

Figure 3: Candidates' radicalism and discourse divergence – Marginal effects



Notes: Marginal effects in Table 4. Left panel, upper line: marginal effects at means of Column (4) for a highly polarized election ($\Delta rad_t = 0.10 \approx \Delta rad_{1995}$) by candidate degree of radicalism; left panel, lower line: effects for an election with low polarization ($\Delta rad_t = 0.02 \approx \Delta rad_{1965}$). Right panel: marginal effects at means of Column (6) by election year.

line presents the effect in a more polarized election ($\Delta rad_t = 0.10 \approx \Delta rad_{1995}$), while the lower one represents the effect in a less polarized election ($\Delta rad_t = 0.02 \approx \Delta rad_{1965}$).

In highly polarized elections, conscription positively affects radical candidates and negatively affects moderate ones, however when polarization is low it affects both negatively. This graph highlights the main prediction of the model, namely that in elections with policy convergence *all parties are penalized*, which is expressed in higher abstention. In elections with policy divergence, the moderate candidates' loss of votes is (partially) captured by radical candidates. The right graph illustrates this asymmetry whereby the marginal effect of conscription on abstention by election is positive in all elections but much larger in the earlier ones which were less polarized.

Robustness – The estimation results for Equation (10) which identifies authoritarian and nationalist candidates are presented in Table C.5 of the Online Appendix. The results are not consistent with the theoretical framework. The sensitivity of the Table 4 results to particular elections is examined by presenting the year-by-year results of

Column (2). The results are presented in Table C.6, and the effect is positive in *every* election, implying that there is a premium for radical candidates in all elections in localities where more men were conscripted.

Intergenerational transmission – The analysis has so far ignored changes in the composition of the electorate. The voters in 1965, some of whom experienced WWII directly, differ from the voters in the 2000s, who are only descendants of those affected directly. Under imperfect intergenerational transmission, the impact of conscription should dissipate over time.[43]

Estimating Equation (11) by generation requires the calculation for each election of the fraction of the electorate directly affected by WWII, and that indirectly affected through parents and grandparents. To construct this measure, I exploit information on the age structure in each municipality. The INSEE censuses provide population information in 5-year $\times$ gender groups for every municipality. This information is then combined with the likelihood of each age cohort being affected directly or indirectly by WWII conscription (already described in Section 4.1) in order to construct the fraction of the electorate that was affected. The same procedure is used to calculate the fraction of the electorate that was eligible or had eligible fathers or grandfathers.

Table A.4 presents the results of estimating Equation (11) by generation. Several elements stand out: first, the effect on preferences (i.e. the interaction with a candidate's degree of radicalism) is positive for all generations and decreases from one generation to the next; second, the effect on preferences is more persistent than the effect on the cost of voting (i.e. the interaction with policy divergence). Results from Column (4) in Table A.4 imply a preferences transmission parameter of 0.6 for the first generation

[43]Tables 2 and 3 indeed indicate such a pattern. Horizontal transmission however would lead to an equilibrium that is different from the non-war equilibrium. In other words, while in the long-run the preferred policies of conscripted and non-conscripted individuals would converge, the new median voter's bliss point ($\bar{\tau}^{\star}$) would be different (larger) than in the non-war case ($\bar{\tau}^{L}$).

($\hat{\phi}_{\tau,1} = 1.243/2.144$) and 0.3 for the second ($\hat{\phi}_{\tau,2} = 0.389/1.243$), and a value 0.5 for the cost of voting ($\hat{\phi}_{c,1} = -0.008/-0.016$). Recall that the survey parameters were $\hat{\phi}^{FEP}_{\tau,1} = 0.7$ and $\hat{\phi}^{FEP}_{\tau,2} = 0.5$.

6 Conclusions

This paper sheds light on the historical roots of political distrust and support for radical candidates. Based on a hypothesis in social psychology that links conscription to political alienation, I focus on the peculiar WWII history of France's eastern borderlands. Identification exploits the fact that while conscription into the Wehrmacht took place in both Alsace and Moselle during their annexation to the Third Reich, different cohorts were drafted. I first provide survey evidence that WWII conscription results in reduced political trust and that this attitude is transmitted from one generation to the next. I then show that conscription results in increased abstention when policy platforms are similar, but increased support for radical candidates when there is polarization.

France's eastern borderlands have proven particularly fertile ground for radical candidates. These early forerunners have contributed to making such candidates relevant alternatives. By illustrating the political gains of campaigning on anti-establishment platforms, they also encouraged the formation of radical parties in other countries and altered the discourse of traditional parties. As such, this historical experience may have affected politics not only in France, but also in other European countries.

Several questions remain nonetheless unanswered. While the analysis examines the effect of WWII conscription, it is unable to pin down which aspect of the conscription (the demobilization process, defeat in the war, foreign forced conscription, post-war collective memory, etc.) led to political distrust. Further disaggregating the effect of

WWII conscription is necessary both to determine the extent to which it is specific to this context and to provide potential policy prescriptions.

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A Appendix - Additional results

A.1 Additional tables

Table A.1: Estimation strategy – Individual characteristics and conscription

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dep. Variable	Individual is conscripted (binary)				
Sample restriction	Male	Male	Eligible	Ineligible	Male
Eligible	0.148***	0.129***			
	(0.009)	(0.009)			
Age		–0.002***	0.035***	0.000	
		(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.000)	
Age × Age		0.000***	–0.001***	–0.000	
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
German national		0.086	0.091	0.106	0.074
		(0.069)	(0.141)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Other nationalities		–0.020**	–0.048	–0.002	–0.020**
		(0.008)	(0.034)	(0.002)	(0.009)
Protestant		0.004	0.002	0.001	0.008
		(0.009)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Other religions		–0.034**	–0.079***	–0.000	–0.032**
		(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.002)	(0.014)
French-speaking		0.024***	0.039*	0.002	0.007
		(0.005)	(0.024)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Household head		0.007	0.041	–0.003	0.000
		(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Household size		0.002	0.000	–0.000	0.001
		(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Municipality fixed effects		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Sub-district fixed effects					Yes
Year-of-birth fixed effects					Yes
Mean dependent variable	0.047	0.047	0.150	0.002	0.047
Observations	7590	7590	2303	5287	7590
Clusters	124	124	124	124	124
R-squared	0.10	0.13	0.10	0.05	0.15

Notes: OLS estimates of the likelihood of appearing in the *Index of French Nationals Compelled into German Armed Forces* (MACVG, 1945, 1946). The unit of observation is a male individual. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Columns (1), (2), and (5): all male individuals; Column (3): eligible males (born in 1908-1927); Column (4): ineligible males (not born in 1908-1927). Municipality fixed effects are included in Columns (2)-(4); sub-district and year-of-birth fixed effects are included in Column (5). * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

Table A.2: Abstention and the RRW vote – Only instrumenting 1908-1913 cohorts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
Panel A: First-stage Estimates. Dep. Variable: Conscripted 1908-1913 (%)								
Eligible births 1908-1913 (%)	0.138***	0.138***	0.135***	0.136***	0.135***	0.134***	0.141***	0.142***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Conscripted 1914-1927 (%)	0.040**	0.039**	0.035*	0.039**	0.036*	0.041*	0.032	0.030
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Mean dependent variable	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing vote (% of registered)								
Conscripted 1908-1913 (%)	0.124		0.080*	1.972***	1.523***	0.641	0.304	0.484
	(0.155)		(0.044)	(0.562)	(0.464)	(0.411)	(0.550)	(0.504)
Conscripted 1914-1927 (%)	0.008		–0.008	0.066	0.022	0.289***	0.327**	0.187**
	(0.019)		(0.005)	(0.094)	(0.079)	(0.069)	(0.129)	(0.075)
Mean dependent variable	1.21	0.00	0.31	26.02	22.25	17.04	25.14	34.10
Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Abstention & invalid ballots (% of registered)								
Conscripted 1908-1913 (%)	1.282**	3.298***	0.998	–0.703	–1.174*	0.587*	0.021	–0.015
	(0.620)	(0.809)	(0.635)	(0.469)	(0.666)	(0.353)	(0.382)	(0.347)
Conscripted 1914-1927 (%)	0.157**	0.051	0.172**	0.013	0.148*	–0.081	0.006	–0.084*
	(0.064)	(0.126)	(0.083)	(0.059)	(0.079)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.046)
Mean dependent variable	15.29	23.63	17.07	19.79	28.39	16.73	19.41	20.64
Historical controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemp. controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage F-statistic	75.14	73.42	60.95	76.08	62.04	52.39	46.88	55.35
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical right-wing candidates and on abstention using eligible births in 1908-1913 as the exogenous instrument. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district (canton) level in parentheses. Panel A: First-stage estimates; Panels B and C: 2SLS estimates with radical right-wing vote and abstention as the outcome, respectively. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. Historical controls included in all specifications: average crude birth rate (1903-1932), proportion of Protestants, Jewish presence (binary), proportion with french name at birth (1891-1940), proportion speaking a dialect (1936, sub-district level), log population (1936), proportion of displaced (1946, sub-district level), proportion of extreme right-wing (1936, sub-district), latitude, longitude, access to waterways (binary), log mean elevation, log elevation std.dev., bordering municipality (binary). Contemporary controls: log population, proportion of foreign population, age-gender distribution (12 groups), proportion with no schooling, proportion with high-school degree, proportion of blue-collar workers, unemployment rate, log median income, log income std.dev. 15km grid and historical dialect fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation (Panel A). * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

Table A.3: Radical and moderate candidates – Other policy positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Election	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Authoritarian/Non-authoritarian candidates difference (% of registered)								
Conscripted (%)	–2.744***	1.400	0.306	2.185**	1.569***	–0.384	2.711***	0.124
	(1.034)	(1.122)	(0.847)	(1.058)	(0.572)	(0.575)	(0.878)	(0.557)
Mean dependent variable	41.45	20.62	–51.52	13.94	33.83	–4.18	35.33	38.99
Polarization index (Dalton, 2008)	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Nationalist/Universalist candidates difference (% of registered)								
Conscripted (%)	–1.364**	–0.270	–2.375**	1.576**	3.242***	0.988*	2.558***	0.124
	(0.670)	(0.841)	(1.163)	(0.684)	(0.867)	(0.524)	(0.788)	(0.646)
Mean dependent variable	72.21	61.31	27.01	–28.16	–6.09	–13.57	20.42	–24.81
Polarization index (Dalton, 2008)	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.08	0.04	0.06	0.07
Historical controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemp. controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage F-statistic	25.09	27.01	25.72	11.92	13.57	14.45	15.90	15.04
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for authoritarian and nationalistic candidates. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district (canton) level in parentheses. Panel A: 2SLS estimates for aggregate authoritarian candidate vote share minus non-authoriatrian candidate vote share; Panel B: 2SLS estimates for aggregate nationalist candidate vote share minus universalist candidate vote share. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. Historical controls included in all specifications: average crude birth rate (1903-1932), proportion of Protestants, Jewish presence (binary), proportion with french name at birth (1891-1940), proportion speaking a dialect (1936, sub-district level), log population (1936), proportion of displaced (1946, sub-district level), proportion of extreme right-wing (1936, sub-district), latitude, longitude, access to waterways (binary), log mean elevation, log elevation std.dev., bordering municipality (binary). Contemporary controls: log population, proportion of foreign population, age-gender distribution (12 groups), proportion with no schooling, proportion with high-school degree, proportion of blue-collar workers, unemployment rate, log median income, log income std.dev. 15km grid and historical dialect fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation with eligible births as the exogenous instrument. Polarization index (Dalton, 2008) is as constructed in Equation (12). * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

Table A.4: Radicalism and discourse divergence – Intergenerational transmission

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep. Variable	Vote share			
Specification	Across Space		Across Time	
Estimation	RF	2SLS	RF	2SLS
Eligible Self (%) $\times$ rad_C	0.204		0.238**	
	(0.167)		(0.104)	
Eligible Father (%) $\times$ rad_C	0.095		0.273***	
	(0.067)		(0.086)	
Eligible Grandfather (%) $\times$ rad_C	0.144***		0.141**	
	(0.045)		(0.061)	
Conscripted Self (%) $\times$ rad_C		1.695		2.144**
		(1.092)		(0.892)
Conscripted Father (%) $\times$ rad_C		0.255		1.243***
		(0.268)		(0.457)
Conscripted Grandfather (%) $\times$ rad_C		0.490***		0.389*
		(0.136)		(0.200)
Eligible Self (%) $\times$ $(\Delta rad_t)^{-1}$			–0.002**	
			(0.001)	
Eligible Father (%) $\times$ $(\Delta rad_t)^{-1}$			–0.001**	
			(0.001)	
Eligible Grandfather (%) $\times$ $(\Delta rad_t)^{-1}$			0.002**	
			(0.001)	
Conscripted Self (%) $\times$ $(\Delta rad_t)^{-1}$				–0.016**
				(0.007)
Conscripted Father (%) $\times$ $(\Delta rad_t)^{-1}$				–0.008**
				(0.004)
Conscripted Grandfather (%) $\times$ $(\Delta rad_t)^{-1}$				0.005
				(0.003)
Grid specific candidate FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemp. controls vector			Yes	Yes
First-stage F-statistic		10.18		6.01
Observations	38346	38346	38346	38346
Clusters	462	462	462	462

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical candidates across space and time, by generation. The unit of observation is a municipality $\times$ election $\times$ candidate. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Columns (1) and (3): Reduced-form estimates; Columns (2) and (4): 2SLS estimates. Columns (1) and (2): 2SLS estimates for candidate vote shares within municipality and election (across candidates); Columns (3) and (4): 2SLS estimates for candidate vote shares within municipality and party (across time). All specification control for the crude birth rate (1903-1932) $\times$ rad_C. Controls vector included in Columns (3) and (4): crude birth rate (1903-1932) $\times$ $(\Delta rad_t)^{-1}$, log population, proportion of foreign population, age-gender distribution (12 groups), proportion with no schooling, proportion with high-school degree, proportion of blue-collar workers, unemployment rate, log median income, log income std.dev. 15km grid $\times$ candidate $\times$ election year fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

A.2 Additional figures

Figure A.1: Approval of radical positions – Falsifications



Notes: Reduced-form and outcome falsifications. Left: Distribution of reduced-form estimation coefficients for all possible couples of regions (*departments*) where incorporation did not take place. Treatment is allocated randomly. The dashed grey line is the reduced-form coefficient from Table 1, Column (2). Out of the 1,514 samples with more than 100 observations, 49 coefficients (3%) are larger (in absolute value) than Column (2). For samples at least as large (i.e. 145 obs), *not a single* of the 376 coefficients is larger. Right: 2SLS estimation coefficients using other policy positions of Le Pen. Immigration: *Do you approve or disapprove of the position taken by JM Le Pen on immigrants?*; Security: *Do you approve or disapprove of the position taken by JM Le Pen on security?*; Tradition: *Do you approve or disapprove of the position taken by JM Le Pen on the defense of traditional values?*; Taxes: *Do you approve or disapprove of the position taken by JM Le Pen on the removal of income taxes?*; EU: *Do you approve or disapprove of the position taken by JM Le Pen on the exit of France from the EU?*. The dashed grey line is the 2SLS coefficient from Table 1, Column (4).

Figure A.2: Radical and moderate candidates – Measuring candidate radicalism



Notes: Correlation between radicalism measure (τ_P) and CHES data. Each dot is a party's program/expert evaluation. Left: Linear fit of the following regression $AEI_P = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \tau_P + \varepsilon_P$. Estimated coefficients: $\hat{\alpha}_0 = 3.22$, $\hat{\alpha}_1 = 0.75$; $N = 17$; $R^2 = 0.65$. Right: Quadratic fit of the following regression $\tau_P = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 LRI_P + \alpha_2 LRI_P^2 + \varepsilon_P$. Estimated coefficients: $\hat{\alpha}_0 = 8.66$, $\hat{\alpha}_1 = -3.48$, $\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.36$; $N = 35$; $R^2 = 0.61$.

Figure A.3: Radicalism and discourse divergence – Measuring discourse divergence



Notes: Candidates' degree of radicalism and discourse divergence across elections. Left: Difference between candidate's degree of radicalism and election weighted-average, formally $rad_{C,t} - \sum_C \hat{\pi}_{C,t} rad_{C,t}$. The red diamonds represent radical candidates; the blues dots represent moderate ones; the circle represents the intention to vote for the candidate in the polls preceding the election. Right: Dalton (2008) polarization index, constructed as in Equation (12).

On war and political radicalization

– Online Appendix –

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Contents

B Data appendix

B.1 Conscription data

Data description – Data on conscription is taken from the *Index of French Nationals Compelled into German Armed Forces*. The Index was released following an official census organized by the Ministry of Veterans and War Victims in October 1945. Its purpose was to repatriate prisoners of War held in allied camps, whose French nationality could be recognized. This list, edited in French and translated in 19 languages, was transmitted to all countries potentially holding Axis' prisoners of War in November 1945 and April 1946. The explanatory notice is the following:

> *The prisoners of War whose French nationality may be recognized as a result of this investigation should be repatriated as soon as possible. [...]. The lists appearing in this booklet were made out after an official census directed by the French Government and carried out by the administrative services of the Departments of Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin and Moselle. For each one of these Departments, they show the name, Christian name, residence, date and place of birth of the French nationals compelled into German forces and not returned home on April 1, 1946.*

The Index includes 44,527 individuals. This indicates that in the beginning of 1946, half a year after the War had ended, the fate of one-third of all men conscripted remained unknown. 44,034 men from (99% of all) are matched to contemporary municipalities, see Table B.1. Birth information is available for 44,154 individuals (99% of all), out of which 42,339 (96%) are born in years drafted into the Wehrmacht. Out of the 1,579 municipalities, 1,435 (91%) have at least one man declared missing. On average, 2.32% of the 1936 population was declared missing (std.dev. 1.52%, median 2.25%).

Table B.1: Conscription data – Data description

	Statistic				
Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Residence info	44527	0.989	0.105	0	1
Birth info	44527	0.992	0.091	0	1
Born year drafted	44154	0.959	0.199	0	1
Declared missing (Binary)	1579	0.909	0.288	0	1
– of whom drafted	1579	0.905	0.293	0	1
– of whom not drafted	1579	0.311	0.463	0	1
Declared missing (#)	1579	27.89	137.90	0	4494
– of whom drafted	1579	26.59	131.14	0	4283
– of whom not drafted	1579	1.30	7.30	0	211
Declared missing (%)	1579	2.32	1.52	0	12.93

Notes: Data comes from the *Index of French Nationals Compelled into German Armed Forces*. The upper panel presents the disaggregated (individual) data; the lower panel presents the statistics after collapsing the data at the municipality level. *Residence info*, *Birth info*, and *Born year drafted* are binary variables taking the value 1 when information is available. *Born year drafted* are men born in 1908-1927 for Alsace, and 1914-1927 for Moselle, conditional on birth information being available. *Declared missing (Binary)*, *- of whom drafted (Binary)*, and *- of whom not drafted (Binary)* are variables that take the value 1 when there is at least one individual in the municipality belonging to this group. *Declared missing of whom not drafted (Binary)* includes individuals with birth information missing. *Declared missing (#)*, *- of whom drafted (#)*, and *- of whom not drafted (#)* is the total number of individuals belonging to each category by municipality. *Declared missing (%)* is the proportion of the 1936 population that appears in the index.

Measuring conscription – Men figuring in the index either were imprisoned or had perished before the end of the war, without but their relatives had not been informed. Formally

$$Miss_m = \Big[\underbrace{P(prison_m)}_{\text{Emprisoned}} + \underbrace{\Big(1 - P(dead_m^{known})\Big) \times P(dead_m^{war})}_{\text{Dead but considered missing}} \Big] \times Cons_m \tag{1}$$

meaning

$$Cons_m = \frac{1}{\vartheta_m} \times Miss_m$$

where $Miss_m$ is the fraction of men declared missing in municipality m, $Cons_m$ is overall Wehrmacht conscription in m, and ϑ_m is a municipality-specific probability of being declared missing if conscripted, with $\vartheta_m \equiv P(prison_m) + \big(1 - P(dead_m^{known})\big) \times P(dead_m^{war})$.

Conscripted men from Alsace and Moselle were scattered across the Eastern front.

Moreover, their individual characteristics were not taken into account in this allocation (see Table A.1 and Section D.2). Mortality and imprisonment rate should thus be independent of municipality characteristics. Under the assumption that casualties were not systematically communicated only in some municipalities, the deaths not communicated should be a fraction of the total number of casualties. If this is the case, ϑ_m can be approximated by the average $\bar{\vartheta}$, with the measurement error introduced (ν_m) being orthogonal to municipality unobservable characteristics.

$$\vartheta_m = \bar{\vartheta} + \nu_m \text{ , with } \nu_m \perp (\varepsilon_m | X_m)$$

$\bar{\theta}$ is calculated using aggregate data. Approximately 134,000 men from Alsace and Moselle were conscripted into the Wehrmacht (MACVG, 1954). In 1946, 44,527 men were declared missing. This implies a $\bar{\vartheta}$ parameter of 0.332. This $\bar{\vartheta}$ is used to construct an approximation of $Cons_m$, by inflating $Miss_m$ by $1/\bar{\vartheta} = 3.01$.

Data validation – To the best of my knowledge, the index is the most precise and disaggregated source on conscription. A second source is the first official post-War population census which took place in March 1946. In this census, a question on conscription was included for Alsace and Moselle. This data is available at the sub-district level in INSEE (1956). Yet, while at that moment an estimated 92,500 had returned from the front, only 65,500 men were declared conscripted into the Wehrmacht. The arguments given by the statistical office for this under-reporting were: (i) migration into other regions, (ii) conscription but no displacement, and (iii) omission of conscription. Finally, under the assumptions presented in the previous sub-section, casualties can be used as a source on conscription. Municipality-level Wehrmacht casualties for Alsace are available from the *Alsace WWII victims database* (`http://memoires.region-alsace.eu/frontoffice/accueil.aspx`). This data is unfortunately not available for Moselle.

Figure B.1: Conscription data – Data validation



Notes: Correlation between conscription from the *Index of French Nationals Compelled into German Armed Forces* and other sources on conscription. The left graph presents the link between the index conscription and conscription at the sub-district-level taken from INSEE (1956). The right graph presents the correlation between the index data and Wehrmacht casualties from the *Alsace WWII victims database*. The pairwise correlation coefficients are $\hat{\rho}_L = 0.79$, $N = 93$, and $\hat{\rho}_R = 0.58$, $N = 870$. See Online Appendix B.1 for the construction of the variables.

The validity of the index data is tested using the conscription data from INSEE (1956) and casualties. Indeed, the index data correlates very well with both source ($\hat{\rho}_L = 0.79$, $N = 93$, and $\hat{\rho}_R = 0.58$, $N = 870$), indicating that it is a valid source for conscription into the Wehrmacht. These correlations are presented in Figure B.1.

B.2 Pre-war birth data

Data description – Pre-war birth data is taken from the 1903-1932 decennial civil status registers. The data is available on `http://archives.bas-rhin.fr/` for the Bas-Rhin department, and `http://www.archives57.com/` for Moselle.[1] The last page of the census for these three decades was digitalized for all municipalities within 20km from the Alsace-Moselle border.

To calculate the number of eligible births for 1908-1927 (1914-1927 for Moselle) the

[1]Last accessed on Oct 30, 2018. I am particularly thankful to the director of the Bas-Rhin archives, Pascale Verdier, for making the 1913-1922 and 1923-1932 decennial tables available online.

total number of births was first estimated using the number of pages (25 entries/page) and the number of entries in the last page of the census.[2] A common year-of-birth distribution for the 1903-1932 period was estimated using the entries of the last page of all municipalities. This allowed to estimate to total number of births (male and female) for the 1908-1927 period (1914-1927 in Moselle) by municipality. The total number of male births was then estimated using a likelihood of a male birth of 50%.

B.3 Covariates data

Historical covariates – The 1936 municipal population is taken from the Cassini Dataset, available on `http://cassini.ehess.fr` (last accessed on Nov 2, 2018). The official 1936 parliamentary election results at the sub-district level come from Lachapelle (1936). This data is used to calculate the share of extreme right-wing vote in the 1936 election using Dreyfus (1969) and Zanoun (2009) to classify candidates. The 1936 share of the sub-district population that only spoke the local dialect (but no official language) is taken from INSEE (1956). This variable is used to approximate pre-war educational attainment. The share of the 1946 sub-district population that was displaced but not conscripted is taken from INSEE (1956). This variable is introduced to take into account the fact that the two *Gauleiters* had different policies when it came to cultural and ideological assimilation.

Information on existing churches by confession are collected for all municipalities within 20km of the Alsace-Moselle border from *Clochers de France* (`https://clochers.org/index.htm`), *Observatoire du Patrimoine Religieux* (`http://www.patrimoine-religieux.fr/`), and *UEPAL* (`http://www.uepal.fr/`). The municipality religious composition is then calculated using the number of churches by confession in a municipality. For instance, a municipality with 2 Catholic and 1 Protestant churches is assumed to have

[2]Some pages in the 1923-1932 birth registers only contain 19 entries.

Figure B.2: Covariates data – Religion and language data validity



Notes: Correlation between measures of religious and linguistic composition and data taken from INSEE (1956). The left graph presents the link between the church composition and religious affiliation in 1936 at the sub-district-level. The right graph presents the correlation between the "French sounding" names at birth in 1891-1940 and the share of the population that is French-speaking in 1936 at the sub-district-level. The pairwise correlation coefficients are $\hat{\rho}_L = 0.96$, $N = 17$, and $\hat{\rho}_R = 0.86$, $N = 93$. See Online Appendix B.3 for the construction of the variables.

2/3 of the population of Catholic confession. An indicator variable is also constructed for the presence of a Synagogue.

Municipality level linguistic composition (French-speaking, German-speaking) is calculated using family names at birth for the 1891-1940 period. The information is taken from the *1891 to 1990 Family Name File* (henceforth FNF) of INSEE. The FNF contains the number of births by family name and municipality over 25-year periods (1891-1915, 1916-1940, 1941-1965, 1966-1990). I first identify the most popular family names in France (excluding Alsace and Moselle) over the 1891-1940 period, i.e. family names that account for 10% of total births during this period. I then match these 114 family names to the family names at birth in Alsace and Moselle municipalities for 1891-1940 and calculate the fraction of births with "French sounding" family names.

Both approximations (language and religion) work particularly well. The correlation between church data and census data (at the sub-district level) from INSEE (1956) is $\hat{\rho} = 0.962$ ($N = 17$); the correlation between names at birth and INSEE (1956) is

Table B.2: Covariates data - Historical covariates

	Statistic				
Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Conscripted (%)	462	7.74	4.51	0.00	39.34
Eligible births (%)	462	19.20	5.28	3.91	33.92
Crude birth rate 1903-1932 (‰)	462	24.87	4.48	7.51	37.56
Protestant churches (%)	462	21.16	32.52	0.00	100.00
Synagogue (binary)	462	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
French name at birth 1891-1940 (%)	462	3.46	5.00	0.00	35.06
Dialect-speaking in 1936 (%)	462	10.96	2.78	3.51	15.76
Population 1936 (Log)	462	6.15	0.86	3.30	9.89
Displaced in 1946 (%)	462	9.76	10.63	3.58	61.27
Extreme right-wing in 1936 (%)	462	25.42	23.45	0.00	68.65
Latitude (degrees)	462	48.85	0.18	48.39	49.20
Longitude (degrees)	462	7.22	0.26	6.71	7.85
Waterway (binary)	462	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
Elevation (Log m.)	462	5.62	0.25	5.02	6.69
Elevation std.dev. (Log m.)	462	3.19	0.71	0.41	5.26
Alsace-Moselle border (binary)	462	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Distance to A-M border (km)	462	10.93	5.37	1.49	19.85
Dialect: Rhine Franconian (binary)	462	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
– South Franconian (binary)	462	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.00
– Alsatian (binary)	462	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
– Lorrain (binary)	462	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00

Notes: Historical covariates used in Section 5. The unit of observation is a municipality (variables are time-invariant). See Online Appendix B.3 for the construction of the variables.

$\hat{\rho} = 0.864$ ($N = 93$), see Figure B.2.

Information on local dialects is taken from Lévy (1929) and Wikipedia (`https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alsace-Lorraine`). Local dialects date back to the 5th century C.E., meaning that municipalities with a common dialect share a very long common history. Finally, data on geographical endowments such as access to waterways and elevation (both mean and std.dev.) is taken from the European Environment Agency. Table B.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the historical covariates for the 462 municipalities within 20km of the Alsace-Moselle border.

Contemporary covariates – Municipality-level data on population is taken from the censuses organized by INSEE. This data is available for 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999,

and every year during the 2006-2014 period. Municipality-level data on the age/gender composition, educational attainment, sectoral employment, and unemployment is taken from the 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2009, and 2014 censuses. The population distribution is available in 5-year $\times$ gender groups and is regrouped into 6 larger gender-specific categories, namely aged 0-14, 15-24, 25-39, 40-54, 55-64, and 65-99.

Educational attainment for individuals aged 16 or more is available into 4 categories: (i) no degree, or at best BEPC, BC, DNB degree, (ii) CAP, BEP degree, (iii) high-school degree (*Baccalauréat*), and (iv) university degree. The categories are available in two age groups (16-24, 25 and above) and by gender. Educational attainment is regrouped into 3 broader categories, regardless of gender and age: (i) "no schooling" (at best BEPC, BC, DNB), (ii) "at least primary schooling" (CAP, BEP), and (iii) "at least high-school" (high-school and university). Sectoral employment for employed individuals aged 25 to 54 is available into 6 categories: (i) farmers, (ii) craftsmen, tradesmen, businessmen, (iii) senior managers, (iv) intermediate professions, (v) employees, and (vi) workers. Sectoral employment is regrouped into 2 broader categories, namely farmers and workers ("blue-collar workers") and the rest. Unemployed individuals are defined as the ones that declared not being employed and searching for a job when the census took place. For all these variables, inter-census years are estimated by linear interpolation, following Gentzkow (2006). The 1968 data is used for the 1965 election and the 2014 for the 2017 elections.

Income data is taken from INSEE and is available for 2001, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009, and 2011. Median income in Euros is available for all municipalities. The standard deviation of income is only available at this level for municipalities with at least 2,000 inhabitants. For the municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants, the income standard deviation of the sub-district is used. Once again, data is interpolated and the 2001 income is used for the 1965, 1969, 1974, and 1995 elections, while the 2011 income is

Table B.3: Covariates data - Contemporary covariates

	Statistic				
Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Election year	3696	1992.63	19.17	1965.00	2017.00
Radical right-wing (%)	3696	15.76	13.31	0.00	81.82
Abstention (%)	3696	20.12	7.14	0.00	57.14
Population (Log)	3696	6.19	1.01	2.08	10.15
Foreigners (%)	3696	3.05	3.66	0.00	25.47
Male aged 15-24 (%)	3696	6.46	3.27	0.00	63.19
– aged 25-39 (%)	3696	9.79	3.05	0.00	36.77
– aged 40-54 (%)	3696	10.14	3.55	0.00	73.91
– aged 55-64 (%)	3696	5.95	2.86	0.00	62.96
– aged 65-99 (%)	3696	6.57	3.03	0.00	50.00
Female aged 0-14 (%)	3696	10.50	4.00	0.00	29.46
– aged 15-24 (%)	3696	5.73	2.74	0.00	33.33
– aged 25-39 (%)	3696	8.99	2.74	0.00	34.85
– aged 40-54 (%)	3696	9.96	2.97	0.00	33.33
– aged 55-64 (%)	3696	5.95	2.64	0.00	32.08
– aged 65-99 (%)	3696	9.06	3.75	0.00	45.93
No schooling (%)	3696	56.32	23.96	0.00	100.00
High-school degree (%)	3696	18.94	13.79	0.00	66.67
Blue-collar workers (%)	3696	48.61	25.38	0.00	100.00
Unemployment rate (%)	3696	4.53	4.83	0.00	43.48
Median income (Log EUR)	3696	10.23	0.17	9.73	10.72
Income std.dev. (Log EUR)	3696	10.10	0.26	9.42	11.53
Conscripted (self) (%)	3696	1.24	1.65	0.00	29.35
– (father) (%)	3696	4.02	3.04	0.00	45.46
– (grandfather) (%)	3696	5.04	5.65	0.00	41.40
Eligible (self) (%)	3696	6.45	6.43	0.00	34.62
– (father) (%)	3696	19.89	9.00	0.00	47.57
– (grandfather) (%)	3696	19.41	17.29	0.00	75.22

Notes: Contemporary covariates used in Section 5. The unit of observation is a municipality $\times$ year (variables are time-varying). See Online Appendix B.3 for the construction of the variables.

used for 2012 and 2017. The share of the population that is a foreigner is available for the 2006, 2007, and 2009-2014 years. A foreigner is defined as any person living in France that does not hold the French nationality. The foreigner share is available into 4 age categories and by gender. The categories are aggregated. The data is interpolated and the 2006 share is used for the 1965, 1969, 1974, 1995, and 2002 elections, while the 2014 share is used for 2017. The descriptive statistics of contemporary municipality covariates are presented in Table B.3.

Figure B.3: Birth distributions – Eligibility/conscription probabilities



Notes: Distribution of conscription and eligibility probability by year-of-birth separately for Alsace and Moselle. The left graph presents the eligibility probabilities. Three waves are evident; the first one (1908-1927) is the likelihood one was eligible; the second (around 1950) is the likelihood her father was eligible; the third (around 1980) is the likelihood at least one grandfather was eligible. The right graph present the conscription probability; the pattern is very similar. See Online Appendix B.4 for the construction of the probabilities.

B.4 Birth distributions

Data description – Birth distributions are calculated using the 1962, 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006, and 2011 censuses organized by INSEE (available on IPUMS-I). This data contains information on 55,880,084 individuals born from 1863 to 2013. Of those, 49,018,439 are native-born. Father (mother) year-of-birth information is available for 9,044,189 (10,559,102) individuals. Note that for both the parental and the filial information to be available, the two had to belong in the same household when the survey was conducted.

Using this information, I construct the father and mother year-of-birth distribution by filial year-of-birth. The parental year-of-birth distribution is then crossed with the father year-of-birth one, to obtain the year-of-birth distribution of grandfathers (both maternal and paternal). I then use these distributions to calculate the likelihood an individual born in a specific year has a father and/or grandfather that was eligible for Wehrmacht service (i.e. born in 1908-1927 in Alsace and 1914-1927 in Moselle).

This probability is then combined with municipality-specific compliance rates to calculate the probability one, one's father, or one's grandfather was conscripted into the Wehrmacht. Compliance rates are calculated using the Index data and the pre-War birth registers and are common for all years-of-birth in a municipality. The overall probabilities of conscription and eligibility by year-of-birth are presented in Figure B.3. Three waves are evident; the first one (1908-1927) is the likelihood one was conscripted; the second (around 1950) is the likelihood her father was conscripted; the third (around 1980) is the likelihood at least one grandfather was conscripted.

B.5 Survey data

Data description – The *2002 French Electoral Panel* (henceforth FEP), is part of post-electoral surveys that have been taking place in France since 1978. The purpose of these surveys is to better understand the voting behavior of French citizens following elections. The FEP consists of three surveys that were completed between April 8 and June 28, 2002. The survey covered 7 topics: socio-economic attitudes, the relationship to politics, political choices, values and beliefs, the relationship to society, the environment and also collected a wide array of individual characteristics. In the second wave of the survey 4,107 individuals were interviewed. 198 respondents come from Alsace and Moselle, from 52 different municipalities. Information on pre-war births is available for 39 out of these municipalities, in which 160 respondents live.

The question of interest (Q232), available in Wave 2, is the following: Do you approve or disapprove of the position taken by JM Le Pen: (a) on immigrants, (b) on security, (c) on the defense of traditional values, (d) in his critique of the political class, (e) in the removal of income taxes, (f) on the exit of France from the European Union. The possible answers are: I strongly approve, I somewhat approve, I somewhat disapprove, and I strongly disapprove. Using these answers, I construct an approval

Table B.4: Survey data - Data description

	Statistic				
Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
P(Conscripted): Overall	149	0.14	0.07	0	0.35
– Respondent	149	0.00	0.01	0	0.15
– R's Father	149	0.06	0.06	0	0.24
– R's Grandfather	149	0.09	0.10	0	0.35
P(Eligible): Overall	149	0.62	0.28	0	1.00
– Respondent	149	0.01	0.08	0	1.00
– R's Father	149	0.30	0.30	0	0.88
– R's Grandfather	149	0.34	0.38	0	0.93
Approval of Le Pen in critique	146	0.36	0.48	0	1
– on immigration	149	0.28	0.45	0	1
– on security	149	0.57	0.50	0	1
– on tradition	148	0.40	0.49	0	1
– on taxes	147	0.46	0.50	0	1
– on the EU	149	0.08	0.27	0	1
– in critique (categorical)	146	2.10	0.97	1	4
Year of birth	149	1956.58	16.08	1918	1983
Male	149	0.46	0.50	0	1
Ideological distance from Chirac	149	0.27	0.23	0	1
– from Le Pen	149	0.53	0.24	0	1
Schooling degree (categorical)	149	2.91	1.37	1	5
Religion (categorical)	149	2.03	2.01	1	7
Parents' origin (categorical)	149	1.50	0.96	1	4

Notes: Covariates used in Section 4. The unit of observation is an individual. See Online Appendix B.4 for the construction of the probabilities. See Online Appendix B.5 for the construction of the other variables.

indicator that takes the value 1 if the respondent answered "I strongly approve" or "I somewhat approve" for each of the six Le Pen positions.

The FEP also contains information on respondents' characteristics, and most importantly their age. The variables used are the following: schooling, religion, parent's origin, gender. Schooling is classified in 5 categories: (i) primary, secondary schooling, (ii) BEPC, BEP, CAP, (iii) high=school, (iv) high school +2 years, and (v) university. Religion is classified into 5 categories: (i) Catholic, (ii) Protestant, (iii) Muslim, (iv) other religion, and (v) no religion. The parents' origin question is the following: "Do you have one or several parents or grandparents that are foreigners or of foreign origin?". The possible answers are (i) yes, one parent, (ii) yes, both parents, (iii) yes, at least one

grand-parent, and (iv) no.

Finally, the FEP contains information on respondents' political preferences, namely where the respondent positions himself on a 1 to 5 left-right scale, and where he positions Jacques Chirac and Jean-Marie Le Pen on this same scale. These answers are exploited to calculate the ideological distance of the respondent from each of the candidate. The variable is constructed by taking the absolute difference between the position of the respondent and the presidential candidate, and dividing it by 4 to normalize it (since the maximum distance can be 4). The descriptive statistics of the survey data are presented in Table B.4.

B.6 Political discourse data

Data description Data on parties' policy positions is taken from the *Comparative Manifesto Project* (henceforth CMP), and the *Euromanifesto Project* (henceforth EMP). The CMP (Volkens et al., 2018) contains information on policy positions of parties that have gained at least one seat in the parliament lower house elections, from 56 countries and 1'100 parties (23 from France), for the 1946-2017 period. The EMP (Schmitt et al., 2018) contains information on parties that have been represented in the European parliament at least once, from 29 countries and 337 parties (30 from France), for the 1979-2014 period.

Both sources contain the same information, the share of quasi-sentences spent by major parties on 7 domains: external relations, freedom and democracy, the political system, the economy, welfare and quality of life, the fabric of society, and social groups. The topics in the two datasets are harmonized using the *Euromanifesto / Manifesto Project mapping scheme* (Schmitt et al., 2016). The parties are harmonized using König et al. (2013) and the *Manifesto Project Dataset List of Political Parties* (version 2018a). The *Manifesto Project Dataset List of Political Parties* also classifies some par-

ties as alliances/coalitions; when this is the case, the data is duplicated and separate parties (with identical programs) are created.

Matching parties to candidates – Presidential candidates are then matched to the party they belong to. The primary source is each politician's Wikipedia page. Party data is unavailable for candidates whose parties do not have seats in the lower house or the European parliament. When this is the case, the candidate is matched to the last party to which he/she belonged to and for which data is available. When no party data exists at all, the candidate is associated to the party that is ideologically closer.

Legislative and European parliament elections do not necessarily coincide with presidential elections. Only the programs for elections within ± 4 years of the presidential elections are used to calculate candidates' positions. When no program is available within this 9 year period, the closest program available is used. On average a candidate is matched to a program 1.4 years from the election ($std.dev. = 2.5$); 3 candidates are matched to programs more than 9 years from their election ($max = 19$). The candidate's platform is calculated as the average over party platforms available. This average is conditional on election type to account for aggregate differences between legislative and European parliament campaigns.

Radical, authoritarian, and nationalist candidates – Candidates are classified into radical, authoritarian, and nationalist using the data. Backes (2009) defines radical candidates as the ones that "*radically criticize the existing social and economic order*". The measure of a candidate's degree of radicalism is constructed under the guidance of this definition. The variables used to construct the measure are the following (variable number): Foreign Special Relationships: Negative (102), Military: Negative (105), Internationalism: Negative (109), European Community/Union: Negative (110), Consti-

Table B.5: Political discourse data – Matching parties to candidates

Candidate (Election)	Party (Data Source)	Polls	Radical	Nation	Authority
Arthaud (2012)	LO (EMP:2009), LO (EMP:2014)	0.005	0.073	-0.018	0.000
Arthaud (2017)	LO (EMP:2014)	0.000	0.134	-0.036	0.000
Asselineau (2017)	Libertas (EMP:2009)	0.010	0.442	0.065	0.000
Balladur (1995)	UDF (CMP:1993), RPR-UDF (EMP:1994), UDF (CMP:1997), Nouvelle UDF (EMP:1999)	0.165	0.052	-0.003	0.048
Barbu (1965)	SIFO (CMP:1962), SIFO (CMP:1967), SIFO (CMP:1968)	0.010	0.177	-0.069	-0.062
Bayrou (2002)	Nouvelle UDF (EMP:1999), UDF (CMP:2002), Nouvelle UDF (EMP:2004)	0.060	0.058	0.048	0.071
Bayrou (2007)	Nouvelle UDF (EMP:2004), MoDem (CMP:2007), MoDem-UDI (EMP:2009)	0.180	0.073	0.029	0.030
Bayrou (2012)	MoDem-UDI (EMP:2009), MoDem (CMP:2012), MoDem-UDI (EMP:2014)	0.109	0.056	-0.011	0.038
Besancenot (2002)	LCR (EMP:1999), LO (EMP:2004)	0.035	0.107	0.000	-0.009
Besancenot (2007)	LO (EMP:2004), LO (EMP:2009)	0.040	0.101	0.000	-0.002
Boutin (2002)	Libertas (EMP:2009)	0.010	0.442	0.065	0.000
Bové (2007)	Les Verts (EMP:2004), Les Verts (CMP:2007), EE (EMP:2009)	0.015	0.039	-0.019	-0.014
Buffet (2007)	PCF (EMP:2004), PCF (CMP:2007), FG (EMP:2009)	0.025	0.093	-0.010	-0.021
Chaban-Delmas (1974)	UDR (CMP:1973), RPR (CMP:1978)	0.160	0.119	0.039	0.028
Cheminade (1995)	N.S. (EMP:2004)	0.005	0.116	0.000	0.000
Cheminade (2012)	N.S. (EMP:2004)	0.005	0.116	0.000	0.000
Cheminade (2017)	N.S. (EMP:2004)	0.000	0.116	0.000	0.000
Chevènement (2002)	MDC (EMP:1994)	0.060	0.134	0.183	0.000
Chirac (1995)	RPR (CMP:1993), RPR-UDF (EMP:1994), RPR (CMP:1997), UMP (EMP:1999)	0.240	0.059	0.007	0.034
Chirac (2002)	UMP (EMP:1999), UMP (CMP:2002), UMP (EMP:2004)	0.190	0.062	-0.020	0.109
de Gaulle (1965)	UNR (CMP:1962), UD-Ve (CMP:1967), UDR (CMP:1968)	0.430	0.146	0.059	0.027
de Villiers (1995)	RPF (EMP:1994), RPF (EMP:1999)	0.060	0.270	0.088	0.106
de Villiers (2007)	MPF (EMP:2004), Libertas (EMP:2009)	0.025	0.539	0.066	0.027
Defferre (1969)	SIFO (CMP:1967), SIFO (CMP:1968), PS (CMP:1973)	0.071	0.204	-0.093	-0.061
Ducatel (1969)	RRRS (CMP:1967), RRRS (CMP:1968)	0.000	0.218	-0.089	-0.067
Duclos (1969)	PCF (CMP:1967), PCF (CMP:1968), PCF (CMP:1973)	0.173	0.215	-0.065	-0.038
Dumont (1974)	Les Verts (CMP:1993)	0.000	0.096	-0.034	-0.043
Dupont-Aignan (2012)	Libertas (EMP:2009)	0.015	0.442	0.065	0.000
Dupont-Aignan (2017)	Libertas (EMP:2009)	0.045	0.442	0.065	0.000
Fillon (2017)	UMP (EMP:2014), UMP (CMP:2017)	0.190	0.125	0.066	0.110
Giscard d'Estaing (1974)	MR (CMP:1973), UDF (CMP:1978)	0.319	0.070	-0.019	-0.032
Gluckstein (2002)	FG (EMP:2004)	0.005	0.206	0.000	0.000
Hamon (2017)	PS-PRG (EMP:2014), PS (CMP:2017)	0.075	0.059	-0.019	0.100
Héraud (1974)	RRRS (CMP:1968)	0.000	0.252	-0.138	-0.061
Hollande (2012)	PS (EMP:2009), PS (CMP:2012), PS-PRG (EMP:2014)	0.279	0.036	-0.012	0.028
Hue (1995)	PCF (CMP:1993), PCF (EMP:1994), PCF (CMP:1997), PCF (EMP:1999)	0.095	0.137	-0.022	-0.022
Hue (2002)	PCF (EMP:1999), PCF (CMP:2002), PCF (EMP:2004)	0.050	0.086	-0.017	-0.004
Joly (2012)	EE (EMP:2009), EELV (CMP:2012), EELV (EMP:2014)	0.020	0.053	-0.019	-0.001
Jospin (1995)	PS (CMP:1993), PS (EMP:1994), PS (CMP:1997), PS (EMP:1999)	0.205	0.046	-0.004	0.016
Jospin (2002)	PS (EMP:1999), PS (CMP:2002), PS (EMP:2004)	0.180	0.028	-0.006	0.078
Krivine (1969)	PCF (CMP:1967), PCF (CMP:1968), PCF (CMP:1973)	0.000	0.215	-0.065	-0.038
Krivine (1974)	PCF (CMP:1973), PCF (CMP:1978)	0.000	0.211	-0.050	0.002
Laguiller (1974)	PCF (CMP:1973), PCF (CMP:1978)	0.000	0.211	-0.050	0.002
Laguiller (1995)	LO (EMP:1999)	0.050	0.130	-0.009	0.000
Laguiller (2002)	LO (EMP:1999), LO (EMP:2004)	0.080	0.160	-0.005	-0.002
Laguiller (2007)	LO (EMP:2004), LO (EMP:2009)	0.015	0.101	0.000	-0.002
Lassalle (2017)	MoDem-UDI (EMP:2014), MoDem (CMP:2017)	0.005	0.063	0.009	0.039
Le Pen JM (1974)	FN (CMP:1986)	0.000	0.145	0.139	0.042
Le Pen JM (1995)	FN (CMP:1993), FN (EMP:1994), FN (CMP:1997), FN (EMP:1999)	0.140	0.157	0.258	0.103
Le Pen JM (2002)	FN (EMP:1999), FN (CMP:2002), FN (EMP:2004)	0.140	0.245	0.166	0.071
Le Pen JM (2007)	FN (EMP:2004), FN (CMP:2007), FN (EMP:2009)	0.130	0.388	0.112	0.009
Le Pen M (2012)	FN (EMP:2009), FN (CMP:2012), FN (EMP:2014)	0.169	0.269	0.143	0.052
Le Pen M (2017)	FN (EMP:2014), FN (CMP:2017)	0.230	0.141	0.188	0.103
Lecanuet (1965)	MRP (CMP:1962), CD (CMP:1967), PDM (CMP:1968)	0.200	0.121	0.016	-0.034
Lepage (2002)	GE (CMP:1997)	0.010	0.074	0.030	-0.019
Macron (2017)	LREM (CMP:2017)	0.245	0.092	0.035	0.083
Madelin (2002)	UMP (EMP:1999), UMP (CMP:2002), UMP (EMP:2004)	0.050	0.062	-0.020	0.109
Mamère (2002)	Les Verts (EMP:1999), Les Verts (CMP:2002), Les Verts (EMP:2004)	0.050	0.034	-0.019	0.005
Marcilhacy (1965)	MRP (CMP:1962), CD (CMP:1967), PDM (CMP:1968)	0.020	0.121	0.016	-0.034
Mégret (2002)	FN (EMP:1999), FN (CMP:2002), FN (EMP:2004)	0.020	0.245	0.166	0.071
Mélenchon (2012)	FG (EMP:2009), FDG (CMP:2012), FG (EMP:2014)	0.149	0.107	-0.016	-0.016
Mélenchon (2017)	FG (EMP:2014), LFI (CMP:2017)	0.190	0.138	-0.002	0.001
Mitterrand (1965)	SIFO (CMP:1962), SIFO (CMP:1967), SIFO (CMP:1968)	0.270	0.177	-0.069	-0.062
Mitterrand (1974)	PS (CMP:1973), PS (CMP:1978)	0.479	0.168	-0.094	-0.051
Muller (1974)	RRRS (CMP:1968)	0.000	0.252	-0.138	-0.061
Nihous (2007)	CPNT (EMP:2004)	0.020	0.365	0.003	0.000
Poher (1969)	CD (CMP:1967), PDM (CMP:1968), MR (CMP:1973)	0.316	0.084	0.031	-0.037
Pompidou (1969)	UD-Ve (CMP:1967), UDR (CMP:1968), UDR (CMP:1973)	0.408	0.131	0.056	0.026
Poutou (2012)	LO (EMP:2009), LO (EMP:2014)	0.010	0.073	-0.018	0.000
Poutou (2017)	LO (EMP:2014)	0.010	0.134	-0.036	0.000
Renouvin (1974)	PS (CMP:1973), PS (CMP:1978)	0.000	0.168	-0.094	-0.051
Rocard (1969)	SIFO (CMP:1967), SIFO (CMP:1968), PS (CMP:1973)	0.031	0.204	-0.093	-0.061
Royal (2007)	PS (EMP:2004), PS (CMP:2007), PS (EMP:2009)	0.230	0.040	-0.003	0.059
Royer (1974)	CNIP (CMP:1973), CNIP (CMP:1978)	0.043	0.123	0.039	-0.034
Saint-Josse (2002)	CPNT (EMP:1999), CPNT (EMP:2004)	0.040	0.364	-0.055	0.000
Sarkozy (2007)	UMP (EMP:2004), UMP (CMP:2007), UMP (EMP:2009)	0.300	0.071	-0.017	0.063
Sarkozy (2012)	UMP (EMP:2009), UMP (CMP:2012), UMP (EMP:2014)	0.239	0.102	0.036	0.070
Schivardi (2007)	FG (EMP:2004), FG (EMP:2009)	0.005	0.144	0.000	-0.009
Sebag (1974)	RRRS (CMP:1968)	0.000	0.252	-0.138	-0.061
Taubira (2002)	PRG (EMP:1999), PRG (EMP:2004)	0.020	0.014	0.001	0.048
Tixier-Vignancour (1965)	UDCA (CMP:1956)	0.070	0.180	-0.056	-0.027
Voynet (1995)	Les Verts (CMP:1993), Les Verts (CMP:1997), Les Verts (EMP:1999)	0.040	0.078	-0.033	-0.029
Voynet (2007)	Les Verts (EMP:2004), Les Verts (CMP:2007), EE (EMP:2009)	0.015	0.039	-0.019	-0.014

Notes: Candidates classification and policy positions. See Online Appendix B.6 for the construction of the variables.

tutionalism: Negative (204), Protectionism: Negative (407), National Way of Life: Negative (602), Traditional Morality: Negative (604), Multiculturalism: Negative (608), and Labor Groups: Negative (702). The degree of radicalism of candidate C in election t is therefore $rad_{C,t} = \sum_q QS(q)_{C,t}$, where $QS(q)_{C,t}$ is the share of candidate C's discourse spent on topic q in election t and $q \in \{102, 105, 109, 110, 204, 407, 602, 604, 608, 702\}$ is the CMP variable. A binary measure ($R_{C,t}$) is also constructed that takes the value 1 when a candidate is more radical than the election-weighted average, formally $R_{C,t} = \mathbb{1}(rad_{C,t} > \overline{rad}_t)$, where $\overline{rad}_t = \sum_C \hat{\pi}_{C,t} rad_{C,t}$, and $\hat{\pi}_{C,t}$ is the candidate's predicted share in the polls that preceded the election.

The degree of authoritarianism and nationalism of a candidate are also constructed in a similar way. The variables used to construct the authoritarian measure are the following (variable number): Military: Positive (104) − Military: Negative (105) + Law and Order: Positive (605). The variables used to construct the nationalist measure are the following (variable number): National Way of Life: Positive (601) − National Way of Life: Negative (602) + Traditional Morality: Positive (603) − Traditional Morality: Negative (604) + Multiculturalism: Positive (607) − Multiculturalism: Negative (608). Table B.5 presents the match between candidates and parties and candidates' degree of radicalism, authoritarianism, and nationalism.

C Additional results

C.1 Approval of radical positions

Maximum likelihood estimators – Table C.1 presents the results from estimating the reduced-form of Equation (8) with a maximum likelihood estimator (presented in footnote 26 of the paper). In Columns (1) and (3), the logit and probit results are presented. Columns (2) and (4), the ordered models, indicate an increase in the likelihood of somewhat and strongly approving at the expense of strongly disapproving.

Table C.1: Approval of radical positions – Maximum likelihood estimators

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep. Variable	*Do you approve or disapprove of the position taken by JM Le Pen in his critique of the political class?*			
Specification	Logit	Ordered Logit	Probit	Ordered Probit
P(Eligible)	0.730***		0.728***	
	(0.259)		(0.251)	
Strongly disapprove		–0.300**		–0.294**
		(0.144)		(0.148)
Somewhat disapprove		–0.039		–0.023
		(0.038)		(0.024)
Somewhat approve		0.277**		0.256**
		(0.135)		(0.128)
Strongly approve		0.062*		0.061*
		(0.034)		(0.035)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Variable	0.371	2.103	0.371	2.103
Observations	143	146	143	146
Log likelihood	–65.92	–159.25	–65.93	–157.87

Notes: Marginal effects at means of the reduced-form maximum likelihood estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehmacht on approval of Le Pen's critique of the political class. The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Column (1): logit regression; Column (2): ordered logit; Column (3): probit; Column (4): ordered probit. Individual controls included in all specifications: ideological distance to Jacques Chirac, distance to Jean-Marie Le Pen, birth cohort (5 groups), gender, schooling degree (5 groups), religion (5 groups), parents' origin (4 groups). Municipality controls: log population, proportion of foreign population, proportion with high-school degree, unemployment rate. Region (*department*) fixed effects are included in all specifications. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

C.2 Abstention and the radical right-wing vote

Baseline results w/ main covariates – Table C.2 presents baseline estimation results (Table 2) with the main covariates. Panel A presents the results using radical right-wing support as the outcome; Panel B using abstention and invalid ballots.

Table C.2: Abstention and the RRW vote – Baseline results w/ main covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Latee elections				
Election	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing vote (% of registered)								
Conscripted (%)	0.035		–0.008	1.109***	0.968***	0.379*	0.412	0.322
	(0.087)		(0.022)	(0.357)	(0.306)	(0.208)	(0.347)	(0.268)
Extreme right-wing in 1936 (%)	0.003		0.000	0.027*	0.024	0.030**	0.022	0.019
	(0.004)		(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Displaced in 1946 (%)	–0.002		–0.000	0.010	0.063	0.008	0.100	0.026
	(0.009)		(0.002)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.075)	(0.048)
Protestant churches (%)	0.005**		–0.000	0.025*	0.012	–0.005	–0.006	–0.006
	(0.003)		(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Synagogue (binary)	0.531***		–0.059	–0.172	–1.316	–1.471**	–2.042**	–2.128**
	(0.168)		(0.071)	(0.851)	(0.821)	(0.614)	(0.816)	(0.994)
French name at birth 1891-1940 (%)	0.013		–0.004	0.093	0.003	–0.093	0.035	–0.077
	(0.031)		(0.007)	(0.110)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.101)
Dialect-speaking in 1936 (%)	–0.063*		–0.013	0.275*	0.118	0.202***	0.073	0.138
	(0.037)		(0.009)	(0.148)	(0.139)	(0.073)	(0.104)	(0.112)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Abstention & invalid ballots (% of registered)								
Conscripted (%)	0.961***	1.723***	0.522*	–0.641***	–0.709	0.182	–0.193	–0.009
	(0.359)	(0.462)	(0.313)	(0.248)	(0.446)	(0.174)	(0.286)	(0.228)
Extreme right-wing in 1936 (%)	–0.009	0.043*	–0.010	–0.033***	–0.006	–0.009	–0.014	–0.023***
	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Displaced in 1946 (%)	–0.033	0.083	–0.026	–0.000	–0.041	–0.004	–0.073**	–0.070
	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.065)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.048)
Protestant churches (%)	0.116***	0.124***	0.083***	0.022**	0.015	0.009***	0.018***	0.008
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Synagogue (binary)	–1.729*	–0.941	–1.240*	–0.488	–0.474	–1.096**	0.346	0.014
	(0.891)	(1.244)	(0.742)	(0.580)	(0.776)	(0.546)	(0.527)	(0.514)
French name at birth 1891-1940 (%)	0.107	0.133	0.015	0.014	–0.040	0.124**	0.006	0.133*
	(0.098)	(0.135)	(0.070)	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.072)
Dialect-speaking in 1936 (%)	–0.039	–0.049	–0.176	–0.356***	–0.092	–0.088	–0.064	–0.118
	(0.134)	(0.187)	(0.111)	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.083)
Historical controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemp. controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage F-statistic	25.09	27.01	25.72	11.92	13.57	14.45	15.90	15.04
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical right-wing candidates and on abstention. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district (canton) level in parentheses. Panel A: First-stage estimates (Equation (7)); Panels B and C: 2SLS estimates (Equation (8)) with radical right-wing vote and abstention as the outcome, respectively. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. Historical controls included in all specifications: crude birth rate 1903-1932 (‰), log population (1936), latitude, longitude, access to waterways (binary), log mean elevation, log elevation std.dev., bordering municipality (binary). Contemporary controls: log population, proportion of foreign population, age-gender distribution (12 groups), proportion with no schooling, proportion with high-school degree, proportion of blue-collar workers, unemployment rate, log median income, log income std.dev. 15km grid and historical dialect fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation (Panel A). * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

Candidate classification sensitivity – Table C.3 evaluates the results' sensitivity to the candidate classification by presenting the estimates separately for the National Front candidate (Panel B) and other radical right-wing candidates (Panel C). The effect is driven by the National Front; support for other radical right-wing candidates increases in conscription (with the exception of de Villiers), but the effect is smaller.

Table C.3: Abstention and the RRW vote – Candidate classification sensitivity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Earlier elections		Later elections				
Election	1965	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
National Front Candidate	–	JMLP	JMLP	JMLP	JMLP	MLP	MLP
Other RRW Candidate	JLTV	–	PdV	BM	PdV	NDA	NDA
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing vote (% of registered)							
Conscripted (%)	0.035	–0.008	1.109***	0.968***	0.379*	0.412	0.322
	(0.087)	(0.022)	(0.357)	(0.306)	(0.208)	(0.347)	(0.268)
Mean dependent variable	1.21	0.31	26.02	22.25	17.04	25.14	34.10
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: National Front vote (% of registered)							
Conscripted (%)		–0.008	1.181***	0.781***	0.378*	0.303	0.067
		(0.022)	(0.363)	(0.292)	(0.203)	(0.278)	(0.286)
Mean dependent variable	0.00	0.31	22.18	19.30	14.89	23.24	27.27
Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Other radical right-wing vote (% of registered)							
Conscripted (%)	0.035		–0.072	0.188*	0.000	0.109	0.256
	(0.087)		(0.178)	(0.098)	(0.081)	(0.172)	(0.249)
Mean dependent variable	1.21	0.00	3.85	2.95	2.16	1.90	6.83
Historical controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemp. controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage F-statistic	25.09	25.72	11.92	13.57	14.45	15.90	15.04
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for all radical right-wing, National Front, and other radical right-wing candidates separately. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district (canton) level in parentheses. Panel A: Baseline results (Table (2), Panel B); Panel B: 2SLS estimates for Jean-Marie Le Pen (1974, 1995-2007) and Marine Le Pen (2012, 2017); Panel C: 2SLS estimates for Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour (1965), Philippe de Villiers (1995, 2007), Bruno Mégret (2002), and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (2012, 2017). Each column presents the estimation for a different election. Historical controls included in all specifications: average crude birth rate (1903-1932), proportion of Protestants, Jewish presence (binary), proportion with french name at birth (1891-1940), proportion speaking a dialect (1936, sub-district level), log population (1936), proportion of displaced (1946, sub-district level), proportion of extreme right-wing (1936, sub-district), latitude, longitude, access to waterways (binary), log mean elevation, log elevation std.dev., bordering municipality (binary). Contemporary controls: log population, proportion of foreign population, age-gender distribution (12 groups), proportion with no schooling, proportion with secondary schooling at least, proportion of blue-collar workers, unemployment rate, log median income, log income std.dev. 15km grid and historical dialect fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation with eligible births as the exogenous instrument (see Table (2), Panel A). * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

Grid and distance sensitivity – Figure C.1 tests the sensitivity of the results to the choice of 15km grid size and 20km distance from the border. By changing the distance,

the identifying variation changes only as far as municipalities are excluded from the sample. Changing the grid size changes the number and the composition of municipalities that drive the identifying variation. Reassuringly, results are robust.

Figure C.1: Abstention and the RRW vote – Grid and distance sensitivity



Notes: Sensitivity of 2SLS results of Table 2 to the grid size FE and the distance to the Alsace-Moselle border. Each graph is a different election/outcome. Each square/dot is a different estimation. Blue square: positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level) effect; red dot: negative and statistically significant effect; light-grey square: effect not statistically significant; red box: baseline results.

C.3 Radical and moderate candidates

Within municipality estimates – The estimation using the radical-moderate difference as the outcome, i.e. Panel C of Table 3, can also be estimated within a municipality by interacting the share of men conscripted with the candidate type and introducing candidate type $\times$ gird FE to capture overall trends. This setup has the advantage of fully accounting for municipality heterogeneity. The results from the within municipality estimation of Equation (9) are presented in Table C.4. Panel A presents the results for the radical-moderate divide; Panels B and C for the other two aspects (authoritarian, nationalist).

Table C.4: Radical and moderate candidates – Within municipality estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Election	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
Panel A: Estimates for Radical/Moderate divide								
Conscripted (%) $\times$ R_C	2.963***	2.166***	5.074***	0.898*	0.640	0.347	–0.021	0.231
	(0.723)	(0.695)	(1.347)	(0.529)	(0.472)	(0.430)	(0.510)	(0.535)
Crude birth rate 1903-1932 (‰) $\times$ R_C	–0.665***	–0.411***	–0.652**	0.048	0.095	0.000	0.128	0.165
	(0.166)	(0.158)	(0.285)	(0.132)	(0.123)	(0.109)	(0.140)	(0.115)
Mean dependent variable ($R_C = 1$)	6.26	7.53	28.28	32.72	31.69	17.98	25.39	44.02
Panel B: Estimates for Authoritarian/Non-authoritarian divide								
Conscripted (%) $\times$ A_C	–3.722***	–2.124**	0.973*	0.913*	0.893**	–0.123	1.210**	–0.111
	(0.966)	(0.908)	(0.556)	(0.546)	(0.437)	(0.510)	(0.474)	(0.436)
Crude birth rate 1903-1932 (‰) $\times$ A_C	0.606**	0.127	–0.165	–0.009	–0.054	–0.115	–0.035	0.027
	(0.240)	(0.204)	(0.131)	(0.139)	(0.120)	(0.110)	(0.138)	(0.101)
Mean dependent variable ($A_C = 1$)	63.09	48.49	15.71	47.08	52.72	39.55	57.96	59.18
Panel C: Estimates for Nationalist/Universalist divide								
Conscripted (%) $\times$ N_C	–2.963***	–2.166***	–5.099***	1.540***	2.156***	0.399	0.849	0.436
	(0.723)	(0.695)	(1.348)	(0.577)	(0.565)	(0.459)	(0.521)	(0.583)
Crude birth rate 1903-1932 (‰) $\times$ N_C	0.665***	0.411***	0.649**	–0.045	–0.019	0.062	–0.060	0.103
	(0.166)	(0.158)	(0.285)	(0.135)	(0.154)	(0.110)	(0.139)	(0.130)
Mean dependent variable ($N_C = 1$)	78.46	68.84	54.97	26.02	32.76	34.85	50.50	27.27
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Grid specific candidate type FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage F-statistic	27.71	27.71	27.71	27.71	27.71	27.71	27.71	27.71
Observations	924	924	924	924	924	924	924	924
Clusters	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462

Notes: Within municipality 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical, authoritarian, and nationalist candidates. The unit of observation is a municipality $\times$ candidate type. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel A: Within municipality 2SLS estimates for aggregate radical candidate vote share and moderate candidate vote share; Panel B: Within municipality 2SLS estimates for aggregate authoritarian candidate vote share and non-authoritarian candidate vote share; Panel C: Within municipality 2SLS estimates for aggregate nationalist candidate vote share and universalist candidate vote share. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. Municipality and 15km grid $\times$ candidate type fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation with eligible births $\times$ candidate type as the exogenous instrument. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

C.4 Candidate radicalism and discourse divergence

Other policy positions – Table C.5 presents the results when estimating Equation (10) using candidates' degree of authoritarianism and nationalism. Results are not consistent with the theoretical framework. Authoritarian candidates are punished within elections (but not between elections); nationalist candidates are punished both within and between elections.

Table C.5: Radicalism and discourse divergence – Other policy positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dep. Variable	Vote share			
Candidates	Authoritarian		Nationalist	
Specification	Across Space	Across Time	Across Space	Across Time
Conscripted (%) $\times$ aut_C	–2.618**	2.513***		
	(1.075)	(0.728)		
Conscripted (%) $\times$ $(\Delta aut_t)^{-1}$		–0.001		
		(0.002)		
Conscripted (%) $\times$ nat_C			–0.838	–1.503*
			(0.578)	(0.808)
Conscripted (%) $\times$ $(\Delta nat_t)^{-1}$				–0.014***
				(0.003)
Mean dependent variable	7.70	7.70	7.70	7.70
Municipality $\times$ election FE	Yes		Yes	
Municipality $\times$ party FE		Yes		Yes
Grid specific candidate FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemp. controls vector		Yes		Yes
First-stage F-statistic	27.72	14.29	27.72	14.05
Observations	38346	38346	38346	38346
Clusters	462	462	462	462

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for authoritarian and nationalist candidates across space and time. The unit of observation is a municipality $\times$ election $\times$ candidate. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Columns (1) and (3): 2SLS estimates for authoritarian/non-authoritarian dimension; Columns (2) and (4): 2SLS estimates for nationalist/universalist dimension. Columns (1) and (3): 2SLS estimates for candidate vote shares within municipality and election (across candidates); Columns (2) and (4): 2SLS estimates for candidate vote shares within municipality and party (across time). Columns (1) and (2) control for the crude birth rate (1903-1932) $\times$ aut_C. Columns (3) and (4) control for the crude birth rate (1903-1932) $\times$ nat_C. Controls vector included in Columns (2)-(4): crude birth rate (1903-1932) $\times$ $(\Delta aut_t)^{-1}$ (or $(\Delta nat_t)^{-1}$), log population, proportion of foreign population, age-gender distribution (12 groups), proportion with no schooling, proportion with secondary schooling at least, proportion of blue-collar workers, unemployment rate, log median income, log income std.dev. 15km grid $\times$ candidate $\times$ election year fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

Year-by-year results – Table C.6 assesses the sensitivity of the findings of Table 4 to particular elections by presenting the year-by-year results of Column (2). The interaction effect is positive in *every* election (Panel A) implying that there is a premium for radical candidates in all elections in localities where more men were mobilized. Conversely, the interaction term is negative in 5 (3) elections for authoritarian (nationalist) candidates. Note however that the first-stage estimation power is reduced with F-stats ranging from 5.2 to 9.9.

Table C.6: Radicalism and discourse divergence – Year-by-year results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Election	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Radical/Moderate divide								
Conscripted (%)	–2.482***	–1.486***	–1.931***	–0.069	–0.044	–0.061	0.004	–0.077
	(0.752)	(0.480)	(0.481)	(0.126)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.073)	(0.068)
Conscripted (%) × rad_C	14.331***	6.833***	11.364***	1.500*	0.587*	0.221	0.304	0.361
	(4.537)	(2.355)	(2.837)	(0.821)	(0.333)	(0.229)	(0.411)	(0.257)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates for Authoritarian/Non-authoritarian divide								
Conscripted (%)	–0.636**	–1.031***	–0.208***	–0.001	0.058	–0.008	–0.072	–0.035
	(0.274)	(0.327)	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.084)	(0.065)
Conscripted (%) × aut_C	–13.398*	–19.916***	–5.161**	3.204**	–0.401	–1.106	5.063	0.361
	(7.896)	(7.349)	(2.124)	(1.479)	(0.970)	(1.705)	(3.690)	(1.305)
Panel C: 2SLS Estimates for Nationalist/Universalist divide								
Conscripted (%)	–0.389***	–0.660***	–0.278***	0.011	–0.046	–0.034	0.004	–0.095
	(0.134)	(0.186)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.075)
Conscripted (%) × nat_C	–9.610**	–9.079***	–4.700***	2.973***	2.401***	0.715	2.580	1.788
	(4.466)	(2.856)	(1.291)	(1.111)	(0.815)	(1.571)	(1.745)	(1.621)
Historical controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemp. controls vector	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Grid specific candidate FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dependent variable	21.15	10.91	12.15	14.04	8.23	11.67	13.08	11.46
First-stage F-statistic	9.65	9.92	8.71	5.22	5.42	6.15	6.76	6.63
Observations	3696	3234	6468	5082	8316	6468	5544	6006
Clusters	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical, authoritarian, and nationalist candidates across space (year-by-year). The unit of observation is a municipality × candidate. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel A: 2SLS estimates for radical/moderate dimension; Panel B: 2SLS estimates for authoritarian/non-authoritarian dimension; Panel C: 2SLS estimates for nationalist/universalist dimension. All specification control for the crude birth rate (1903-1932) × rad_C (or aut_C, nat_C). Each column presents the estimation for a different election. Historical controls included in all specifications: average crude birth rate (1903-1932), proportion of Protestants, Jewish presence (binary), proportion with french name at birth (1891-1940), proportion speaking a dialect (1936, sub-district level), log population (1936), proportion of displaced (1946, sub-district level), proportion of extreme right-wing (1936, sub-district), latitude, longitude, access to waterways (binary), log mean elevation, log elevation std.dev., bordering municipality (binary). Contemporary controls vector: log population, proportion of foreign population, age-gender distribution (12 groups), proportion with no schooling, proportion with secondary schooling at least, proportion of blue-collar workers, unemployment rate, log median income, log income std.dev. 15km grid × candidate fixed effects are included in all specifications. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

D Historical appendix

D.1 Extended historical background (Riedweg, 1995)

Wehrmacht conscription – The Alsace region and the Moselle department were ceded to the German Empire with the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871 that ended the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. They formed the *Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen* until the end World War I in 1918. In June 1940, following the French capitulation, they were once again annexed to the Third Reich. Unlike the previous annexation however, in this case the two regions were absorbed into the neighboring pre-existing German districts of Baden (in the case of Alsace) and Saar-Palatinate (in the case of Moselle). Alsace and Moselle were therefore administrated separately: Alsace by Robert Wagner, the *Gauleiter* of Baden since 1933, and Moselle by Josef Bürckel, the *Gauleiter* of Saar-Palatinate since 1935. The task of the two administrators was identical: to transform the population of the western territories into good Germans and convinced national-socialists.

Robert Wagner, by his birth name Robert Backfisch, was a WWI veteran and a long-term companion of arms of Hitler.[3] As such, he considered that the introduction of a mandatory military service was the appropriate procedure to integrate the Western Territories (Alsace, Moselle, Luxembourg). Josef Bürckel was considered a "nazification" (*Gleichschaltung*) expert after being in charge of nazifying the Saar region and Austria. He believed that assimilation through education was not possible, and therefore openly considered the possibility of deporting part of the population and replacing them with German farmers. (*Latest News of Strasbourg*, April 30, 1942).

[3]Robert Wagner joined the army during WWI. He remained in the army after the War and became a virulent anti-communist. Mutated in Munich, he participated in Hitler's 1923 failed putsch attempt and was imprisoned with him in the Landsberg fortress. His personal relationship with Hitler dated from this period.

Wagner's plan however stumbled on the opposition of the German High Command (henceforth OKW), since people from Western Territories were considered Germans in regard to the race (*Volksdeutsche*), but were not German citizens (*Reichsburger*). The laws of Nuremberg made a clear distinction between citizens of the Reich and German nationals. Only citizens had full political rights and the obligation associated (e.g. military service). In this spirit, according to the law on the military obligation (*Wehrgesetz*) of May 21, 1935, only Reich citizens were compelled to the service. The populations of the Western Territories were further protected by the Hague Convention that prohibited the mobilization of the population of an occupied territory. Moreover, this population was considered unsafe by the OKW as long as the "nazification" process had not been completed.

The course of the war on the Eastern Front greatly facilitated Wagner's plan. The decision to attribute the German nationality to the populations of the Western Territories was taken on August 9, 1942. The citizenship issue resolved, Hitler gave each *Gauleiter* a full liberty on how to apply the measure. The "decree on the citizenship in Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg" appeared in the official journal of the Reich on August 23, 1942.

The main judicial obstacle overcome, a decree concerning the mandatory military service was issued on August 25, 1942, in Alsace, August 29 in Moselle, and August 30 in Luxembourg; it was immediately followed by a decree clarifying that the military service concerned the cohorts born from 1920 to 1924.[4] The first cohorts (1922-1924) reached the front in October 1942; they were soon followed by the 1920-1921 cohorts (Jan 1943). The 1914 to 1919 cohorts were mobilized in April and June 1943 in Alsace and Moselle, respectively, but not in Luxembourg. The 1925 cohort was conscripted

[4]This decree was issued on August 27, 1942, in Alsace, and August 25 in Moselle. Note that while the decree on the mandatory service in Moselle was already issued on August 19, 1942, it was only published on August 29, once the decree on the citizenship status was made public.

in May 1943. In late 1943 and early 1944, the 1911-1913 and 1908-1910 classes were mobilized in Alsace but not in Moselle, nor in Luxembourg. Finally, towards the end of the war, the 1926 and 1927 cohorts were mobilized.

Several measures were taken as a result of the mistrust of the OKW towards these soldiers: defectors' families were deported and a restricted area along the frontier with France was established (Sep 1942); soldiers were solely sent to the Eastern Front, leaves were restricted, and access at transmission units and aviation was prohibited (Jun 1943); soldiers were isolated within units from other former French citizens. The story of Camille L., a tailor that could not ski before the war but was allocated to an alpine regiment on the Eastern Front offers a good illustration of these specificities (see Section D.2).

Identifying variation – The identification strategy in this paper exploits the fact that while men born from 1908 to 1927 were mobilized in Alsace, only men born from 1914 to 1927 were mobilized in Moselle. The reasons for the divergence in policies between the two annexed regions remains unclear; the most prominent hypothesis however lies in the rivalry between the two administrators and the unprecedented discretion they disposed of.

In theory the heads of administration were under the command of the occupying army but, on August 2, 1940, a decree by Hitler gave the full civil administration control to the two *Gauleiters*. The Wehrmacht would only exercise the military authority, while the interior minister was in charge of the coordination between the different authorities in Alsace and Moselle. As a result, the two administrators disposed of truly unrestricted powers, since they were only liable to Hitler in person.

The two administrators were given the same goal; their personalities and their methods however differed significantly (Iung et al., 2012, p.18). Robert Wagner, as

a WWI veteran, though that the Wehrmacht was, alongside the party, the school of the Nation where the youth would complete their ideological and cultural assimilation. Josef Bürckel, a "nazification" (*Gleichschaltung*) expert after being in charge of such an operation in the Saar region and Austria, considered that assimilation through education was not possible. He thus openly considered deporting part of the population to install German farmers.

The independence of the administrators, that allowed them to implement different ethnic and political purification policies, is at the heart of the identifying variation. While in Moselle Bürckel proceeded in deportations, Wagner hoped to convert the Alsace population to national-socialism through political education and persuasion, an important part of which was the military service. As a result, 20 cohorts (1908-1927) were drafted in Alsace, compared to 14 in Moselle (1914-1927). In Luxembourg only the 1920 to 1927 cohorts were mobilized; *Gauleiter* Simon, who was against the introduction of conscription, refused to mobilize cohorts born before 1920 which did not elicit any response from the OKW. This testifies once again that, despite the introduction of a mandatory military service, the administrators had a broad freedom on how to apply the measure. The conscription process was otherwise identical (Grandhomme, 2013). As explained in Riedweg (1995, p.99), "*The responsibility falls entirely on Gauleiter Wagner that did everything he could so that a maximum of Alsatians are incorporated in the Wehrmacht*". This is according to him, another example of *Reich Polycracy*: the independence of Wagner and Bürckel from central Reich authorities allowed them to apply different policies when it came to ethnic and political purification.

D.2 Conscription example: Camille L.

I interviewed Camille in Marmoutier, Alsace, in December 2014. Camille, a tailor prior to the War, was born in Marmoutier, Alsace, in 1922. He was thus part of the first

cohort drafted into the Wehrmacht and was conscripted on October 12, 1942.

After passing the Review Board in Saverne, Alsace, he was sent to Innsbruck, Austria, for a brief training. On November 29, 1942, he was sent to Murmansk, Russia, to get his main training. Even though he could not ski prior to the War, Camille was allocated to the 139th Alpine Regiment. Furthermore, as he recalled, he was the only soldier from France, since the unit was solely composed of Austrians and Poles.[5] He was sent to the Kandalaktcha Front on March 12, 1944, where he fought until he was wounded on February 8, 1945.

Camille came back to France in September 1945. He had to walk through Lapland to a camp in Trondheim, Norway, where German soldiers were sorted depending on whether their enrolment was justified. He was then shipped to Le Havre, France, and from there to Chalon-Sur-Saône, where he was interrogated for three days and demobilised. He arrived in Strasbourg on September 29 where, after being interrogated for one more day, he was allowed to go home.

D.3 *Departments'* acquisition of powers

A twofold process of territorial and functional decentralization began in France with the creation of the *departments*. This process was revived by the 1982 Defferre laws, shortly after the 1981 presidential election won by François Mitterrand. The Defferre law turned *departments* into a local authorities. This meant that the administration's supervision, exercised by the prefect, was abolished. The President of the General Council now held the *departmental* executive power and ensured the preparation and implementation of his *department*'s budget. The General Councils were given new competences as well: social action, trade and fishing ports, school transport, and

[5] A very similar story, that of Auguste Ritter, born in 1923 in Colmar, Haut-Rhin, can be found on http://www.memoire-orale.org/notice.php?id=156 (last accessed on Aug 17, 2016). As A. Ritter recalled, his unit was primarily composed of Austrians, only higher ranks being German.

management of the colleges.

Between 2002 and 2004, Jean-Pierre Raffarin's government brought back the reform of the decentralization on the political agenda. Local authorities had a vocation to take on competencies that could be best implemented at their level (subsidiarity principle). A right of petition to seize a territorial assembly was granted to the voters of each territorial collectivity. From that point on, local referendums and voter consultation could be organized in the event of changes in the boundaries of local authorities. By providing local authorities with a "decisive part" in their own resources and by accompanying any transfer of financial resources, the law recognized the "financial autonomy" of local and regional authorities. The law also provided "financial equalization schemes" between communities to correct resource inequalities.

The role and the responsibilities of the *department* in social and medico-social action were reinforced. It now took up the management of roads previously classified in the national public road domain. The *departments* were also transferred the recruitment and management of the technicians and workers in colleges. The organization of school transport was entrusted to them. Furthermore, it took charge of social and occupational integration.

Between 2005 and 2008, new transfers of competences were carried out, particularly in the field of child protection (Law of the 5th of March 2007) and support for disabled people (Act of the 11th of February 2005). Finally, in 2014, the law on the modernization of territorial public action instructed the *departments* to coordinate the joint action of local authorities and Inter-communal authorities for the exercise of powers relating to social action, social development and the contribution to the reduction of fuel poverty, autonomy of individuals and solidarity of territories.

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