On war and political radicalization:

Evidence from forced conscription into the Wehrmacht

– Online Appendix –

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Contents

B Data appendix

B.1 Conscription proxy

Data description – Data on conscription is taken from the Index of French Nationals Compelled into German Armed Forces (*Répertoire des Français incorporés dans les formations militaires allemandes*) (MACVG, 1945, 1946). The Index was released following an official census organized by the Ministry of Veterans and War Victims in October 1945. Its purpose was to repatriate prisoners of War held in allied camps, whose French nationality could be recognized. This list, edited in French and translated in 19 languages, was transmitted to all countries potentially holding Axis' prisoners of War in November 1945 and April 1946. The explanatory notice is the following:

> *The prisoners of War whose French nationality may be recognized as a result of this investigation should be repatriated as soon as possible. [...]. The lists appearing in this booklet were made out after an official census directed by the French Government and carried out by the administrative services of the Departments of Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin and Moselle. For each one of these Departments, they show the name, Christian name, residence, date and place of birth of the French nationals compelled into German forces and not returned home on April 1, 1946.*

The Index includes 44,527 individuals. This indicates that in the beginning of 1946, half a year after the War had ended, the fate of one-third of all men conscripted remained unknown. 44,034 men from (99% of all) are matched to contemporary municipalities, see Table B.1. Birth information is available for 44,154 individuals (99% of all), out of which 42,339 (96%) are born in years drafted into the Wehrmacht. Out of the 1,579 municipalities, 1,435 (91%) have at least one man declared missing. On average, 2.3% of the 1936 population was declared missing (std.dev. 1.5%, median 2.3%), of which 0.3% were born during the 1908-1913 period (std.dev. 0.4%) and 1.9% were born during the 1914-1927 period (std.dev. 1.3%).

Table B.1 – Conscription proxy: Data description

	Statistics			Distribution				
Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	5th pctile	Median	95th pctile	Max
Residence info	44,527	0.99	0.10	0	1	1	1	1
Birth info	44,527	0.99	0.09	0	1	1	1	1
Born year drafted	44,154	0.96	0.20	0	1	1	1	1
Born 1908-1913	44,154	0.16	0.36	0	0	0	1	1
Born 1914-1927	44,154	0.81	0.39	0	0	1	1	1
Declared missing (Binary)	1,579	0.91	0.29	0	0	1	1	1
Born 1908-1913 (Binary)	1,579	0.55	0.50	0	0	1	1	1
Born 1914-1927 (Binary)	1,579	0.90	0.30	0	0	1	1	1
Declared missing (#)	1,579	27.9	137.9	0	0	11	74	4,494
Born 1908-1913 (#)	1,579	4.4	29.5	0	0	1	13	1,003
Born 1914-1927 (#)	1,579	22.4	102.9	0	0	9	61	3,280
Declared missing (%)	1,579	2.3	1.5	0	0	2.3	4.9	12.9
Born 1908-1913 (%)	1,579	0.3	0.4	0	0	0.2	1.2	2.9
Born 1914-1927 (%)	1,579	1.9	1.3	0	0	1.9	4.0	10.6

Notes: Data comes from the *Index of French Nationals Compelled into German Armed Forces*. The upper panel presents the disaggregated (individual) data; the lower panel presents the statistics after collapsing the data at the municipality level. *Residence info*, *Birth info*, and *Born year drafted* are binary variables taking the value 1 when information is available. *Born year drafted* are men born in 1908-1927 for Alsace, and 1914-1927 for Moselle, conditional on birth information being available. *Declared missing (Binary)* and sub-groups are variables that take the value 1 when there is at least one individual in the municipality belonging to this group. *Declared missing (#)* and sub-groups is the total number of individuals belonging to each category by municipality. *Declared missing (%)* and sub-groups is the proportion of the 1936 population that appears in the index.

Measuring conscription – Men figuring in the index either were imprisoned or had perished before the end of the war, but their relatives had not been informed. Formally

$$Missing_m = \Big[\underbrace{P(prison_m)}_{\text{Emprisoned}} + \underbrace{\Big(1 - P(dead_m^{known})\Big) \times P(dead_m^{war})}_{\text{Dead but considered missing}} \Big] \times Conscripted_m \tag{1}$$

meaning

$$Conscripted_m = \frac{1}{\vartheta_m} \times Missing_m$$

where $Missing_m$ is the fraction of men declared missing in municipality m, $Conscripted_m$ is overall Wehrmacht conscription in m, and ϑ_m is a municipality-specific probability of being declared missing if conscripted, with $\vartheta_m \equiv P(prison_m) + \big(1 - P(dead_m^{known})\big) \times P(dead_m^{war})$.

The German military command was distrustful towards former French citizens which led to

several special arrangements concerning the incorporation of the latter. After December 1942, these soldiers were no longer allowed on the West Territories that were occupied (France, the Netherlands, and Belgium) nor in certain units (scouting, intelligence, aviation, marine) (Riedweg, 1995, p.102). In May 1943 the decision was taken that soldiers from Alsace and Moselle have to be scattered on the whole territory of the Reich. In the ground army (*Ersatzheer*) there should not be more than 8% to 15% per unit at most; in battle units there should not be more than 5% at most (Riedweg, 1995, p.102). Finally June 1943, the decision was taken that soldiers from Alsace and Moselle should be solely sent to the Eastern Front (Iung et al., 2012, p.61).

Conscripted men from Alsace and Moselle were thus scattered across the Eastern front. Moreover, their individual characteristics were not taken into account in this allocation (see Table 1 of manuscript and Sections D.1 and D.2). Mortality and the imprisonment rate should thus be independent of municipality characteristics. As long as casualties were not only systematically communicated in some municipalities but not others, the deaths not communicated should be a fraction of the total number of casualties. This means that ϑ_m can be approximated by the average $\bar{\vartheta}$, with the measurement error introduced (ν_m) being orthogonal to municipality unobservable characteristics

$$\vartheta_m = \bar{\vartheta} + \nu_m \text{ , with } \nu_m \perp (\varepsilon_m | X_m)$$

$\bar{\theta}$ is calculated using aggregate data. Approximately 134,000 men from Alsace and Moselle were conscripted into the Wehrmacht (MACVG, 1954). In 1946, 44,527 men were declared missing. This implies a $\bar{\vartheta}$ parameter of 0.332. This $\bar{\vartheta}$ is used to construct an approximation of $Conscripted_m$, by inflating $Missing_m$ by $1/\bar{\vartheta} = 3.01$.

Data validation – To the best of my knowledge, the index is the most precise and disaggregated source on conscription. A second source is the first official post-War population census which took place in March 1946. In this census, a question on conscription was included for Alsace and Moselle. This data is available at the canton level in INSEE (1956). Yet, while at that moment an estimated 92,500 had returned from the front, only 65,500 men self-declared conscripted into the Wehrmacht. The arguments given by the statistical office for this under-reporting were: (i) migra-

Figure B.1 – Conscription proxy: Data validation



Notes: Correlation between conscription from the *Index of French Nationals Compelled into German Armed Forces* and other sources on conscription. The left graph presents the link between the index conscription and conscription at the *canton*-level taken from INSEE (1956). The right graph presents the correlation between the index data and Wehrmacht casualties from the *Alsace WWII victims database*. The pairwise correlation coefficients are $\hat{\rho}_L = 0.79$, $N = 93$, and $\hat{\rho}_R = 0.58$, $N = 870$. See Online Appendix B.1 for the construction of the variables.

tion into other regions, (ii) conscription but no displacement, and (iii) omission of conscription.

Finally, under the assumptions presented in the previous sub-section, casualties can be used as a source on conscription. Municipality-level Wehrmacht casualties for Alsace are available from the *Alsace WWII victims database* (`http://memoires.region-alsace.eu/frontoffice/accueil.aspx`). The data on this webpage is unfortunately only available for Alsace. The source of the data in the *Alsace WWII victims database* is the same as the source of *Mémoire des Hommes* (`https://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/fr/article.php?larub=48`), namely the *Fichier des Incorporés De Force (IDF) "Morts Pour La France" (BAVCC-Caen)*. While the *Mémoire des Hommes* contains information on both Alsace and Moselle victims, the search engine of this web-page only allows restricting searches by department of birth. Moreover, while the municipality of birth is available, the municipality of residence is not.

The validity of the index data is tested using the conscription data from INSEE (1956) and casualties from the *Alsace WWII victims database*. These correlations are presented in Figure B.1. Indeed, the index data correlates very well with both sources ($\hat{\rho}_L = 0.79$, $N = 93$, and $\hat{\rho}_R = 0.58$, $N = 870$), indicating that it is a valid source for conscription into the Wehrmacht. Conscription

Figure B.2 – Conscription proxy: Conscription and casualties per year-of-birth



Notes: Conscription from the *Index of French Nationals Compelled into German Armed Forces* and casualties from the *Alsace WWII victims database* for municipalities in Alsace within 20km of the Alsace-Moselle border, by year-of-birth. The left-hand-side graph present conscription and casualties as a fraction of 1936 population. The right-hand-side graph presents the implied casualty rates per year-of-birth.

and casualties by year-of-birth for the municipalities in Alsace within 20km of the border are presented in Figure B.2.

B.2 Pre-war births

Data description – Pre-war birth data is taken from the 1903-1932 decennial civil status registers (*Tables décennales de l'état civil*). The data is available on `http://archives.bas-rhin.fr/` for the Bas-Rhin department, and `http://www.archives57.com/` for Moselle.[1] The last page of the census for these three decades was digitalized for all municipalities within 20km from the Alsace-Moselle border.

To calculate the number of eligible births for 1908-1927 (1914-1927 for Moselle) the total number of births was first estimated using the number of pages (25 entries/page) and the number of entries in the last page of the census.[2] A common year-of-birth distribution for the 1903-1932

[1]Last accessed on Oct 30, 2018. I am particularly thankful to the director of the Bas-Rhin archives, Pascale Verdier, for making the 1913-1922 and 1923-1932 decennial tables available.

[2]Some pages in the 1923-1932 birth registers only contain 19 entries. This was accounted for

period was estimated using the entries of the last page of all municipalities. This allowed to estimate to total number of births for the 1908-1913 and 1914-1927 periods by municipality. The total number of male births is then approximated by using a likelihood of a male birth of 50%.

B.3 Covariates

1936 election results – The 1936 election was conducted using a single-seated first-past-the-post voting system. Electoral constituencies (the *circonscriptions*) were the *arrondissements*, with the exception of large cities that were split into more than one constituency, a fact that lead to more electoral constituencies than *arrondissements*.[3]

The official 1936 parliamentary election results at the canton level come from Lachapelle (1936). This data is used to calculate the share of right-wing and left-wing vote in the 1936 election using Lachapelle (1936), Dreyfus (1969), and Zanoun (2009) to classify candidates. Candidates considered as right-wing are the candidates belonging to the first (conservatives) and second (popular democrats) groups in Lachapelle (1936, p.VIII). Parties belonging to the first group are the following: *Action populaire*, *Chrétien social*, *Conservateur*, *Conservateur agraire*, *Conservateur chrétien social*, *Indépendants (Action populaire)*, *Républicains indépendants*, *U.R.D.*, and *U.R.D. (Féderation républicaine)*. Parties belonging to the second group are the following: *Démocrates populaires*, *Radicaux indépendants*, *Républicains de gauche*, and *Républicains de gauche (Alliance démocratique)*. Some candidates belong to parties not classified in any of the Lachapelle (1936) groups, but are instead classified as *Indépendent*, *Autonomistes*, *Conservateur Françiste*, *Françiste*, and *Royaliste*. I first exploit information from the newspaper *Le Temps* dating from April 28, 1936 (two days after the election),

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when calculating the total number of births.

[3] *Arrondissements* are the third lowest administrative unit in France. An average arrondissement in Alsace and Moselle in 1936 comprised 75 municipalities. In 1936 there were 23 arrondissements in Alsace and Moselle for 25 constituencies. The divergence between the number of constituencies and arrondissements in 1936 comes from the two largest cities in Alsace, namely Strasbourg and Mulhouse, both of which belong to a single arrondissement but are split in two constituencies: Strasbourg-Ville (1re) and Strasbourg-Ville (2e), and Mulhouse-Ville and Mulhouse-Campagne.

that reports parties for 6 of these 15 candidates. The 4 *Conservateur Françiste*, *Françiste*, and *Royaliste* candidates are classified as conservatives, therefore right-wing. There are 5 candidates that are *Autonomistes*. These candidates are classified as right-wing using information from Dreyfus (1969), Zanoun (2009), and Wikipedia.

Abstention in the 1936 election is only available at the constituency level. To overcome this issue I exploited data from INSEE (1956) that reports the male population of French nationality in 1936, per arrondissement and canton.[4] Note that in the 1936 election, only males aged 21 and above were allowed to vote. The correlation between the male population of French nationality and eligible voters in the 1936 election at the arrondissement level is of 0.93 and highly significant. Registered voters are on average 0.59 of the male population of French nationality. I use this number to rescale the male population and obtain a proxy of registered voters. This approximation does not hold unconditionally however. I do implicitly assume that the male age distribution is relatively stable across cantons (i.e. that the fraction of the population below 21 years is roughly the same).

Historical control variables – The 1936 municipal population is taken from the Cassini Dataset, available on `http://cassini.ehess.fr` (last accessed on Nov 2, 2018). The 1936 share of the *canton* population that only spoke the local dialect (but no official language) is taken from INSEE (1956). This variable is used to approximate pre-war educational attainment. The 1936 share of the canton population that is male and foreigner is taken from INSEE (1956). This variable is used to approximate pre-war industrialization. The share of the 1946 canton population that was displaced but not conscripted is taken from INSEE (1956). This variable is introduced to take into account the fact that the two *Gauleiters* had different policies when it came to cultural and

[4]Some cantons belong to different constituencies and arrondissements (Grostenquin: Château-Salins and Forbach, and Saint-Avold: Boulay-Moselle and Forbach). Metz 1er and Metz 2eme are also a mixture of the cantons in Metz-Ville and Metz-Campagne (Gorze: Metz 1er and Metz-Campagne; Pange, Verny, Vigy: Metz 2eme and Metz-Campagne; Metz-Campagne: Metz 1er, Metz 2eme and Metz-Campagne; Metz-Ville: Metz 1er, Metz 2eme and Metz-Ville).

Figure B.3 – Covariates: Religion and language data validity



Notes: Correlation between measures of religious and linguistic composition and data taken from INSEE (1956). The left graph presents the link between the church composition and religious affiliation in 1936 at the *canton*-level. The right graph presents the correlation between the "French sounding" names at birth in 1891-1940 and the share of the population that is French-speaking in 1936 at the canton-level. The pairwise correlation coefficients are $\hat{\rho}_L = 0.97$, $N = 17$, and $\hat{\rho}_R = 0.87$, $N = 92$. See Online Appendix B.3 for the construction of the variables.

ideological assimilation.

Information on existing churches by confession is collected for all municipalities within 20km of the Alsace-Moselle border from *Clochers de France* (`https://clochers.org/index.htm`), *Observatoire du Patrimoine Religieux* (`http://www.patrimoine-religieux.fr/`), and *UEPAL* (`http://www.uepal.fr/`). The municipality religious composition is then calculated using the number of churches by confession in a municipality. For instance, a municipality with 2 Catholic and 1 Protestant churches is assumed to have 2/3 of the population of Catholic confession. An indicator variable is also constructed for the presence of a Synagogue.

Municipality level linguistic composition (French- and German-speaking) is calculated using family names at birth for the 1891-1940 period. The information is taken from the *1891 to 1990 Family Name File* (henceforth FNF) of INSEE. The FNF contains the number of births by family name and municipality over 25-year periods (1891-1915, 1916-1940, 1941-1965, 1966-1990). I first identify the most popular family names in France (excluding Alsace and Moselle) over the 1891-1940 period. To do so, I choose family names that account for 10% of total births during this period. I then match these 114 family names to the family names at birth in Alsace and Moselle for 1891-

Table B.2 – Covariates: Historical control variables

	Statistics			Distribution				
Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	5th pctile	Median	95th pctile	Max
Conscripted (%)	462	7.74	4.51	0.00	0.97	7.62	15.44	39.34
Eligible births (%)	462	19.20	5.28	3.91	11.61	18.41	28.24	33.92
Births 1903-1912 (%)	462	16.24	3.95	4.34	10.28	16.20	22.60	33.10
Births 1913-1922 (%)	462	10.69	2.52	3.15	6.68	10.55	14.87	21.31
Births 1923-1932 (%)	462	10.40	2.49	1.72	6.60	10.37	13.91	21.63
Protestant churches (%)	462	21.16	32.52	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00
Synagogue (binary)	462	0.07	0.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
French name at birth (%)	462	3.46	5.00	0.00	0.00	1.72	13.02	35.06
Population 1936 (Log)	462	6.15	0.86	3.30	4.81	6.14	7.63	9.89
Male foreigners in 1936 (%)	462	1.75	3.29	0.11	0.25	0.75	11.15	15.33
Dialect-speaking in 1936 (%)	462	10.96	2.78	3.51	4.54	11.40	14.58	15.76
Displaced in 1946 (%)	462	9.76	10.63	3.58	3.73	6.23	25.04	61.27
Waterway (binary)	462	0.07	0.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Elevation (Log m.)	462	5.62	0.25	5.02	5.26	5.61	6.21	6.69
Elevation std.dev. (Log m.)	462	3.19	0.71	0.41	2.22	3.10	4.59	5.26
Distance to Germany (Log km)	462	3.18	0.66	0.29	1.77	3.37	3.93	4.10
Right-wing in 1936 (% registered)	462	62.52	12.73	31.96	40.20	62.40	81.27	81.91
Dialect: Rhine Franconian (binary)	462	0.52	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
South Franconian (binary)	462	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Alsatian (binary)	462	0.33	0.47	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Lorrain (binary)	462	0.15	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00

Notes: Historical covariates used in Section 3. The unit of observation is a municipality (variables are time-invariant). See Online Appendix B.3 for the construction of the variables.

1940 and calculate the fraction of births with "French sounding" family names per municipality. Both approximations (language and religion) work particularly well. The correlation between church data and census data (at the canton level) from INSEE (1956) is $\hat{\rho} = 0.969$ ($N = 17$); the correlation between names at birth and INSEE (1956) is $\hat{\rho} = 0.865$ ($N = 92$), see Figure B.3.

Information on local dialects is taken from Lévy (1929) and Wikipedia (`https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alsace-Lorraine`). Local dialects date back to the 5th century C.E., meaning that municipalities with a common dialect share a very long common history. Finally, data on geographical endowments such as access to waterways and elevation (both mean and std.dev.) is taken from the European Environment Agency. Table B.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the historical covariates for the 462 municipalities within 20km of the Alsace-Moselle border.

Contemporary control variables – Municipality-level data on population is taken from the censuses organized by INSEE. This data is available for 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, and every year during the 2006-2014 period. Municipality-level data on the age/gender composition, educational attainment, sectoral employment, and unemployment is taken from the 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2009, and 2014 censuses. The population distribution is available in 5-year $\times$ gender groups and is regrouped into 6 larger generations, namely those born from 1856 to 1900, 1928 to 1945, 1946-1964, 1965-1980, 1981-1996, and 1997-2017. Note that all population variables (i.e. log population, share per generation, and male share) are constructed excluding the 1901-1927 individuals, since these cohorts are directly affected by the treatment.

Educational attainment for individuals aged 16 or more is available into 4 categories: (i) no degree, or at best BEPC, BC, DNB degree, (ii) CAP, BEP degree, (iii) high-school degree (*Baccalauréat*), and (iv) university degree. The categories are available in two age groups (16-24, 25 and above) and by gender. Educational attainment is regrouped into 2 broader categories, regardless of gender and age: (i) "no high-school degree" (at best BEPC, BC, DNB, and CAP, BEP), and (ii) "at least high-school" (high-school and university). Sectoral employment for employed individuals aged 25 to 54 is available into 6 categories: (i) farmers, (ii) craftsmen, tradesmen, businessmen, (iii) senior managers, (iv) intermediate professions, (v) employees, and (vi) workers. Sectoral employment is regrouped into 2 broader categories, namely farmers and workers ("blue-collar workers") and the rest. Unemployed individuals are defined as the ones that declared not being employed and searching for a job when the census took place. For all these variables, inter-census years are estimated by linear interpolation, following Gentzkow (2006). The 1968 data is used for the 1965 election and the 2014 for the 2017 election.

Income data is taken from INSEE and is available for 2001, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009, and 2011. Median income in Euros is available for all municipalities. The standard deviation of income is only available at this level for municipalities with at least 2,000 inhabitants. For the municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants, the income standard deviation of the canton is used. Once again, data is interpolated and the 2001 income is used for the 1965, 1969, 1974, and 1995 elections, while the 2011 income is used for 2012 and 2017. The share of the population that is a foreigner

Table B.3 – Covariates: Contemporary control variables

	Statistics			Distribution				
Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	5th pctile	Median	95th pctile	Max
Election year	3,696	1992.63	19.17	1965.00	1965.00	1998.50	2017.00	2017.00
Radical right-wing (% registered)	3,696	13.92	11.55	0.00	0.00	16.44	30.85	46.43
Abstention (% registered)	3,696	20.12	7.14	0.00	9.25	19.51	32.98	57.14
Population (Log excl. b. 1901-27)	3,696	6.02	1.05	0.92	4.46	5.98	7.87	9.96
Born 1856-1900 (% excl. b. 1901-27)	3,696	5.23	8.79	0.00	0.00	0.00	22.22	100.00
Born 1928-1945 (% excl. b. 1901-27)	3,696	21.29	8.73	0.00	8.31	20.61	35.17	89.47
Born 1946-1964 (% excl. b. 1901-27)	3,696	34.44	10.74	0.00	20.36	31.81	53.57	88.15
Born 1965-1980 (% excl. b. 1901-27)	3,696	19.08	8.48	0.00	2.26	21.61	29.28	61.50
Born 1981-1996 (% excl. b. 1901-27)	3,696	11.95	10.12	0.00	0.00	15.28	25.19	66.67
Born 1997-2017 (% excl. b. 1901-27)	3,696	8.01	9.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	25.19	45.45
Male (% excl. b. 1901-27)	3,696	50.57	5.03	–0.00	43.24	50.57	57.73	100.00
Foreigners (%)	3,696	3.05	3.66	0.00	0.00	1.86	10.41	25.47
High-school degree (%)	3,696	18.94	13.79	0.00	0.51	18.53	42.16	66.67
Blue-collar workers (%)	3,696	48.61	25.38	0.00	6.00	46.85	97.28	100.00
Unemployment rate (%)	3,696	4.53	4.83	0.00	0.00	3.70	13.07	43.48
Median income (Log EUR)	3,696	10.23	0.17	9.73	9.97	10.22	10.53	10.72
Income std.dev. (Log EUR)	3,696	10.10	0.26	9.42	9.81	10.05	10.66	11.53

Notes: Contemporary covariates used in Section 3. The unit of observation is a municipality × year (the variables are time-varying). See Online Appendix B.3 for the construction of the variables.

is available for the 2006, 2007, and 2009-2014 years. A foreigner is defined as any person living in France that does not hold the French nationality. The foreigner share is available into 4 age categories and by gender. The categories are aggregated. The data is interpolated and the 2006 share is used for the 1965, 1969, 1974, 1995, and 2002 elections, while the 2014 share is used for 2017. The descriptive statistics of contemporary covariates are presented in Table B.4.

B.4 1936 Population census

Data description – To evaluate the importance of the draft rule in the conscription process, I collected data from the 1936 population census (*Listes nominatives*). While one would ideally sample municipalities on both sides of the border, the 1936 population census for Moselle was destroyed in 1942. Only municipalities from Alsace were thus sampled. The sample consists of municipalities from a single arrondissement, that of Saverne in the Bas-Rhin (Alsace). The arrondissement chosen has two advantages: (i) it borders on Moselle, and (ii) its municipalities are highly heterogeneous in terms of religious and linguistic composition. In 1936 the Saverne arrondissement

consisted of 134 municipalities (that correspond to 124 contemporary municipalities as of January 1, 2018) with a total population of 79,584, meaning that an average municipality has 594 inhabitants in 1936 (std.dev.=880).[5]

Sampling procedure – The sampling strategy follows IPUMS as described in Saleh (2013). I first used the 1936 municipal population from the Cassini Dataset to estimate the number of pages each municipal census is composed of (a page in the 1936 census consists of 30 entries). Using this information I calculated the target sample size in each municipality, by setting a target sample of 5% of the population and no less than 4 pages (120 entries). I then randomly drew half the pages to be digitalized and kept consecutive pages. For example, since pages 4 and 13 were drawn for Waldhambach, I scanned pages 4, 5, 13, and 14.

This resulted in a full sample of 16,330 individuals. Following Saleh (2013), only full households were kept, yielding the final sample of 15,232 individuals. The average municipality sample size is of 31% of a municipality's population. Only 3 municipalities fail to reach the 5% target threshold (Dettwiller with 4.7%, Ingwiller with 4.2%, and Val de Moder with 3.6%). Roughly half of the 15,232 individuals are males. 2,303 of those 7,592 individuals (15%) were eligible for Wehrmacht conscription (i.e. born during the period from 1908 to 1927).

Matching the *Index* to the 1936 census – The matching from the *Index* to the 1936 population census is based on the first and last name, and the year-of-birth of individuals in the two sources. The search was restricted to the municipality of residence of each individual, meaning that, if an individual moved between 1936 and 1942, he would not be detected. The main reason restricting

[5]The 10 municipalities that have been absorbed by other municipalities by 2018 are the following: Allenwiller, Birkenwald, Salenthal, and Singrist, that merged into Sommerau in 2016; Griesbach-le-Bastberg, Imbsheim, and Riedheim, that were absorbed by Bouxwiller in 1973; Bosselshausen that was absorbed by Kirrwiller in 1974 and split again in 2007; Obermodern and Zutzendorf, that merged into Obermodern-Zutzendorf in 1983; and Bischtroff-sur-Sarre and Zollingen, that were absorbed by Sarrewerden in 1972.

Table B.4 – 1936 Population census: Data description

	Statistics			Distribution				
Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	5th pctile	Median	95th pctile	Max
Year-of-birth	15,228	1901.88	22.06	1839	1864	1904	1933	1937
Appears in the *Index*	15,232	0.02	0.15	0	0	0	0	1
Male	15,232	0.50	0.50	0	0	0	1	1
Eligible for Wehrmacht	15,232	0.15	0.36	0	0	0	1	1
of whom in the *Index*	2,303	0.15	0.36	0	0	0	1	1
Nationality: French	15,232	0.99	0.09	0	1	1	1	1
German	15,232	0.00	0.05	0	0	0	0	1
Other	15,232	0.01	0.07	0	0	0	0	1
Religion: Roman catholic	15,232	0.41	0.49	0	0	0	1	1
Protestant	15,232	0.58	0.49	0	0	1	1	1
Other	15,232	0.01	0.08	0	0	0	0	1
French speaking	15,232	0.38	0.48	0	0	0	1	1
Household head	15,232	0.28	0.45	0	0	0	1	1
Household size	15,232	4.56	1.98	1	2	4	8	14

Notes: Data comes from the 1936 population census (*Listes nominatives*). Individual-level data. All variables are binary with the exception of *Year-of-birth* and *Household size*.

the search within the residence municipality is that the matching was done manually; when collecting the 1936 population census data, the first and last name were not digitalized. The reason for not digitalizing the names in the census was that most of the lists were hand written and this would result in an extremely time-consuming process.

This results in 353 individuals being matched from the *Index* to the 1936 population census, and a compliance rate for eligible men of 15%. According to the 1936 census general results (National Library of France, 4-L31-106) approximately 266,000 male individuals that were born in the years drafted lived in Alsace and Moselle in 1936. The unconditional matching rate should therefore be of $44,150/266,000 = 0.165$ which is comparable to the matching rate of 0.15. The divergence in the matching rates could be due to the fact that individuals are observed in 1936 rather than 1942 and some of them might have moved to different municipalities.

B.5 Comparative Manifesto Project

Data description – Data on parties' policy positions is taken from the *Comparative Manifesto Project* (henceforth CMP), and the *Euromanifesto Project* (henceforth EMP). The CMP (Volkens et

al., 2018) contains information on policy positions of parties that have gained at least one seat in the parliament lower house elections, from 56 countries and 1,100 parties (23 from France), for the 1946-2017 period. The EMP (Schmitt et al., 2018) contains information on parties that have been represented in the European parliament at least once, from 29 countries and 337 parties (30 from France), for 1979-2014.

Both sources contain the same information, the share of quasi-sentences spent by major parties on 7 domains: external relations, freedom and democracy, the political system, the economy, welfare and quality of life, the fabric of society, and social groups. The topics in the two datasets are harmonized using the *Euromanifesto / Manifesto Project mapping scheme* (Schmitt et al., 2016). The parties are harmonized using König et al. (2013) and the *Manifesto Project Dataset List of Political Parties* (version 2018a). The *Manifesto Project Dataset List of Political Parties* also classifies some parties as alliances/coalitions; when this is the case, the data is duplicated and separate parties (with identical programs) are created.

Matching parties to candidates – Presidential candidates are then matched to the party they belong to. The primary source is each politician's Wikipedia page. Party data is unavailable for candidates whose parties do not have seats in the lower house or the European parliament. When this is the case, the candidate is matched to the last party to which he/she belonged to and for which data is available. When no party data exists at all, the candidate is associated to the party that is ideologically closer.

Legislative and European parliament elections do not necessarily coincide with presidential elections. Only the programs for elections within ± 4 years of the presidential elections are used to calculate candidates' positions. When no program is available within this 9 year period, the closest program available is used. On average a candidate is matched to a program 1.4 years from the election ($std.dev. = 2.5$); 3 candidates are matched to programs more than 9 years from their election ($max = 19$). The candidate's platform is calculated as the average over party platforms available. This average is conditional on election type to account for aggregate differences between legislative and European parliament campaigns.

Table B.5 – Comparative Manifesto Project: Matching parties to candidates

Candidate (Election)	Party (Data Source)	Polls	Radical	Nation	Authority	L-R
Arthaud (2012)	LO (EMP:2009), LO (EMP:2014)	0.005	0.073	-0.018	0.000	0.420
Arthaud (2017)	LO (EMP:2014)	0.000	0.134	-0.036	0.000	0.357
Asselineau (2017)	Libertas (EMP:2009)	0.010	0.442	0.065	0.000	0.435
Balladur (1995)	UDF (CMP:1993), RPR-UDF (EMP:1994), UDF (CMP:1997), Nouvelle UDF (EMP:1999)	0.165	0.052	-0.003	0.048	0.539
Barbu (1965)	SIFO (CMP:1962), SIFO (CMP:1967), SIFO (CMP:1968)	0.010	0.177	-0.069	-0.062	0.300
Bayrou (2002)	Nouvelle UDF (EMP:1999), UDF (CMP:2002), Nouvelle UDF (EMP:2004)	0.060	0.058	0.048	0.071	0.522
Bayrou (2007)	Nouvelle UDF (EMP:2004), MoDem (CMP:2007), MoDem-UDI (EMP:2009)	0.180	0.073	0.029	0.030	0.455
Bayrou (2012)	MoDem-UDI (EMP:2009), MoDem (CMP:2012), MoDem-UDI (EMP:2014)	0.110	0.056	-0.011	0.038	0.436
Besancenot (2002)	LCR (EMP:1999), LO (EMP:2004)	0.035	0.107	0.000	-0.009	0.336
Besancenot (2007)	LO (EMP:2004), LO (EMP:2009)	0.040	0.101	0.000	-0.002	0.408
Boutin (2002)	Nouvelle UDF (EMP:1999), UDF (CMP:2002), Nouvelle UDF (EMP:2004)	0.010	0.058	0.048	0.071	0.522
Bové (2007)	FG (EMP:2004), FG (EMP:2009)	0.015	0.144	0.000	-0.009	0.432
Buffet (2007)	PCF (EMP:2004), PCF (CMP:2007), FG (EMP:2009)	0.025	0.093	-0.010	-0.021	0.347
Chaban-Delmas (1974)	UDR (CMP:1973), RPR (CMP:1978)	0.150	0.119	0.039	0.028	0.588
Cheminade (1995)	N.S. (EMP:2004)	0.005	0.116	0.000	0.000	0.333
Cheminade (2012)	N.S. (EMP:2004)	0.000	0.116	0.000	0.000	0.333
Cheminade (2017)	N.S. (EMP:2004)	0.000	0.116	0.000	0.000	0.333
Chevènement (2002)	MDC (EMP:1994)	0.060	0.134	0.183	0.000	0.579
Chirac (1995)	RPR (CMP:1993), RPR-UDF (EMP:1994), RPR (CMP:1997), UMP (EMP:1999)	0.240	0.059	0.007	0.034	0.502
Chirac (2002)	UMP (EMP:1999), UMP (CMP:2002), UMP (EMP:2004)	0.190	0.062	-0.020	0.109	0.530
de Gaulle (1965)	UNR (CMP:1962), UD-Ve (CMP:1967), UDR (CMP:1968)	0.430	0.146	0.059	0.027	0.603
de Villiers (1995)	RPF (EMP:1994), RPF (EMP:1999)	0.060	0.270	0.088	0.106	0.527
de Villiers (2007)	MPF (EMP:2004), Libertas (EMP:2009)	0.025	0.539	0.066	0.027	0.486
Defferre (1969)	SIFO (CMP:1967), SIFO (CMP:1968), PS (CMP:1973)	0.070	0.204	-0.093	-0.061	0.313
Ducatel (1969)	RRRS (CMP:1967), RRRS (CMP:1968)	0.010	0.218	-0.089	-0.067	0.315
Duclos (1969)	PCF (CMP:1967), PCF (CMP:1968), PCF (CMP:1973)	0.170	0.215	-0.065	-0.038	0.304
Dumont (1974)	Les Verts (CMP:1993)	0.007	0.096	-0.034	-0.043	0.386
Dupont-Aignan (2012)	Libertas (EMP:2009)	0.015	0.442	0.065	0.000	0.435
Dupont-Aignan (2017)	Libertas (EMP:2009)	0.045	0.442	0.065	0.000	0.435
Fillon (2017)	UMP (EMP:2014), UMP (CMP:2017)	0.190	0.125	0.066	0.110	0.572
Giscard d'Estaing (1974)	MR (CMP:1973), UDF (CMP:1978)	0.300	0.070	-0.019	-0.032	0.515
Gluckstein (2002)	FG (EMP:2004)	0.005	0.206	0.000	0.000	0.416
Hamon (2017)	PS-PRG (EMP:2014), PS (CMP:2017)	0.075	0.059	-0.019	0.100	0.412
Héraud (1974)	RRRS (CMP:1968)	0.007	0.252	-0.138	-0.061	0.304
Hollande (2012)	PS (EMP:2009), PS (CMP:2012), PS-PRG (EMP:2014)	0.280	0.036	-0.012	0.028	0.408
Hue (1995)	PCF (CMP:1993), PCF (EMP:1994), PCF (CMP:1997), PCF (EMP:1999)	0.095	0.137	-0.022	-0.022	0.363
Hue (2002)	PCF (EMP:1999), PCF (CMP:2002), PCF (EMP:2004)	0.050	0.086	-0.017	-0.004	0.375
Joly (2012)	EE (EMP:2009), EÃL'LV (CMP:2012), EELV (EMP:2014)	0.020	0.053	-0.019	-0.001	0.401
Jospin (1995)	PS (CMP:1993), PS (EMP:1994), PS (CMP:1997), PS (EMP:1999)	0.205	0.046	-0.004	0.016	0.413
Jospin (2002)	PS (EMP:1999), PS (CMP:2002), PS (EMP:2004)	0.180	0.028	-0.006	0.078	0.430
Krivine (1969)	PCF (CMP:1967), PCF (CMP:1968), PCF (CMP:1973)	0.010	0.215	-0.065	-0.038	0.304
Krivine (1974)	PCF (CMP:1973), PCF (CMP:1978)	0.007	0.211	-0.050	0.002	0.338
Laguiller (1974)	PCF (CMP:1973), PCF (CMP:1978)	0.007	0.211	-0.050	0.002	0.338
Laguiller (1995)	LO (EMP:1999)	0.050	0.130	-0.009	0.000	0.445
Laguiller (2002)	LO (EMP:1999), LO (EMP:2004)	0.080	0.160	-0.005	-0.002	0.389
Laguiller (2007)	LO (EMP:2004), LO (EMP:2009)	0.015	0.101	0.000	-0.002	0.408
Lassalle (2017)	MoDem-UDI (EMP:2014), MoDem (CMP:2017)	0.005	0.063	0.009	0.039	0.460
Le Pen JM (1974)	FN (CMP:1986)	0.007	0.145	0.139	0.042	0.663
Le Pen JM (1995)	FN (CMP:1993), FN (EMP:1994), FN (CMP:1997), FN (EMP:1999)	0.140	0.157	0.258	0.103	0.652
Le Pen JM (2002)	FN (EMP:1999), FN (CMP:2002), FN (EMP:2004)	0.140	0.245	0.166	0.071	0.571
Le Pen JM (2007)	FN (EMP:2004), FN (CMP:2007), FN (EMP:2009)	0.130	0.388	0.112	0.009	0.559
Le Pen M (2012)	FN (EMP:2009), FN (CMP:2012), FN (EMP:2014)	0.170	0.269	0.143	0.052	0.513
Le Pen M (2017)	FN (EMP:2014), FN (CMP:2017)	0.230	0.141	0.188	0.103	0.508
Lecanuet (1965)	MRP (CMP:1962), CD (CMP:1967), PDM (CMP:1968)	0.200	0.121	0.016	-0.034	0.511
Lepage (2002)	GE (CMP:1997)	0.010	0.074	0.030	-0.019	0.517
Macron (2017)	LREM (CMP:2017)	0.245	0.092	0.035	0.083	0.517
Madelin (2002)	UMP (EMP:1999), UMP (CMP:2002), UMP (EMP:2004)	0.050	0.062	-0.020	0.109	0.530
Mamère (2002)	Les Verts (EMP:1999), Les Verts (CMP:2002), Les Verts (EMP:2004)	0.050	0.034	-0.019	0.005	0.427
Marcilhacy (1965)	MRP (CMP:1962), CD (CMP:1967), PDM (CMP:1968)	0.020	0.121	0.016	-0.034	0.511
Mégret (2002)	FN (EMP:1999), FN (CMP:2002), FN (EMP:2004)	0.020	0.245	0.166	0.071	0.571
Mélenchon (2012)	FG (EMP:2009), FDG (CMP:2012), FG (EMP:2014)	0.150	0.107	-0.016	-0.016	0.383
Mélenchon (2017)	FG (EMP:2014), LFI (CMP:2017)	0.190	0.138	-0.002	0.001	0.395
Mitterrand (1965)	SIFO (CMP:1962), SIFO (CMP:1967), SIFO (CMP:1968)	0.270	0.177	-0.069	-0.062	0.300
Mitterrand (1974)	PS (CMP:1973), PS (CMP:1978)	0.450	0.168	-0.094	-0.051	0.315
Muller (1974)	RRRS (CMP:1968)	0.007	0.252	-0.138	-0.061	0.304
Nihous (2007)	CPNT (EMP:2004)	0.020	0.365	0.003	0.000	0.481
Poher (1969)	CD (CMP:1967), PDM (CMP:1968), MR (CMP:1973)	0.310	0.084	0.031	-0.037	0.503
Pompidou (1969)	UD-Ve (CMP:1967), UDR (CMP:1968), UDR (CMP:1973)	0.400	0.131	0.056	0.026	0.603
Poutou (2012)	LO (EMP:2009), LO (EMP:2014)	0.010	0.073	-0.018	0.000	0.420
Poutou (2017)	LO (EMP:2014)	0.010	0.134	-0.036	0.000	0.357
Renouvin (1974)	PS (CMP:1973), PS (CMP:1978)	0.007	0.168	-0.094	-0.051	0.315
Rocard (1969)	SIFO (CMP:1967), SIFO (CMP:1968), PS (CMP:1973)	0.030	0.204	-0.093	-0.061	0.313
Royal (2007)	PS (EMP:2004), PS (CMP:2007), PS (EMP:2009)	0.230	0.040	-0.003	0.059	0.434
Royer (1974)	CNIP (CMP:1973), CNIP (CMP:1978)	0.040	0.123	0.039	-0.034	0.574
Saint-Josse (2002)	CPNT (EMP:1999), CPNT (EMP:2004)	0.040	0.364	-0.055	0.000	0.536
Sarkozy (2007)	UMP (EMP:2004), UMP (CMP:2007), UMP (EMP:2009)	0.300	0.071	-0.017	0.063	0.509
Sarkozy (2012)	UMP (EMP:2009), UMP (CMP:2012), UMP (EMP:2014)	0.240	0.102	0.036	0.070	0.497
Schivardi (2007)	FG (EMP:2004), FG (EMP:2009)	0.005	0.144	0.000	-0.009	0.432
Sebag (1974)	RRRS (CMP:1968)	0.007	0.252	-0.138	-0.061	0.304
Taubira (2002)	PRG (EMP:1999), PRG (EMP:2004)	0.020	0.014	0.001	0.048	0.423
Tixier-Vignancour (1965)	UDCA (CMP:1956)	0.070	0.180	-0.056	-0.027	0.624
Voynet (1995)	Les Verts (CMP:1993), Les Verts (CMP:1997), Les Verts (EMP:1999)	0.040	0.078	-0.033	-0.029	0.376
Voynet (2007)	Les Verts (EMP:2004), Les Verts (CMP:2007), EE (EMP:2009)	0.015	0.039	-0.019	-0.014	0.430

Notes: Candidates classification and policy positions. See Online Appendix B.5 for the construction of the variables. L-R is the left-right index variable of the CMP data normalized to range from 0 to 1.

Figure B.4 – Policy positions: Measuring radicalism



Notes: Correlation between radicalism measure (τ_P) and CHES data. Left: Linear fit of the following regression $AEI_P = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \tau_P + \varepsilon_P$. Estimated coefficients: $\hat{\alpha}_0 = 3.22$, $\hat{\alpha}_1 = 0.75$; $N = 17$; $R^2 = 0.65$. Right: Quadratic fit of the following regression $\tau_P = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 LRI_P + \alpha_2 LRI_P^2 + \varepsilon_P$. Estimated coefficients: $\hat{\alpha}_0 = 8.66$, $\hat{\alpha}_1 = -3.48$, $\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.36$; $N = 35$; $R^2 = 0.61$.

Radical, authoritarian, and nationalist candidates – Candidates are classified into radical, authoritarian, and nationalist using the data. Backes (2009) defines radical candidates as the ones that "*radically criticize the existing social and economic order*". The measure of a candidate's degree of radicalism is constructed under the guidance of this definition. The variables used to construct the measure are the following (variable number): Foreign Special Relationships: Negative (102), Military: Negative (105), Internationalism: Negative (109), European Community/Union: Negative (110), Constitutionalism: Negative (204), Protectionism: Negative (407), National Way of Life: Negative (602), Traditional Morality: Negative (604), Multiculturalism: Negative (608), and Labor Groups: Negative (702). The degree of radicalism of candidate C in election t is therefore $Radical_{C,t} = \sum_q QS(q)_{C,t}$, where $QS(q)_{C,t}$ is the share of candidate C's discourse spent on topic q in election t and $q \in \{102, 105, 109, 110, 204, 407, 602, 604, 608, 702\}$ is the CMP variable.

To test the validity of the radicalism measure I compare it to the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (CHES) measure of anti-establishment discourse (available for 2012 and 2017). The correlation (Figure B.4, left graph) is strong despite the small sample for which data are commonly available ($\hat{\rho} = 0.805$, $N = 17$). The correlation with the left-right index of CHES (available since 1999) is U-shaped (Figure B.4, right graph), meaning that parties more to the left or the right are more

likely to use this type of discourse than parties closer to the center.

The degree of authoritarianism and nationalism of a candidate are also constructed in a similar way. The variables used to construct the authoritarian measure are the following (variable number): Military: Positive (104) − Military: Negative (105) + Law and Order: Positive (605). The variables used to construct the nationalist measure are the following (variable number): National Way of Life: Positive (601) − National Way of Life: Negative (602) + Traditional Morality: Positive (603) − Traditional Morality: Negative (604) − Multiculturalism: Positive (607) + Multiculturalism: Negative (608). Table B.5 presents the match between candidates and parties and their degree of radicalism, authoritarianism, and nationalism.

Measuring polarization – Policy divergence is measured with the polarization index proposed by Dalton (2008). The index is constructed as follows

$$\Delta Radical_t \equiv PI(Radical_{C,t}) = \left(\sum_C \left\{ \hat{\pi}_{C,t} \times \left[Radical_{C,t} - \sum_C \hat{\pi}_{C,t} Radical_{C,t} \right]^2 \right\} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \tag{2}$$

where $\hat{\pi}_{C,t}$ is the candidate's predicted share in the polls that preceded the election. Pre-election poll data is taken from Wikipedia. Only the polls in the month preceding the election are used. The index weights the divergence between the position of the candidates ($Radical_{C,t}$) and the election-weighted average $\left[\sum_C \left(\hat{\pi}_{C,t} \times Radical_{C,t} \right) \right]$ by the expected importance of each candidate ($\hat{\pi}_{C,t}$).

The polarization index is presented in Figure B.5. The left graph presents a candidate's distance to the election weighted average and her expected importance. In accordance with the anecdotal evidence, in earlier elections there is little divergence compared to the later elections, a feature captured by the polarization index (right graph).

Figure B.5 – Policy positions: Measuring polarization



Notes: Candidates' degree of radicalism and polarization across elections. Left: Difference between candidate's degree of radicalism and the election weighted-average. The point present the candidate positions; the circle represents the intention to vote for the candidate in the polls preceding the election. Right: Dalton (2008) polarization index, constructed as in Equation (2).

B.6 French Electoral Studies 1968-2017

Data description – The *French Electoral Studies* (henceforth FES), are post-electoral surveys that have been taking place in France since 1958.[6] The purpose of these surveys is to better understand the voting behavior of French citizens in the aftermath of elections. The FES was conducted in 1958, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1978, and in every presidential election year since 1988. It typically contains questions on socio-economic attitudes, the relationship to politics, political choices, values and beliefs, the relationship to society, the environment and a wide array of individual characteristics.

The FES also importantly contains questions on respondents' political trust and retrospective voting choices in presidential elections. The 1969 survey contains a question on the choice in the presidential elections of 1965 and 1969, that of 1978 for 1974, and the 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 surveys for the election that took place in that specific year. The question on political trust that is present in all waves is the following: *"Do you think politicians on the whole care what people like*

[6]The name of the survey has changed through time. It was called *French Post-election Survey* in 1958, 1962, 1978, 1988, 1995, and 2012, *French National Election Study* in 1969, *French Electoral Panel* in 2002 and 2007, and *French Electoral Study* in 2017.

you think?". The possible answers are (i) a lot, (ii) quite, (iii) a little, and (iv) not at all. Note that in 1969 the formulation was slightly different: *"I don't think that the government cares much what people like me think"* with possible answers (i) I agree, (ii) it depends, and (iii) I disagree.

Estimation and results – I use the FES data to estimate multinomial logistic regressions of the effect of political distrust (rescaled to take values from 0 to 1) on the candidate choice in presidential elections. Formally, the regression equation is

$$\ln\left(\frac{P(choice=j)}{P(choice=base)}\right) = x_i'\gamma_j + \beta_j distrust_i \tag{3}$$

where $P(choice=j)$ is the probability of choosing candidate j and $P(choice=base)$ is the probability of choosing a baseline candidate. I estimate Equation (3) separately for each election. The vector x_i' consists of age, age squared, and gender. In every election I choose as the baseline the candidate that ended up winning the election. Respondents from the annexed departments are excluded from the estimation, while standard errors are clustered at the department level.

The relative probability of choosing candidate j with respect to the baseline candidate (the relative risk ratio) is

$$\frac{P(choice=j)}{P(choice=base)} = \exp\left(x_i'\gamma_j + \beta_j distrust_i\right) \tag{4}$$

The relative risk ratios of Equation (4) are presented in Figure B.6 instead of a table. In line with the anecdotal evidence, in early election distrustful voters are not very likely to vote differently than trustful ones; they are 3 times likelier to vote for Mitterand than de Gaulle in 1965, 7 times more likely to vote for Duclos than Pompidou in 1969, and 9 times more likely to vote for Le Pen than Giscard d'Estaing in 1974. This is in stark contrast with the voting behavior of distrustful voters in later elections: they are 23 times more likely to vote for Le Pen than Chirac in 1995 and 16 times in 2002. In 2007 distrustful voters are 57 times more likely to vote for Le Pen than Sarkozy, in 2012 they are 5 times more likely to vote for Le Pen than Hollande, and in 2017 they are 49 times more likely to vote for Le Pen than Macron.

Figure B.6 – French Electoral Studies 1968-2017: Mlogit coefficient (log scale)



Notes: Relative risk ratios with 90% confidence intervals of multinomial logistic regressions of the effect of political distrust on the probability of choosing a presidential candidate. Each graph refers to a different estimation. No estimation result is available due to the small amount of observations for: Ducatel (1969, 4 obs.), Krivine (1969, 3 obs.), Sebag (1974, 1 obs.), Schivardi (2007, 7 obs.), Cheminade (2012, 4 obs.), Arthaud (2017, 8 obs.), and Cheminade (2017, 1 obs.). The number of observations is (elections year): 1,469 (1965), 440 (1969), 4,204 (1974), 3,117 (1995), 2,990 (2002), 1,900 (2007), 1,492 (2012), and 1,328 (2017). Standard errors clustered at the department level. For graph readability, standard errors for the following candidates have been capped at 107 (year, upper confidence interval): Cheminade (1995, 1482.3), Gluckstein (2002, 271.2), Le Pen (2007, 129.0), Bové (2007, 116.3), Laguiller (2007, 180.6), Nihous (2007, 1146.5), Poutou (2012, 146.7), and Arthaud (2012, 666.4).

B.7 Birth distributions

Data description – Birth distributions are calculated using the 1962, 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006, and 2011 censuses organized by INSEE (available on IPUMS-I). This data contains information on 55,880,084 individuals born from 1863 to 2013. Of those, 49,018,439 are native-born. Father (mother) year-of-birth information is available for 11,959,878 (14,116,884) individuals. Note that for both the parental and the filial information to be available, the two had to belong in the same household when the survey was conducted.

Using this information, I construct the father and mother year-of-birth distribution by filial year-of-birth. The parental year-of-birth distribution is then crossed with the father year-of-birth

Figure B.7 – Birth distributions: Eligibility probability



Notes: Distribution of eligibility probability by year-of-birth separately for Alsace and Moselle, for individuals affected directly, spouses, children, and grandchildren.

one, to obtain the year-of-birth distribution of grandfathers (both maternal and paternal). I then use these distributions to calculate the likelihood an individual born in a specific year has a father and/or grandfather that was eligible for Wehrmacht service (i.e. born in 1908-1927 in Alsace and 1914-1927 in Moselle).

For example, an individual born in Alsace (Moselle) in 1957 has a 51.6% (47.4%) probability of having an eligible father, and a 17.1% (1.6%) probability of having at least one eligible grandfather. For an individual born in 1967 these probabilities are 9.7% (9.4%), and 72.3% (36.4%) respectively. Variation in the eligibility probability is therefore generated by the respondent's year-of-birth and the region of residence, and his gender (for individuals born during the 1908-1927 period). The overall probabilities of eligibility by year-of-birth are presented in Figure B.7. Three waves are evident; the first one (1908-1927) is the likelihood one was eligible; the second (around 1950) is the

likelihood her father was eligible; the third (around 1980) is the likelihood at least one grandfather was eligible.

B.8 Interregional Survey of Political Phenomena

The *Interregional Survey of Political Phenomena* (henceforth ISPP) is an annual survey that was conducted by the Centre for Political Research (CEVIPOF) from 1985 to 2004 in France. In total, 249,170 individuals participated, of which 18,671 from the annexed lands; 2,213 of these respondents were born from 1908 to 1927, including 1,106 men.

The questions of interest are related to trust in institutions and party preferences. The question on party preferences is present in every wave and is formulated as follows: *"Here is a list of parties or political movements. Could you indicate which one you feel closer to, or less distant from?"*. The outcome variable for party proximity is an indicator that take the value 1 if the respondent answered she feels closer to a specific party family. Parties are regrouped as follows: (i) Communist: Communists and extreme left, (ii) Socialist: Socialists, Radical Party of the Left, Citizen and Republican Movement, and Unified Socialist Party, (iii) Ecologist: Ecologists, Europe Ecology - The Greens, and Ecology Generation, (iv) Liberal: Union for French Democracy, (v) Conservative: Rally for the Republic, National Center of Independents and Peasants, and Liberal Democracy, and (vi) Radical right: National Front, National Republican Movement, and Movement for France.

The question on trust in institutions was asked in the 1987 and 1989 waves and is formulated as follows: *"Would you say you rather trust or not in [institution]?"*. The institutions for which a question is asked are the following: (i) the schooling system, (ii) the judicial system, (iii) labor unions, (iv) the police, (v) the church, (vi) the army, (vii) employers, (viii) the administration, (ix) political parties, (x) banks, (xi) elected politicians, (xii) firms, (xiii) the media. The possible answers are "I rather trust" and "I rather distrust". An indicator that takes the value 1 is constructed if the respondent answered she rather trusts an institution. 184 men and 188 women born from 1908 to 1927 in Alsace and Moselle participated in the 1987 and 1989 ISPP waves.

The ISPP also contains information on respondents' characteristics, and importantly their age and gender. The variables used are the following: father's nationality (french or not), religion,

Table B.6 – Interregional Survey of Political Phenomena: Data description

	Statistics			Distribution				
Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	5th pctile	Median	95th pctile	Max
Survey year	18,671	1994.72	5.68	1985	1986	1995	2003	2004
Year-of-birth	18,671	1950.98	17.89	1893	1920	1954	1977	1986
Male	18,671	0.48	0.50	0	0	0	1	1
Alsace	18,671	0.72	0.45	0	0	1	1	1
Born 1908-1913	18,671	0.01	0.12	0	0	0.00	0.00	1.00
Born 1914-1927	18,671	0.10	0.30	0	0	0.00	1.00	1.00
Born 1908-1913: Husband	18,671	0.01	0.07	0	0	0.00	0.03	0.59
Born 1908-1913: Father	18,671	0.09	0.12	0	0	0.02	0.38	0.41
Born 1908-1913: Grandfather	18,671	0.17	0.18	0	0	0.08	0.46	0.47
Trust in: Schooling system	2,117	0.83	0.37	0	0	1	1	1
Judicial system	2,116	0.52	0.50	0	0	1	1	1
Police	2,112	0.71	0.45	0	0	1	1	1
Church	2,003	0.64	0.48	0	0	1	1	1
Army	2,033	0.69	0.46	0	0	1	1	1
Political parties	1,995	0.19	0.39	0	0	0	1	1
Elected politicians	1,980	0.54	0.50	0	0	1	1	1
Party feeling closer to: Communist	18,663	0.04	0.20	0	0	0	0	1
Socialist	18,663	0.23	0.42	0	0	0	1	1
Ecologist	18,663	0.13	0.33	0	0	0	1	1
Liberal	18,663	0.11	0.31	0	0	0	1	1
Conservative	18,663	0.17	0.37	0	0	0	1	1
Radical right	18,663	0.06	0.24	0	0	0	1	1
None	18,663	0.25	0.43	0	0	0	1	1
Father nationality: French	18,661	0.28	0.45	0	0	0	1	1
Foreign	18,661	0.03	0.18	0	0	0	0	1
Question not asked	18,661	0.69	0.46	0	0	1	1	1
Religion: Roman Catholic	18,513	0.60	0.49	0	0	1	1	1
Protestant	18,513	0.09	0.29	0	0	0	1	1
Muslim	18,513	0.02	0.15	0	0	0	0	1
Jewish	18,513	0.00	0.06	0	0	0	0	1
Other	18,513	0.01	0.11	0	0	0	0	1
No religion	18,513	0.05	0.22	0	0	0	1	1
Question not asked	18,513	0.22	0.41	0	0	0	1	1
Family in region: Since always	18,656	0.23	0.42	0	0	0	1	1
Since parents	18,656	0.06	0.25	0	0	0	1	1
I moved	18,656	0.08	0.27	0	0	0	1	1
Question not asked	18,656	0.63	0.48	0	0	1	1	1

Notes: Covariates used in Section 5. The unit of observation is an individual. See Online Appendix B.7 for the construction of the probabilities. See Online Appendix B.8 for the construction of the other variables.

family implantation in the region. Father's nationality was not asked after the 1991 wave. Religion is classified into 5 categories: (i) Roman Catholic, (ii) Protestant, (iii) Muslim, (iv) other religion,

and (v) no religion. Religion was not asked in the 1992, 1993, 1996, and 1997 waves. The family origin question is the following: "Since when has your family been living in the region?". The possible answers are (i) since always, or since many generations, (ii) since my parents' generation, (iii) I moved into the region. Family origin was asked in the 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1995, 1997, and 1998 waves. The descriptive statistics of the survey data are presented in Table B.6.

B.9 French Electoral Panel 2002-2007

The *French Electoral Panel* (henceforth FEP) of 2002 and 2007, are part of post-electoral surveys that have been taking place in France since the 1950s and are already described in Section B.6. The 2002 FEP consisted of three surveys that were completed between April and June 2002. 4,107 individuals were interviews during the first wave, 4,017 in the second (of whom 1,822 had already participated in the first wave), and 2,013 in the third wave (of whom 1,417 had already participated in the first two waves), for a total of 6,898 individuals responding in at least one wave of the survey. The 2007 survey consisted of four waves that were completed between March and June 2007; 4,004 individuals participated in the first wave, of which 2,208, 2,018, and 1846 were re-interviewed in the subsequent waves. The surveys contain information on respondents' individual characteristics, political attitudes, past voting behavior, and most importantly, the municipality of residence. Out the 10,686 survey respondents in the 2002 and 2007 waves, 476 come from Alsace and Moselle, from 66 different municipalities.

Questions on retrospective voting are present in both the 2002 and 2007 surveys. The questions of interest in 2002 are formulated as follows: *"Could you tell me how you voted in the previous parliamentary elections, that took place in June 1997?"* (waves 1, 2, and 3), *"For which candidate did you vote [on 21 April, i.e. the first round of the 2002 presidential election]?"* (waves 2 and 3), *"For which candidate did you vote [in the second round of the presidential election]?"* (waves 2 and 3). In 2007, the question of interested is formulated as follows: *"Could you tell me how you voted in the first round of the 2002 presidential election?"*. Two outcome variables are constructed using these questions. The first, "Ever voted for the radical right-wing" is an indicator that take the value 1 if the respondent answered she voted for the National Front in 1997, Le Pen or Mégret in the first round of 2002, or

Table B.7 – French Electoral Panel 2002-2007: Data description

	Statistics			Distribution				
Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	5th pctile	Median	95th pctile	Max
Survey: 2002 Wave 1	476	0.37	0.48	0	0	0	1	1
2002 Wave 2	476	0.23	0.42	0	0	0	1	1
2002 Wave 3	476	0.05	0.21	0	0	0	0	1
2007 Wave 1	476	0.35	0.48	0	0	0	1	1
Year-of-birth	476	1957.66	17.22	1918	1928	1958	1983	1988
Male	476	0.46	0.50	0	0	0	1	1
Alsace	476	0.71	0.46	0	0	1	1	1
Conscription proxy (%)	476	6.77	1.88	1.15	3.73	6.93	10.50	13.75
Born 1908-1913: Father	476	0.10	0.13	0	0	0.02	0.38	0.41
Born 1908-1913: Grandfather	476	0.19	0.18	0	0	0.14	0.46	0.47
Trust in: Schooling system	195	0.77	0.42	0	0	1	1	1
Judicial system	197	0.53	0.50	0	0	1	1	1
Police	198	0.76	0.43	0	0	1	1	1
Army	194	0.87	0.34	0	0	1	1	1
Political parties	197	0.25	0.43	0	0	0	1	1
Ever voted for the radical right	381	0.12	0.33	0	0	0	1	1
Voted for the radical right in 2002R1	336	0.14	0.34	0	0	0	1	1
Parents nationality: One foreign	475	0.74	0.44	0	0	1	1	1
Both parents foreign	475	0.08	0.27	0	0	0	1	1
One grandparent foreign	475	0.08	0.27	0	0	0	1	1
None foreign	475	0.10	0.30	0	0	0	1	1
Religion: Roman Catholic	474	0.71	0.46	0	0	1	1	1
Protestant	474	0.12	0.33	0	0	0	1	1
Muslim	474	0.07	0.26	0	0	0	1	1
Other	474	0.01	0.12	0	0	0	0	1
No religion	474	0.09	0.28	0	0	0	1	1

Notes: Covariates used in Table 10. The unit of observation is an individual. See Online Appendix B.7 for the construction of the probabilities. See Online Appendix B.9 for the construction of the other variables.

Le Pen in the second round of 2002. The second outcome "Voted for the radical right in the first round of the 2002 election" takes the value 1 if the respondent answered she voted for Le Pen or Mégret in the first round of the 2002 election.

The question on trust in institutions was only asked in the second wave of the 2002 survey. The question is formulated as follows: *"Would you say you rather trust or not in [institution]?"*. The institutions for which a question is asked are the following: (i) the schooling system, (ii) the police, (iii) labor unions, (iv) the state, (v) the national assembly (parliament), (vi) the judicial system, (vii) the army, (viii) political parties. The possible answers are "I rather trust" and "I rather distrust".

An indicator that takes the value 1 is constructed if the respondent answered she rather trusts an institution.

The FEP also contains information on respondents' characteristics, their age and gender, and the municipality of residence. The variables used are the following: parents' nationality (one foreign, both foreign, at least one grandparent foreign, none) and religion (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, other, and no religion). The information of the municipality of residence is the official INSEE municipality number, which allows matching individuals to the level of conscription in the place they live. The descriptive statistics of the survey data are presented in Table B.7.

C Additional results

C.1 Estimation strategy

Pre-war comparability – Table 2 in the main text presents the results of regressing pre-War electoral outcomes and Nazi policies on an Alsace binary variable. The results presented in Table 2 imply that the only difference in Nazi policies was Wehrmacht conscription, which was larger in Alsace due to the different draft rule. In Table C.1 I further evaluate whether municipalities on the two sides of the border are comparable with respect to their socio-professional composition. Data on occupations in 1907 comes from Rossé et al. (1936); data on population, religion, and languages in 1936 comes from INSEE (1956). All data is at the canton level.

This analysis reveals no differences when it comes to occupation, population, and language. It does however reveal that there are more protestants in Alsace. While the religious composition of municipalities is controlled for in all specifications, several tests are performed to evaluate whether this is driving the findings. Firstly, as already presented in Table 1 using individual-level data from the 1936 census, the likelihood of conscription conditional is the same for Catholic and Protestant individuals. Second, even though municipalities on the two sides of the border present differences in religious affiliation, they do not vote differently before the War, as shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. While these findings are encouraging, they do not exclude the likelihood that the results are driven by Protestant municipalities, and that the fact that there are fewer Protestants in Moselle leads to this difference in voting behavior after the War.

Presence of protestants – To formally assess whether the increased presence of Protestants in Alsace is driving the results, I estimate the baseline specification of Equation (3), allowing however for the effect of conscription to differ between Catholic and Protestant municipalities. A threshold of 25% of Protestants is used to classify municipalities, since the distribution of religious affiliation above and below this threshold is identical in Alsace and Moselle. In municipalities with less than 25% of Protestants there are 0.6% Protestants in Moselle and 0.8% in Alsace with a t-test statistic of equality of -0.5; in municipalities with more than 25% Protestants, there are 58.7% and 62.3% respectively with a t-test statistic of -0.6.

Table C.1 – Estimation strategy: Pre-War comparability

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Occupation 1907 (Rossé et al., 1936)		Population 1936 (INSEE, 1956)		Religion 1936 (INSEE, 1956)		Language 1936 (INSEE, 1956)	
Dep. Variable	Agriculture	Industry	Foreign	Male	Protestant	Jewish	French	Dialect
	Panel A: Unconditional differences							
Alsace dummy	1.803	–0.762	–4.204**	–1.936**	15.640***	0.156	–19.204***	3.958**
	(5.519)	(6.187)	(1.866)	(0.755)	(4.543)	(0.190)	(5.823)	(1.521)
Mean dep. variable	43.93	35.48	2.98	50.06	13.77	0.93	13.69	11.62
Observations	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
Clusters	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
	Panel B: Conditional on geography and dialect							
Alsace dummy	0.724	–0.180	–0.076	–1.664	48.531***	0.236	–4.837	–1.856
	(7.724)	(5.515)	(1.725)	(1.606)	(10.050)	(0.229)	(4.980)	(1.722)
Mean dep. variable	43.93	35.48	2.98	50.06	13.77	0.93	13.69	11.62
Observations	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
Clusters	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
	Panel C: Conditional on geography and dialect (estimation sample)							
Alsace dummy	10.408	–9.384	–0.671	–0.825	58.830***	0.238	–6.573	–0.013
	(12.447)	(8.710)	(0.853)	(3.090)	(11.188)	(0.298)	(4.645)	(1.685)
Mean dep. variable	47.74	32.42	2.10	50.08	20.50	0.88	11.95	10.81
Observations	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31

Notes: Differences in pre-War occupation, population, religions, and language between Alsace and Moselle. The unit of observation is a 1936 canton. Panel A: Unconditional differences; Panel B: Differences conditional on geography and dialects; Panel C: Differences conditional on geography and dialects (estimation sample). Column (1): Share of the population occupied in agriculture in 1907; Column (2): Share of the population occupied in industry in 1907; Column (3): Share of foreign population in 1936; Column (4): Share of male population in 1936; Column (5): Share of population of protestant confession in 1936; Column (6): Share of population of jewish confession in 1936; Column (7): Share of french-speaking population in 1936; Column (8): Share of dialect-speaking population in 1936; Geography and dialects controls included in Panels B and C: access to waterways (binary), elevation (log mean, log std.dev.), distance to Germany (log km), 25km border segment fixed-effects, historical dialect fixed effects, and a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). Standard errors clustered at the arrondissement level in parentheses in Panels A and B; robust standard errors in Panel C. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

Table C.2 presents the results of the aforementioned estimation, where each column represents a different election. Panels C and D present the 2SLS point estimates for radical right-wing vote and abstention respectively. Since the instrument in the first-stage estimation is weak, reduced-form estimation results are also presented in Panels A and B. The results indicate that the effect of conscription is not driven by the differential presence of Protestants. The only differences that are statistically significant are the effects on abstention in 1969 and 1974. While the effect in 1969 is positive and significant for both Catholic and Protestant municipalities, in 1974 it is fails

Table C.2 – Estimation strategy: Presence of protestants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election year	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
	Panel A: Reduced-Form Estimates. Dep. Variable: Radical right (% of registered)							
Eligible births (%)	–0.016		0.003	0.271**	0.170*	0.013	0.054	0.027
	(0.028)		(0.004)	(0.100)	(0.084)	(0.049)	(0.079)	(0.087)
Eligible births (%) × Catholic	–0.005		0.000	–0.019	0.011	–0.007	–0.007	–0.053
	(0.009)		(0.004)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.050)
	Panel B: Reduced-Form Estimates. Dep. Variable: Abstention (% of registered)							
Eligible births (%)	0.262***	0.385***	0.215***	–0.028	–0.174**	0.099**	0.050	0.082
	(0.079)	(0.132)	(0.076)	(0.056)	(0.072)	(0.037)	(0.063)	(0.052)
Eligible (%) × Catholic	–0.105	–0.109*	–0.111*	–0.063	–0.029	0.011	–0.044	–0.025
	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.036)
	Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing (% of registered)							
Conscripted (%)	–0.067		0.011	1.095***	0.739**	0.051	0.211	0.084
	(0.125)		(0.017)	(0.383)	(0.325)	(0.200)	(0.290)	(0.350)
Conscripted (%) × Catholic	–0.012		0.001	–0.091	–0.031	–0.021	–0.026	–0.144
	(0.027)		(0.009)	(0.168)	(0.163)	(0.083)	(0.131)	(0.133)
	Panel D: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Abstention (% of registered)							
Conscripted (%)	1.048**	1.494**	0.829**	–0.129	–0.760**	0.407**	0.182	0.319
	(0.407)	(0.638)	(0.332)	(0.213)	(0.298)	(0.193)	(0.261)	(0.221)
Conscripted (%) × Catholic	–0.305	–0.336*	–0.295*	–0.162	–0.013	0.016	–0.123	–0.085
	(0.199)	(0.197)	(0.150)	(0.102)	(0.165)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.101)
Lat-lon polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical dialect FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full set of controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage *F*-statistic	8.48	8.76	9.92	10.40	8.98	11.59	8.60	8.62
Underidentification *F*-statistic	7.37	7.46	7.49	7.91	7.69	8.52	8.47	8.10
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical right-wing candidates and on abstention. Heterogeneous effects with respect to religious affiliation. A threshold of 25% is used to classify municipalities into Roman-Catholic and Protestant. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the canton level in parentheses. Panels A: Reduced-form estimates with radical right-wing vote and abstention as the outcome, respectively; Panels B and C: 2SLS estimates. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

marginally to reach any conventional level of significance for Catholics (p-value=0.125).

Balancing religious affiliations – An alternative strategy would be to match municipalities on their observable characteristics, by using nearest neighbor matching to match Alsace and Moselle

Table C.3 – Conscription and electoral outcomes: Balancing religious affiliations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election year	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
	Panel A: First-Stage Estimates. Dep. Variable: Conscripted (%)							
Eligible births (%)	0.205***	0.234***	0.218***	0.216***	0.214***	0.221***	0.206***	0.215***
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.040)
Mean dep. variable	7.74	7.74	7.74	7.74	7.74	7.74	7.74	7.74
	Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing vote (% of registered)							
Conscripted (%)	0.044		0.005	0.940**	0.554*	0.109	0.362	–0.143
	(0.090)		(0.017)	(0.411)	(0.289)	(0.197)	(0.249)	(0.292)
Mean dep. variable	1.21	0.00	0.31	22.18	22.25	14.89	23.24	27.27
	Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Abstention (% of registered)							
Conscripted (%)	1.359***	1.983***	0.913***	0.005	–1.005***	0.575***	0.070	0.624**
	(0.468)	(0.667)	(0.314)	(0.293)	(0.315)	(0.207)	(0.259)	(0.297)
Mean dep. variable	15.29	23.63	17.07	19.79	28.39	16.73	19.41	20.64
Lat-lon polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical dialect FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full set of controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage *F*-statistic	15.04	20.04	23.25	23.24	25.19	33.71	17.54	29.04
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical right-wing candidates and on abstention when balancing religious affiliation. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the canton level in parentheses. Panel A: First-stage estimates; Panels B and C: 2SLS estimates with radical right-wing vote and abstention as the outcome, respectively. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

municipalities. The nearest neighbor matching estimator weights the difference between observable characteristics by the inverse of their variance-covariance matrix. Its key advantage with respect to for example propensity score matching is that it is non-parametric, in other words, it does not require any functional assumptions for the treatment model. Its main caveat (which also applies to propensity-score matching) is that it is only appropriate for binary treatments, and therefore not appropriate in this case where both the treatment and the instrument are continuous variables.

Instead of using a matching estimator to account for differences in religious affiliations, which

is inappropriate for this exercise, I perform entropy balancing, as proposed in Hainmueller (2012). Entropy balancing is conceptually close to matching on observables, since it re-weights observations across the border in order to match their moments. The results when matching the first three moments of the distribution of religious affiliation (mean, variance, and skewness) across the Alsace-Moselle border are presented in Table C.3. Reassuringly, the coefficient are very similar to the baseline coefficients of Table 5, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Figure C.1 – Abstention and the radical right-wing vote: Unconditional evidence



Notes: Conscription, abstention, and radical right-wing vote in Alsace and Moselle. The unit of observation is a conscription percentile. The left panel presents average abstention in earlier elections (1965-1974). The right panel presents average radical right-wing support in later elections (1995-2017). The pairwise correlation coefficients are $\hat{\rho}_L = 0.64$ and $\hat{\rho}_R = 0.68$. Light colored diamonds present abstention in later elections (1995-2017) and radical right-wing support in earlier elections (1965 and 1974).

C.2 Abstention and the radical right-wing vote

Unconditional evidence – Figure C.1 presents the unconditional correlation of the conscription percentile with abstention in earlier elections (1965-1974) and radical right-wing support in later elections (1995-2017). While there is a strong and positive correlation between conscription and abstention in early elections, and conscription and radical right-wing support in later ones, there appears to be no correlation between conscription and abstention in later elections, nor conscription and radical right-wing vote in early ones. The pairwise correlation coefficients are: $\hat{\rho} = 0.637$ for early abstention and $\hat{\rho} = 0.679$ for late radical right-wing support, but $\hat{\rho} = -0.197$ for post-1974 abstention and $\hat{\rho} = -0.415$ for the pre-1995 radical right-wing vote.

Candidate classification – The candidates classified as belonging to the radical right in Table 5 are: Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour (1965), Jean-Marie Le Pen (1974, 1995, 2002, 2007), Bruno Mégret (2002), and Marine Le Pen (2012, 2017). The *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (CHES) classifies the parties of Philippe de Villiers (1995, 2007), Movement for France (MPF) and Rally for France (RPF), as radical right parties while the CMP classifies them as conservative. Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (2012, 2017), the president of France Arise (DLF), endorsed Le Pen in the 2017 election second round.

Table C.4 – Abstention and the radical right-wing vote: Candidate classification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election year	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
National Front Candidate	–	–	JMLP	JMLP	JMLP	JMLP	MLP	MLP
Other RRW Candidate	JLTV	–	–	PdV	BM	PdV	NDA	NDA
	Panel A: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: National Front vote (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)			0.012	1.085***	0.543*	0.048	0.210	0.085
			(0.017)	(0.378)	(0.291)	(0.199)	(0.287)	(0.349)
Mean dep. variable	0.00	0.00	0.31	22.18	19.30	14.89	23.24	27.27
	Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Other RRW vote (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	–0.068			–0.076	0.194*	–0.089	–0.143	0.193
	(0.125)			(0.115)	(0.103)	(0.066)	(0.133)	(0.218)
Mean dep. variable	1.21	0.00	0.00	3.85	2.95	2.16	1.90	6.83
Lat-lon polynomial	2nd		2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Border segment FE	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical dialect FE	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full set of controls	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage F-statistic	20.04		22.63	23.52	20.85	28.01	20.51	20.79
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for National Front, and other radical right-wing candidates separately. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the canton level in parentheses. Panel A: 2SLS estimates for Jean-Marie Le Pen (1974, 1995-2007) and Marine Le Pen (2012, 2017); Panel B: 2SLS estimates for Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour (1965), Philippe de Villiers (1995, 2007), Bruno Mégret (2002), and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (2012, 2017). Each column presents the estimation for a different election. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

Table C.4 evaluates the sensitivity of the results to the candidate classification by presenting the estimates separately for the National Front candidate (Panel A) and other radical right-wing candidates (Panel B). The effect is mainly driven by the National Front candidate; support for Bruno Mégret, the former National Front number two, also increases in conscription.

Inclusion of controls – The two-stage least-square results when only including the fertility controls and the fraction of the population that was deported are presented in Panel A1 and B1 of Table C.5. The results do not change qualitatively, but do change quantitatively for abstention, potentially indicating that some mediators are controlled for in the baseline estimation.

To formally assess whether this is the case, I also present results when sequentially introduc-

Table C.5 – Abstention and the radical right-wing vote: Inclusion of controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election year	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
	Panel A1: No controls. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing vote (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	0.077		0.005	0.669**	0.493**	0.019	0.188	0.143
	(0.049)		(0.011)	(0.319)	(0.222)	(0.137)	(0.202)	(0.290)
	Panel A2: No socio-economic controls. Dep. Variable: RRW vote (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	–0.060		0.006	0.778*	0.696**	0.150	0.313	0.244
	(0.100)		(0.016)	(0.402)	(0.326)	(0.214)	(0.307)	(0.384)
	Panel A3: No demographic controls. Dep. Variable: RRW vote (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	–0.056		0.009	0.874**	0.535	–0.002	0.091	0.085
	(0.117)		(0.020)	(0.423)	(0.335)	(0.215)	(0.317)	(0.453)
	Panel B1: No controls. Dep. Variable: Abstention (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	2.179***	2.663***	1.697***	0.330	–0.195	0.572***	0.455*	0.529***
	(0.276)	(0.502)	(0.282)	(0.215)	(0.196)	(0.188)	(0.239)	(0.192)
	Panel B2: No socio-economic controls. Dep. Variable: Abstention (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	1.068**	1.475**	0.709**	–0.017	–0.819***	0.431**	0.330	0.567**
	(0.391)	(0.557)	(0.301)	(0.241)	(0.295)	(0.207)	(0.282)	(0.275)
	Panel B3: No demographic controls. Dep. Variable: Abstention (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	1.077**	1.546**	0.969**	–0.138	–0.648**	0.382**	0.159	0.229
	(0.425)	(0.686)	(0.397)	(0.224)	(0.308)	(0.187)	(0.250)	(0.191)
First-stage *F*-stat (A1 and B1)	54.87	54.87	54.87	54.87	54.87	54.87	54.87	54.87
First-stage *F*-stat (A2 and B2)	25.86	26.03	31.80	24.95	20.43	26.18	21.43	20.67
First-stage *F*-stat (A3 and B3)	21.75	22.81	19.87	25.55	28.46	30.89	26.75	25.34
Lat-lon polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical dialect FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fertility controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical right-wing candidates and on abstention when only including sequentially adding controls. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the canton level in parentheses. Panels A1 to A3: 2SLS estimates with radical right-wing vote as the outcome; Panels B1 to B3: 2SLS estimates abstention as the outcome. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

ing the contemporary control vectors in Panels A2, A3, B2, and B3. The results when only including the historical controls and the contemporary demographic controls (i.e. excluding education

Table C.6 – Abstention and the radical right-wing vote: Excluding casualties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election year	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
	Panel A: First-Stage Estimates. Dep. Variable: Conscription proxy (%)							
Eligible births (%)	0.207***	0.218***	0.219***	0.213***	0.200***	0.215***	0.217***	0.214***
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Mean dep. variable	7.55	7.55	7.55	7.55	7.55	7.55	7.55	7.55
	Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing vote (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	–0.083		0.014	1.259***	0.862**	0.017	0.234	0.081
	(0.148)		(0.021)	(0.445)	(0.376)	(0.235)	(0.331)	(0.403)
Mean dep. variable	1.20	0.00	0.31	22.18	22.24	14.87	23.23	27.26
	Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Abstention (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	1.144**	1.645**	0.881**	–0.202	–0.916**	0.465*	0.184	0.369
	(0.495)	(0.752)	(0.386)	(0.243)	(0.361)	(0.228)	(0.301)	(0.264)
Mean dep. variable	15.25	23.58	17.04	19.77	28.38	16.72	19.40	20.64
Lat-lon polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical dialect FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full set of controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage *F*-statistic	15.02	16.15	16.99	17.58	15.54	21.24	15.06	15.37
Observations	461	461	461	461	461	461	461	461
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht net of 1908-1913 casualties on support for radical right-wing candidates and on abstention. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the canton level in parentheses. Panel A: 2SLS estimates with radical right-wing vote as the outcome; Panel B: 2SLS estimates abstention as the outcome. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

controls, occupation, unemployment, and income) are presented in Panels A2 and B2. Indeed, the coefficients on abstention are smaller in magnitude in early elections. The results when only including historical and socio-economic controls (i.e. excluding all demographic variables) are presented in Panels A3 and B3. Once again the coefficients are smaller in magnitude, indicating that these control variables could be mediating the effect. Moreover, the 2002 radical right-wing election coefficient marginally fails to reach statistical significance (p-value=0.12).

Excluding casualties – Table C.6 presents the results when accounting for WWII casualties by subtracting 1908-1913 casualties from the number of conscripted men. Data on casualties per year-

of-birth comes from the *Alsace WWII victims database* and is only available for municipalities in Alsace. Since the casualties data is only available for Alsace, the assumption thus has to be made that there are no 1908-1913 casualties in Moselle. This assumption does not seem far fetched, since only 0.06% of the 1936 population was conscripted and born during the 1908-1913 period in Moselle ($sd = 0.22\%$, $max = 2.46\%$), and casualty rates for these cohorts were roughly 20%. Moreover, a manual search on the *Mémoire des hommes* dataset (that comes from the same source as the *Alsace WWII victims database*) indicates that there were 87 Wehrmacht conscript casualties born in Moselle from 1908 to 1913. In contrast, in Alsace there were 800 for the sole cohort born in 1913. The results, presented in Table C.6, are very similar to the baseline, indicating that the effect is unlikely to be driven by casualties.[7]

Instrumenting 1908-1913 conscription – Table C.7 proposes an alternative estimation strategy. This specification exploits the variation in the eligibility of the 1908-1913 cohorts while controlling for 1914-1927 conscription. By introducing 1914-1927 conscription, this specification has the advantage of being able to simultaneously capture the effect of both differential conscription due to the draft rule (via the 1908-1913 conscription), and due to differences in compliance (via the 1914-1927 conscription). Note that the coefficients of this specification are not directly comparable with the baseline coefficients. The results are robust and similar to the baseline.

Polynomials in distance – Table C.8 presents the results when replacing the latitude-longitude polynomial by polynomials in distance to the Alsace-Moselle border. Panels A1 and A2 present the first-stage estimates using a linear and a quadratic polynomial in distance respectively. While eligible births do predict conscription, their predictive power is poor (i.e. the instrument is weak), with F-stat values ranging from 4 to 6. Consequently, reduced-form estimates are presented in the subsequent panels instead of two-stage least squares estimates.

Panels B1 and B2 present the reduced form point estimates when using the vote share of the

[7]The data on casualties from Berg in Alsace was not collected, this municipality is thus excluded from the estimation.

Table C.7 – Abstention and the radical right-wing vote: Instrumenting 1908-1913 conscription

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election year	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
	Panel A: First-Stage Estimates. Dep. Variable: Conscription proxy 1908-1913 (%)							
Eligible births 1908-1913 (%)	0.139***	0.140***	0.135***	0.136***	0.133***	0.139***	0.143***	0.143***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Conscription proxy 1914-1927 (%)	0.034*	0.033*	0.037*	0.034	0.036*	0.039*	0.034*	0.033*
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Mean dep. variable	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90
	Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing vote (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy 1908-1913 (%)	–0.136		0.025	1.859**	1.213*	–0.081	0.197	0.095
	(0.203)		(0.030)	(0.792)	(0.655)	(0.319)	(0.504)	(0.611)
Conscription proxy 1914-1927 (%)	0.032		–0.005	0.081	0.058	0.222***	0.224***	0.070
	(0.021)		(0.005)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.058)	(0.070)	(0.063)
Mean dep. variable	1.21	0.00	0.31	22.18	22.25	14.89	23.24	27.27
	Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Abstention (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy 1908-1913 (%)	1.642***	2.458**	1.305**	–0.281	–1.408**	0.749**	0.277	0.598
	(0.552)	(0.926)	(0.592)	(0.404)	(0.556)	(0.281)	(0.438)	(0.372)
Conscription proxy 1914-1927 (%)	0.135	0.154	0.170	0.027	0.157**	–0.054	0.036	–0.082
	(0.111)	(0.192)	(0.107)	(0.054)	(0.072)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.057)
Mean dep. variable	15.29	23.63	17.07	19.79	28.39	16.73	19.41	20.64
Lat-lon polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical dialect FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full set of controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage *F*-statistic	97.46	101.83	80.44	84.99	84.87	88.80	100.91	97.58
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of 1908-1913 conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical right-wing candidates and on abstention. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the canton level in parentheses. Panel A: 2SLS estimates with radical right-wing vote as the outcome; Panel B: 2SLS estimates abstention as the outcome. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

radical right as the outcome. Reassuringly, the point estimates are very stable and statistically indistinguishable from the baseline reduced-form estimates, presented in Table 4 in the main text. Panels C1 and C2 present the results using abstention as the outcome. Once again, eligible births increase abstention, but only in early elections.

Table C.8 – Abstention and the radical right-wing vote: Polynomials in distance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election year	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
	Panel A1: First-Stage. Dep. Variable: Conscription proxy (%)							
Eligible births (%)	0.134*	0.140*	0.147**	0.135**	0.122*	0.145**	0.145**	0.139*
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.073)
First-stage *F*-statistic	3.61	3.77	4.66	4.47	3.88	5.67	4.32	3.67
Distance polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
	Panel A2: First-Stage. Dep. Variable: Conscription proxy (%)							
Eligible births (%)	0.137*	0.143*	0.148**	0.138**	0.123*	0.148**	0.148**	0.142*
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.069)	(0.071)
First-stage *F*-statistic	3.87	4.03	4.74	4.57	3.93	5.79	4.67	3.99
Distance polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
	Panel B1: Reduced-Form. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing (% of registered)							
Eligible births (%)	–0.026		0.003	0.264*	0.103	0.064	0.062	0.140
	(0.035)		(0.006)	(0.136)	(0.103)	(0.064)	(0.111)	(0.124)
Distance polynomial	1st		1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
	Panel B2: Reduced-Form. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing (% of registered)							
Eligible births (%)	–0.025		0.002	0.273**	0.107	0.068	0.071	0.147
	(0.035)		(0.005)	(0.132)	(0.102)	(0.065)	(0.109)	(0.125)
Distance polynomial	2nd		2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
	Panel C1: Reduced-Form. Dep. Variable: Abstention (% of registered)							
Eligible births (%)	0.250**	0.460***	0.183*	–0.065	–0.122	0.066	0.064	0.141*
	(0.101)	(0.135)	(0.104)	(0.072)	(0.104)	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Distance polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
	Panel C2: Reduced-Form. Dep. Variable: Abstention (% of registered)							
Eligible births (%)	0.247**	0.464***	0.188*	–0.061	–0.120	0.069	0.071	0.143*
	(0.099)	(0.135)	(0.107)	(0.071)	(0.103)	(0.066)	(0.082)	(0.078)
Distance polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical dialect FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full set of controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: Reduced-form estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical right-wing candidates and on abstention. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the canton level in parentheses. Panel A: First-stage estimates; Panels B and C: Reduced-form estimates with radical right-wing vote and abstention as the outcome, respectively. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. Panels A1, B1, and C1 include a linear polynomial in distance to the Alsace-Moselle border; Panels A2, B2, and C2 quadratic. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

C.3 Compositional effects

Effects on population and age – While all population controls exclude individuals born from 1901 to 1927, the municipality-level results could still be a combination of individual preference related effects and composition effects. To assess the importance and persistence of conscription-driven compositional changes I estimate Equation (3) using demographic variables as outcomes. The results from 1965 to 2017 are presented in Table C.9.

As expected, municipalities where conscription was higher have a lower post-War population and a lower post-War male population, see Panels A and B. Moreover, these differences persist. While the share of male population is not significantly different, it becomes so in the 1990, potentially indicating a lower life expectancy of conscripts (see Panel C). Finally, conscription also alters the age structure of municipalities; the male population is on average older in places where more conscription took place and stays so until the 2007 election (see Panels D to F).

Age, gender, and voting behavior (survey evidence) – To assess the importance of these demographic changes on voting outcomes I use both individual survey data and municipality-level data of other regions in France where incorporation did not take place. The survey data comes from the 1962, 1978, 1988, and 1995 post-electoral surveys already presented in Section B.6. The estimation procedure consists of regressing an indicator for abstention or radical right-wing vote on age and gender variables in elections from 1958 to 1995, while controlling for income, profession, and department of residence. The survey results are presented in Figure C.2 for ease of interpretation.

Consistently with a long literature, women are less likely to vote, and less likely to vote for the radical right. Abstention decreases in age, while older men are also less likely to vote for the radical right. This implies that the presence of fewer men should lead to higher abstention and a lower vote for the radical right, while the aging of the population should lead to both lower abstention and radical right-wing vote. The largest female coefficient (for the 1962 parliament election) implies women are 12 pp less likely to vote. Conscription led to 3 pp more women. A back-of-the-envelope calculation implies thus that gender composition can account for at most a

Table C.9 – Compositional effects: Effects on population and age

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election year	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
	Panel A: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Log population							
Conscription proxy (%)	–0.038**	–0.041**	–0.040**	–0.046**	–0.044**	–0.048**	–0.031	–0.033*
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Mean dep. variable	6.13	6.13	6.13	6.18	6.21	6.24	6.26	6.26
	Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Log male population							
Conscription proxy (%)	–0.041*	–0.040*	–0.025	–0.062**	–0.061**	–0.057**	–0.035	–0.033
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Mean dep. variable	5.40	5.41	5.41	5.48	5.52	5.55	5.56	5.56
	Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Male (%)							
Conscription proxy (%)	–0.263	–0.213	–0.305	–0.821**	–0.766**	–0.458	–0.031	0.145
	(0.430)	(0.384)	(0.338)	(0.323)	(0.286)	(0.270)	(0.240)	(0.247)
Mean dep. variable	49.37	49.45	49.72	50.03	50.14	49.96	49.90	49.90
	Panel D: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Average age							
Conscription proxy (%)	0.417	0.415	0.259	0.436**	0.540**	0.602**	0.412	0.291
	(0.258)	(0.250)	(0.301)	(0.204)	(0.226)	(0.255)	(0.244)	(0.291)
Mean dep. variable	34.51	34.56	35.29	37.59	38.99	40.07	41.31	41.85
	Panel E: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Male average age							
Conscription proxy (%)	0.680**	0.629**	0.287	0.574**	0.688***	0.698**	0.276	–0.024
	(0.286)	(0.273)	(0.314)	(0.237)	(0.243)	(0.274)	(0.240)	(0.306)
Mean dep. variable	33.36	33.32	33.80	36.10	37.72	38.97	40.25	40.83
	Panel F: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Female average age							
Conscription proxy (%)	0.125	0.164	0.172	0.212	0.303	0.453*	0.517*	0.537
	(0.335)	(0.317)	(0.376)	(0.223)	(0.248)	(0.259)	(0.275)	(0.364)
Mean dep. variable	35.77	35.87	36.87	39.12	40.35	41.25	42.44	43.03
Lat-lon polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical dialect FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full set of controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage *F*-statistic	21.75	22.81	19.87	25.55	28.46	30.89	26.75	25.34
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on population, age, education, and employment outcomes. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the canton level in parentheses. Panel A: 2SLS estimates for log population; Panel A: 2SLS estimates for log male population; Panel A: 2SLS estimates for fraction of males; Panel A: 2SLS estimates for average age; Panel A: 2SLS estimates for average male age; Panel A: 2SLS estimates for average female age. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. The contemporary controls vector does not include any demographic characteristics. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

Figure C.2 – Compositional effects: Age, gender, and voting behavior (survey evidence)



Notes: OLS estimates of the effect of age and gender on voting behavior from 1958 to 1995. The survey data comes from the 1962, 1978, 1988, and 1995 post-electoral surveys conducted by Centre for Political Research (CEVIPOF).

0.4 pp increase in abstention (out of a 6 to 11 pp difference). Compositional effects would lead to a reduction, if any, in radical right vote.

Age, gender, and voting behavior (municipal evidence) – These individual effects might not map one-to-one to aggregate outcomes. To understand how these translate into aggregate outcomes I perform estimations using data from municipalities in other regions of France. The results are presented in Table C.10. The results for radical right-wing support are consistent with the survey data (see Panel A); men and younger individuals are more likely to vote for the radical right, implying once again a negative effect of conscription-driven compositional changes on vote for the radical right. Radical right-wing vote correlates positively with municipality size in 1995 and 2002 and negatively from 2007 on.

Since conscription acts as a negative shock to population, the population decrease should have a negative effect on radical support for the 1995 and 2002 elections and a positive effect for the 2007-2017 elections. The 2007 coefficient of -0.2 implies that the conscription-driven population decrease could explain up to 0.06 pp of the increase in radical support, the counterfactual pop-

Table C.10 – Compositional effects: Age, gender, and voting behavior (municipal evidence)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election year	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
	Panel A: OLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Radical right-wing vote (% of registered)							
Log population	No data	No data	No data	0.430***	0.385***	–0.224***	–0.142*	0.042
				(0.078)	(0.088)	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.100)
Male (%)				0.017*	0.000	0.017**	–0.001	0.013
				(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Average age				–0.124***	–0.166***	–0.183***	–0.298***	–0.334***
				(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.044)
Mean dep. variable				11.29	14.47	10.75	17.71	21.34
	Panel B: OLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Abstention (% of registered)							
Log population	No data	No data	No data	–0.094	0.619***	–0.021	0.145*	0.468***
				(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Male (%)				0.017*	0.012	0.004	0.018*	–0.009
				(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Average age				0.004	–0.082***	0.031	0.084***	0.077**
				(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.038)
Mean dep. variable				19.81	25.99	13.95	16.69	18.86
Lat-lon polynomial				2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Historical controls vector				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemp. controls vector				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canton FE				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations				31,551	31,554	31,554	31,619	31,596
Clusters				1,447	1,447	1,447	1,447	1,447

Notes: OLS estimates of the effect of municipality size, gender composition, and age on support for radical right-wing candidates and on abstention. The unit of observation is a municipality. Municipalities from Alsace and Moselle, as well as municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants in 1936 are excluded from the sample. Standard errors clustered at the canton level in parentheses. Panel A: OLS estimates with radical right-wing vote as the outcome; Panel B: OLS estimates with abstention as the outcome. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

ulation in the annexed lands being 0.3 log points larger. Aggregate results on abstention (Panel B) indicate that it is larger in localities that are more populous, and, in contrast with the survey results, that it is larger in localities with more men and an older population. While the population and gender effect would both lead to a lower abstention in Alsace and Moselle, the aging population could potentially lead to an increase of up to 0.25 pp in abstention.

Taken together, these findings indicate that the compositional effects of conscription should lead to a decrease in radical right-wing support and abstention, if anything. Moreover, the fact that these effects persist is hard to reconcile with the observed transition from abstention to voting for the radical right.

Table C.11 – Radical and moderate candidates: Distrustful voters

Election year	(1) 1965	(2) 1969	(3) 1974	(4) 1995	(5) 2002	(6) 2007	(7) 2012	(8) 2017
	Panel A: Reduced-Form Estimates. Dep. Variable: Candidate vote (% of registered)							
Eligible births (%)	–0.305***	–0.619***	–0.360***	–0.079***	–0.020	–0.036	–0.046***	–0.089**
	(0.038)	(0.094)	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.035)
Eligible births (%) × Distrust [std]	0.244***	0.326***	0.194***	0.043***	0.016**	0.008	0.015***	0.060**
	(0.038)	(0.059)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.030)
	Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Candidate vote (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	–0.854***	–1.734***	–1.008***	–0.221***	–0.055	–0.100	–0.130***	–0.248**
	(0.165)	(0.372)	(0.198)	(0.079)	(0.038)	(0.085)	(0.038)	(0.100)
Conscription (%) × Distrust [std]	0.742***	0.891***	0.581***	0.135***	0.056**	0.012	0.044**	0.176*
	(0.168)	(0.217)	(0.128)	(0.049)	(0.028)	(0.052)	(0.018)	(0.097)
First-stage *F*-statistic	6.45	6.72	6.98	6.90	6.38	7.02	6.58	6.28
Underidentification *F*-statistic	12.54	13.13	12.96	13.36	12.31	13.34	12.70	11.98
Candidate-lat-lon polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Candidate-border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate-dialect FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full set of controls × Distrust [std]	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dependent variable	14.12	14.98	9.15	8.91	4.48	7.55	8.93	8.70
Observations	2,772	2,310	4,158	4,158	7,392	5,082	4,158	4,158
Clusters	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical and moderate candidates. The unit of observation is a municipality × candidate. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel A: Reduced-form estimates with respect to the degree of radical discourse; Panel B: 2SLS estimates. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. The distrust measure is constructed as the relative risk ratio of a multinomial logit estimation of a distrust variable on the choice of presidential candidate from the French Electoral Studies 1968-2017 (see Online Appendix Section B.6 for details). All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

C.4 Radical and moderate candidates

Distrustful voters – Table C.11 replicates the estimation of Section 4.2 using a different measure of candidate radicalism, namely the coefficients of the multinomial logistic estimations that were presented in Section B.6. The measure is once again standardized for ease of comparison across elections. The results closely replicate the findings of the baseline Table 6. In all elections moderate candidates are penalized while there is a premium for radical ones (classified as the ones for which distrustful voters are more likely to vote for).

Aggregate vote shares – An alternative estimation strategy exploits the radicalism measure and evaluates how conscription affects the aggregate radical and aggregate moderate vote shares, as

Table C.12 – Radical and moderate candidates: Aggregate vote shares

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election year	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
	Panel A: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Aggregate radical vote (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	0.280	–0.267	1.029***	1.009***	0.641**	–0.041	0.066	0.229
	(0.233)	(0.175)	(0.264)	(0.360)	(0.297)	(0.218)	(0.353)	(0.204)
Mean dependent variable	6.26	4.90	3.22	26.02	23.46	17.04	25.14	7.61
	Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Aggregate moderate vote (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	–1.295***	–1.206*	–1.823***	–0.862**	0.119	–0.368	–0.243	–0.549***
	(0.466)	(0.669)	(0.487)	(0.340)	(0.456)	(0.275)	(0.332)	(0.175)
Mean dependent variable	78.46	71.47	79.72	54.19	48.16	66.23	55.45	71.75
	Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Rad - Mod difference (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	1.576**	0.939	2.852***	1.871***	0.522	0.327	0.310	0.778**
	(0.613)	(0.752)	(0.711)	(0.667)	(0.710)	(0.458)	(0.634)	(0.308)
Mean dependent variable	–72.21	–66.57	–76.50	–28.16	–24.70	–49.19	–30.31	–64.14
Lat-lon polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical dialect FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full set of controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage F-statistic	20.04	21.20	22.63	23.52	20.85	28.01	20.51	20.79
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on the aggregate vote share of radical and moderate candidates. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the canton level in parentheses. Panel A: 2SLS estimates for the aggregate radical vote share; Panel B: 2SLS estimates for the aggregate moderate vote share; Panel C: 2SLS estimates for the difference between the aggregate radical and moderate vote shares. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

well as the difference between the two. To separate candidates into moderate and radical, I classify as radical the two candidates with the highest radicalism value and as moderate all other candidates.[8] I then re-estimate the baseline two-stage least-squares specification of Equation (3) using aggregate vote shares as the outcomes.

The results are presented in Table C.12. Panel A presents the results for the aggregate radical vote share; Panel B the results for the aggregate moderate vote share; Panel C for the radical-

[8]In some cases the same CMP data is used for more than one candidate, resulting in more than two candidates being the most radical ones, as for example with Le Pen and Mégret in 2002.

moderate vote share difference. A consistent pattern emerges whereby in most elections the vote share of radical candidates increases with the conscription rate; the effect is statistically significant in 3 out of the 8 elections. The vote share of moderate candidates decreases with the conscription rate (with the exception of 2002, positive but not statistically significant). Finally, the difference between the radical and moderate aggregate vote shares increases with the conscription rate in *all* elections, and the effect is precisely estimated in 4 of the 8 elections. Note that this last finding is also in line with the predictions of the theoretical framework of Section 4: formally, Equations (7) and (8) imply that $\Delta\pi \equiv \pi_R - \pi_M = 2(\bar{\tau}^L - \bar{\tau}_C) + 2(\bar{\tau}^H - \bar{\tau}^L) \cdot \alpha > 0$.

Other policy positions – In Table C.13, I replicate the estimation of Table C.12 using other positions that are prominent in the radical-right wing discourse and have already been discussed in the main text, namely nationalism, authoritarianism, right-wing discourse (the Budge and Laver (2016) index), and extremism (the absolute value of the Budge and Laver (2016) index).

The results depict a different picture in that in early elections (1965 and 1969) conscription decreases the difference between most nationalist candidates and other candidates. This is also the case for the most authoritarian candidates, which are also penalized with respect to the other candidates in the 2002 election. Most right-wing candidates receive lower shares of the vote (with respect to other candidates) in early elections as well. Finally, most extremist candidates receive lower shares of the vote in municipalities where more men where conscripted in all elections from 1995 to 2012, and the effect is significant for the 1995 and 2002 elections.

This evidence is consistent with the evidence already presented in Table A.3 of the main Appendix, indicating that other aspects of the radical right-wing are unlikely to be driving support in municipalities with more conscripts.

Table C.13 – Radical and moderate candidates: Other policy positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Earlier elections			Later elections				
Election year	1965	1969	1974	1995	2002	2007	2012	2017
	Panel A: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Nationalist vote difference (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	–1.576**	–0.533	0.713*	1.871***	0.472	0.327	0.310	1.926**
	(0.613)	(0.783)	(0.374)	(0.667)	(0.726)	(0.458)	(0.634)	(0.844)
Mean dependent variable	72.21	61.31	–79.29	–28.16	–22.41	–49.19	–30.31	6.10
	Panel B: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Authoritarian vote difference (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	–2.789**	–0.533	0.938	1.871***	–1.427**	–0.057	2.977***	1.926**
	(1.044)	(0.783)	(0.862)	(0.667)	(0.565)	(0.516)	(0.804)	(0.844)
Mean dependent variable	43.87	61.31	–56.35	–28.16	–36.91	–4.18	16.62	6.10
	Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Right-wing vote difference (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	–2.789**	–0.533	0.938	2.265***	0.472	1.761***	2.977***	0.657
	(1.044)	(0.783)	(0.862)	(0.791)	(0.726)	(0.507)	(0.804)	(0.639)
Mean dependent variable	43.87	61.31	–56.35	6.25	–22.41	3.71	16.62	–21.28
	Panel C: 2SLS Estimates. Dep. Variable: Extremist (r-l) vote difference (% of registered)							
Conscription proxy (%)	1.711**	0.979	2.852***	–0.616**	–1.297***	–0.080	–0.532	0.238
	(0.640)	(0.715)	(0.711)	(0.263)	(0.379)	(0.313)	(0.409)	(0.208)
Mean dependent variable	–74.62	–67.51	–76.50	–75.16	–64.59	–72.92	–70.19	–75.13
Lat-lon polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical dialect FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full set of controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462	462	462
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on the aggregate vote share by candidate position. The unit of observation is a municipality. Standard errors clustered at the canton level in parentheses. Panel A: 2SLS estimates for the difference between the aggregate vote share of most nationalist candidates and other candidates; Panel B: 2SLS estimates for the difference between the aggregate vote share of most authoritarian candidates and other candidates; Panel C: 2SLS estimates for the difference between the aggregate vote share of most right-wing candidates (measured using the Budge and Laver (2016) index) and other candidates; Panel D: 2SLS estimates for the difference between the aggregate vote share of most extremist candidates (measured using the absolute value of the Budge and Laver (2016) index) and other candidates. Each column presents the estimation for a different election. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude ($x + y + x^2 + y^2 + xy$). First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

C.5 From abstention to radical support

First stage and reduced-form estimates – Table C.14 presents the reduced-form estimation behind Equation (10), while Table C.15 presents the first-stage estimations. Only the coefficients of interest are presented.

Table C.14 – From abstention to radical support: Refuced-form estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dep. Variable	Candidate vote share				Abstention	
Specification	2SLS Within election		2SLS Across elections		2SLS Across elections	
Eligible births (%) × Radical	0.148***	0.157***	0.246***	0.555***		
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.090)	(0.159)		
Eligible births (%) × $(1/\Delta rad_t)$			–0.006***	–0.005***	0.018***	0.019***
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Candidate-border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election × Municipality FE	Yes	Yes				
Party × Municipality FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemporary controls			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other policy positions		Yes		Yes		Yes
Mean dependent variable	7.70	7.70	9.29	9.29	20.12	20.12
Observations	38,346	38,346	30,030	30,030	3,696	3,696
Clusters	3,696	3,696	3,696	3,696	462	462

Notes: Reduced-form estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical candidates and abstention across space and time. The unit of observation is a municipality × election × candidate. Standard errors clustered at the municipality × election in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

Table C.15 – From abstention to radical support: First-stage estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Specification	2SLS Within election		2SLS Across election				2SLS Across election	
Dep. Variable	Conscripted (%) × Radical		Conscripted (%) × Radical	Conscripted (%) × $(\Delta\text{Rad})^{-1}$	Conscripted (%) × Radical	Conscripted (%) × $(\Delta\text{Rad})^{-1}$	Conscripted (%) × $(\Delta\text{Rad})^{-1}$	
Eligible births (%) × Radical	0.388***	0.388***	0.388***	0.032	0.388***	–0.044		
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.799)	(0.025)	(0.839)		
Eligible births (%) × $(\Delta\text{Radical})^{-1}$			–0.000	0.384***	–0.000	0.385***	0.384***	0.384***
			(0.000)	(0.036)	(0.000)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Candidate-border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election × Municipality FE	Yes	Yes						
Party × Municipality FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemporary controls			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other policy positions		Yes			Yes	Yes		Yes
Mean dependent variable	1.17	1.17	1.13	116.36	1.13	116.36	116.36	116.36
Observations	38,346	38,346	30,030	30,030	30,030	30,030	30,030	30,030
Clusters	3,696	3,696	3,696	3,696	3,696	3,696	462	462

Notes: First-stage estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical candidates and abstention across space and time. The unit of observation is a municipality × election × candidate. Standard errors clustered at the municipality × election in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

Intergenerational transmission – The analysis has so far ignored changes in the composition of the electorate. The voters in 1965, some of whom experienced WWII directly, differ from the voters in the 2000s, who are descendants of the men affected directly. Under imperfect intergenerational

Table C.16 – From abstention to radical support: Intergenerational transmission

Dep. Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Vote share					
Specification	Across candidates		Across time		Other positions	
Estimation	Reduced form	Two-stage least-squares	Reduced form	Two-stage least-squares	Reduced form	Two-stage least-squares
Eligible (RF) | Conscription (2SLS)						
Self (%) × Radical	0.339**	2.174**	0.422***	3.108***	0.640***	4.113***
	(0.172)	(0.977)	(0.100)	(0.802)	(0.175)	(1.349)
Father (%) × Radical	0.051	0.129	0.316***	1.417***	0.357***	1.600***
	(0.055)	(0.236)	(0.081)	(0.447)	(0.100)	(0.452)
Grandfather (%) × Radical	0.053	0.162	0.037	–0.037	0.101	0.196
	(0.035)	(0.128)	(0.052)	(0.207)	(0.072)	(0.309)
Self (%) × $(\Delta\text{Radical})^{-1}$			–0.003***	–0.020***	–0.001	–0.009*
			(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Father (%) × $(\Delta\text{Radical})^{-1}$			–0.002***	–0.012***	–0.003***	–0.019***
			(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Grandfather (%) × $(\Delta\text{Radical})^{-1}$			0.005***	0.018***	0.000	0.002
			(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Candidate-border segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election × Municipality FE	Yes	Yes				
Party × Municipality FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contemporary controls			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-stage F-statistic		82.07		15.23		5.16
Underidentification *F*-statistic		184.35		76.90		69.18
Observations	38,346	38,346	30,030	30,030	30,030	30,030
Clusters	3,696	3,696	462	462	462	462

Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of conscription into the Wehrmacht on support for radical candidates across space and time, by generation. The unit of observation is a municipality × election × candidate. Standard errors clustered at the municipality × election in parentheses. Columns (1) and (3): Reduced-form estimates; Columns (2) and (4): 2SLS estimates. Columns (1) and (2): 2SLS estimates for candidate vote shares within municipality and election (across candidates); Columns (3) and (4): 2SLS estimates for candidate vote shares within municipality and party (across time). First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the first-stage estimation with Eligible births (%) × Radical and Eligible births (%) × $(\Delta\text{Radical})^{-1}$ as the exogenous instruments. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

transmission, the impact of conscription should dissipate over time.[9]

Estimating Equation (10) by generation requires the calculation for each election of the fraction of the electorate directly affected by WWII, and that indirectly affected through parents and grandparents. To construct this measure, I exploit information on the age structure in each munic-

[9]Horizontal transmission however would lead to an equilibrium that is different from the non-war equilibrium. In other words, while in the long-run the preferred policies of conscripted and non-conscripted individuals would converge, the new median voter's bliss point ($\bar{\tau}^{\star}$) would be different (larger) than in the non-war case ($\bar{\tau}^{L}$).

ipality. The INSEE censuses (described in Section B.3) provide population information in 5-year $\times$ gender groups for every municipality. This information is combined with the likelihood of each age cohort being affected directly or indirectly by WWII conscription in order to construct the fraction of the electorate that was affected. The same procedure is used to calculate the fraction of the electorate that was eligible or had eligible fathers or grandfathers (described in Section B.7).

Table C.16 presents the results of estimating Equation (10) by generation. Since the age structure of municipalities is endogenous, one should be cautious when interpreting the results causally. Columns (1) and (2) present the results within an election (across candidates); Columns (3) and (4) across elections; Columns (5) and (6) across election when simultaneously accounting for other aspects of the discourse of the radical right. Several elements stand out: first, the effect on preferences (i.e. the interaction with a candidate's degree of radicalism) is positive for children of conscripts but no longer present for grandchildren; second, a similar pattern is present for the effect on the cost of voting (i.e. the interaction with policy divergence).

C.6 Party proximity and trust in institutions

Intergenerational transmission – Table C.17 replicates the results of Column (1) of Table 9, using party preference as the outcome. Column (1) replicates the results with political trust as the outcome. Column (2) presents the results when using support for any radical right wing party as the outcome. The results indicate that only individuals affected directly are more likely to support the radical right-wing; this result hides however substantial variation. Columns (3) to (5) break down support for the radical right-wing into the three main parties in the data, namely the National Front, the National Republican Movement, and the Rally and Movement for France.

The results in Column (3) confirm the findings of Column (2); only individuals directly are more likely to declare proximity to the National Front; individuals affected through their father are more likely to declare being close to the Rally/Movement for France, as shown in Column (5), while individuals affected through their grandparents are more likely to support minor radical right-wing parties overall, see Column (6).[10]

[10]Information on minor radical right-wing parties is only available as of 1998, since these parties

Table C.17 – Party proximity and trust in institutions: Intergenerational transmission

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Trust	*Which party do you feel closer to, or less distant from*				
Dep. Variable	Elected politicians	*Radical right (any)*	*National Front*	*National Rep Movement*	*Rally/Movement for France*	*Other radical right*
Alsace	0.064*	0.001	0.006	–0.003	–0.015	–0.017
	(0.035)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Born 1908-1913 × Alsace	–0.536***	0.036***	0.033***			
	(0.053)	(0.010)	(0.010)			
Born 1908-1913 (Woman) × Alsace	0.120	–0.001	–0.004			
	(0.187)	(0.006)	(0.006)			
Born 1908-1913 (Father) × Alsace	–0.600***	–0.007	–0.026	–0.007	0.074*	0.069
	(0.145)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.045)
Born 1908-1913 (Grand-father) × Alsace	–0.218	–0.022	–0.040**	0.024	0.044	0.064*
	(0.157)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-of-birth FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean dep. variable	0.535	0.057	0.044	0.010	0.031	0.039
Observations	1,935	17,667	17,667	5,019	6,003	6,003
Clusters	133	156	156	144	145	145
R-squared	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04

Notes: Reduced-form estimates of the potential mechanism. The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors clustered at year-of-birth × region level in parentheses. Each column presents a different estimation result. Column (1): Intergenerational transmission of attitudes; Column (2): proximity to radical right-wing parties; Column (3): proximity to the National Front; Column (4): proximity to the National Republican Movement; Column (5): proximity to the Rally for France and the Movement for France; Column (6): proximity to the National Republican Movement, the Rally for France, and the Movement for France. Year-of-birth × gender fixed effects are included in all specifications. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.

did not exist before that date. It is thus impossible to estimate the effect for individuals affected directly due to data scarcity.

D Historical appendix

D.1 Extended historical background

The Alsace and Moselle border – Alsace and Lorraine have long been disputed regions. During the second half of the first millennium C.E. they were part of the Frankish Realm. At the end of the 9th century they became parts of the Holy Roman Empire. The southern part of Alsace was annexed back to the French Kingdom with the treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War on 1648. The rest of the region was eventually annexed on 1697, with the treaty of Ryswick, that ended the War of the League of Augsburg. The departments of Alsace (Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin) and Lorraine (Moselle, Meurthe, Meuse, and Vosges) were created in 1790 and the border was stabilized in 1793, when the the County of Saarwerden was annexed.

Alsace and Lorraine remained parts of the French Kingdom until the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, when, following the defeat of the French troops and the signing of the Treaty of Frankfurt, Alsace and parts of the Moselle and Meurthe departments in Lorraine jointly formed the *Imperial Territory of Alsace-Lorraine*. They remained a part of the German Empire until the end World War I and the 1918 armistice, that resulted in the re-integration of Alsace and the newly founded Moselle department to the Third French Republic.

Following the French capitulation in June 1940, the 1871 borders were fully re-instated. Yet, unlike the previous annexation during the period 1871-1918 during which the departments formed a single administrative unit, in this case the two regions were absorbed into the neighboring pre-existing German *Gaue* of Baden (in the case of Alsace) and Saar-Palatinate (in the case of Moselle) to avoid the strengthening of a joint local identity (Iung et al., 2012, p.13). Alsace and Moselle were therefore administrated separately: Alsace by Robert Wagner, the *Gauleiter* of Baden since 1933, and Moselle by Josef Bürckel, the *Gauleiter* of Saar-Palatinate since 1935. The task of the two administrators was identical: to transform the population of the western territories into good Germans and convinced national-socialists.

Figure D.1 – Extended historical background: The Alsace and Moselle border



Notes: Map of the French-German border before 1870, after 1871, after 1918 and during WWII. Before the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, Moselle was part of Lorraine. After 1871, parts of the Moselle and Meurthe departments formed with most of Alsace the *Imperial Territory of Alsace-Lorraine*. After WWI, the Moselle and Meurthe-et-Moselle departments were founded. During WWII, Moselle was integrated in the Westmark (formerly Sarr) *Gau*, while Alsace was integrated in the pre-existing Baden *Gau*.

Wehrmacht conscription (Riedweg, 1995) – In theory the heads of administration were under the command of the occupying army but, on August 2, 1940, a decree by Hitler gave the full civil administration control to the two *Gauleiters*. The Wehrmacht would only exercise the military authority, while the interior minister was in charge of the coordination between the different authorities in Alsace and Moselle. As a result, the two administrators disposed of truly unrestricted powers, and essentially were responsible only to Hitler himself. The two administrators held similar positions but their personalities and methods differed significantly (Iung et al., 2012).

Robert Wagner, by his birth name Robert Backfisch, was a WWI veteran and a long-term companion of arms of Hitler.[11] As such, he considered that the introduction of a mandatory military service was the appropriate procedure to integrate the Western Territories (Alsace, Moselle, Luxembourg). Josef Bürckel was considered a "nazification" (*Gleichschaltung*) expert after being in charge of nazifying the Saar region and Austria. He believed that assimilation through education was not possible, and therefore openly considered the possibility of deporting part of the population and replacing them with German farmers (*Latest News of Strasbourg*, April 30, 1942).

The independence of the administrators, allowed them to implement different ethnic and political purification policies. While in Moselle Bürckel proceeded in deportations, Wagner hoped to convert the Alsace population to national-socialism through political education and persuasion, an important part of which was the military service. Wagner's plan however stumbled on the opposition of the German High Command (henceforth OKW), since people from Western Territories were considered Germans in regard to the race (*Volksdeutsche*), but were not German citizens (*Reichsburger*). The laws of Nuremberg made a clear distinction between citizens of the Reich and German nationals. Only citizens had full political rights and the obligations associated (e.g. military service). In this spirit, according to the law on the military obligation (*Wehrgesetz*) of May 21, 1935, only Reich citizens were compelled to the service. The populations of the Western Territories

[11]Robert Wagner joined the army during WWI. He remained in the army after the War and became a virulent anti-communist. Mutated in Munich, he participated in Hitler's 1923 failed putsch attempt and was imprisoned with him in the Landsberg fortress. His personal relationship with Hitler dated from this period.

were further protected by the Hague Convention that prohibited the mobilization of the population of an occupied territory. Moreover, this population was considered unsafe by the OKW as long as the "nazification" process had not been completed.

The course of the war on the Eastern Front greatly facilitated Wagner's plan. The decision to attribute the German nationality to the populations of the Western Territories was taken on August 9, 1942. The citizenship issue resolved, Hitler gave each *Gauleiter* a full liberty on how to apply the measure. The "decree on the citizenship in Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg" appeared in the official journal of the Reich on August 23, 1942. Having overcome the main judicial obstacle, a decree concerning the mandatory military service was issued on August 25, 1942, in Alsace, August 29 in Moselle, and August 30 in Luxembourg; it was immediately followed by a decree clarifying that the military service concerned the cohorts born from 1920 to 1924.[12] The first cohorts (1922-1924) were drafted in October 1942; they were soon followed by the 1920-1921 cohorts (Jan 1943). The 1914 to 1919 cohorts were mobilized in April and June 1943 in Alsace and Moselle, respectively, but not in Luxembourg. The 1925 cohort was conscripted in May 1943. In late 1943 and early 1944, the 1911-1913 and 1908-1910 classes were mobilized in Alsace but not in Moselle, nor in Luxembourg. Towards the end of the war, the 1926 and 1927 cohorts were mobilized.

In all, 20 cohorts (1908-1927) were drafted in Alsace, compared to 14 in Moselle (1914-1927). In Luxembourg only the 1920 to 1927 cohorts were mobilized; *Gauleiter* Simon, who was against the introduction of conscription, refused to mobilize cohorts born before 1920 which did not elicit any response from the OKW. This testifies once again that, despite the introduction of a mandatory military service, the administrators had a broad freedom on how to apply the measure. The conscription process was otherwise identical (Iung et al., 2012). As explained in Riedweg (1995, p.99), "*The responsibility falls entirely on Gauleiter Wagner that did everything he could so that a maximum of Alsatians are incorporated in the Wehrmacht*". This is according to him, another example of *Reich Polycracy*: the independence of Wagner and Bürckel from central Reich authorities allowed them to apply different policies when it came to ethnic and political purification.

[12]While the decree on the mandatory service in Moselle was already issued on August 19, 1942, it was only published on the 29, once the citizenship status decree was made public.

Being in the Wehrmacht during the War – The Wehrmacht was organized on a territorial basis. Alsace became part of the 5th corps area based in Stuttgart, and Moselle of the 12th based in Wiesbaden (Riedweg, 1995, p.109). Conscription in the Wehrmacht was two years long and consisted of four stages: registration, first (medical) examination, drafting, and call-up (Iung et al., 2012, p.34). Police authorities and the ordinary local registration of the civilian population, were responsible for the registration of men liable for military service (Ambrose, 1990, p.55). Under the German administration system the local police always had a complete roster of all residents of their precincts, based on the required registration of residents (Ambrose, 1990, p.56). Shortly after the registration, the recruiting subarea headquarters (*Wehrbezirkskommando*) issued orders for the holding of the first examination.[13] On this occasion the registrants were classified according to their physical fitness (Ambrose, 1990, p.56).

In wartime the procedure was accelerated, and the drafting was combined with the call-up (Ambrose, 1990, p.56). The actual call-up (*Einberufung*) was issued by mail by the recruiting subarea headquarters in the form of an induction order (*Gestellungsbefehl*) directing the registrant to report at a specified time at the headquarters of a unit (Ambrose, 1990, p.56). Depending on the unit, instruction could last from two to several months. Upon arrival in the barracks conscripts from the annexed lands were mixed with conscripts from all over the Reich (Riedweg, 1995, p.119). This training was mostly military, most of the indoctrination taking place in the "Empire Labour Service" (*Reichsarbeitsdienst*) and the "Hitler Youth" (*Hitler-Jugend*).[14] Note that German military

[13]In Alsace the *Wehrersatzinspektion* of Strasbourg, that was divided in seven *Wehrbezirkskommados*, was in charge of the draft. The census for the draft was organized at the arrondissement level by the police authorities that were already in charge of the household files. It was the police forces that updated the *Wehrstammstollen*, *Wehrstammbücher*, and *Wehrstammkarten* (the registers and individual files). Conscripts were summoned individually for the census. The draft board consisted of a spelling and math exam. Draftees also had to produce several documents such as their birth certificate, schooling degrees, and Nazi association certificates (Riedweg, 1995, p.109).

[14]The "Empire Labour Service" (*Reichsarbeitsdienst*) for the youth aged 17 to 25 was instated on May 8, 1941, in Alsace and April 23, 1941, in Moselle, while the Hitler Youth (*Hitler-Jugend*) for the

allowances were larger than the French ones, and paid at the beginning of the month, instead of the end. Allowances were based on previous income and should compensate for any resources lost. They were capped at 85% of previous income and were valid for all employment types (employee, self employed etc). As such, families of men incorporated were not in need during the annexation period (Riedweg, 1995, p.115).

The lack of trust of the German military command towards former French citizens led to several special arrangements concerning the incorporation of the latter. The origins of the mistrust of the German High Command find themselves in WWI. In March 1915, during WWI, the decision was already taken that soldiers from Alsace-Moselle should fight as far away as possible from the West Front. A study in 1917 revealed that there were 80 deserters out of 10,000 soldiers from Alsace-Moselle as opposed to 1 out of 10,000 for the rest of the Reich (Riedweg, 1995, p.55).

To avoid desertions, the delays between the stages were very short (Iung et al., 2012, p.35). Moreover, a decree on September 1942 ordained the deportation of defectors' families inside the Reich (the "*Sippenhaft*" principle) and the establishment of a restricted area (*Sperrbezirk*) along the frontier with France and Switzerland to discourage evasion (Riedweg, 1995, p.82).[15] After December 1942, these soldiers were no longer allowed on the West Territories that were occupied (France, the Netherlands, and Belgium) nor in certain units (scouting, intelligence, aviation, marine) (Riedweg, 1995, p.102). In May 1943 the decision was taken that soldiers from Alsace and Moselle have to be scattered on the whole territory of the Reich. In the ground army (*Ersatzheer*) there should not be more than 8% to 15% per unit at most; in battle units there should not be more than 5% at most (Riedweg, 1995, p.102). Finally, in June 1943, the decision was taken that soldiers from Alsace and Moselle should be solely sent to the Eastern Front, while in December of the same year, leaves were restricted (Iung et al., 2012, p.61).

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youth aged 10 to 18 was introduced in January 1941 and became mandatory in August 1942.

[15]The success of the surveillance service of this area was such that the local news argued that "to try to illegally cross the border is a suicide attempt" (*Latest News of Strasbourg*, August 28, 1942).

Being in Moselle during the War (Sary, 1983) – In the meanwhile, life in Moselle went slowly back to normal. On June 18, 1940, time changed from French to German time (+1 hour), while an exchange rate of 1 French Franc for 0.05 Reichsmarks was fixed. By the end of June shops and schools opened once again, as did cinemas in cities. Since trains no longer circulated, the prices of subsistence goods were fixed. Goods coming from Germany were distributed: 500 gr of sugar, 100 gr of coffee, 150 gr of past or dried vegetables per person. Rationing was introduced at the end of July: 2.5 kg of bread, 500 gr of meat, 45 gr of butter, 50 gr of fat per person/week. On July 6, gas supply was reinstated, while parades, military concerts, and football games started again soon after (Sary, 1983, p.149).

In August 1940, Bürckel was named *Gauleiter* and begun his process of *nazification*. Street were renamed. Unlike the previous annexation period however, street names were no longer translated, but completely changed: for example, *rue du Cambout* in Metz was renamed into *Bayernplatz* (*Camboutstrasse* in 1871), and *rue Lassalle* into *Martinstrasse* (*Lassallestrasse* in 1871) (Sary, 1983, p.152). Mass had to be performed in German (Sary, 1983, p.146). All administrative managers were replaced and public administration was re-organized. An urbanization plan that intended to merge small municipalities into larger ones was introduced and public transport was intensified with the creation of new lines and the intensification of routes (Sary, 1983, p.155).

Several measures were introduced to overcome potential shortages: potatoes were planted in the middle of the city of Metz, training days were provided to business managers to increase productivity, while farmers were encouraged to increase their production to sustain the population (Sary, 1983, p.158). All these measures were however not sufficient and several prescriptions were decided: in March 1941, it was decided that restaurants should not serve meat on Wednesdays and Fridays; in August 1942, milk was rationed; in December 1942, a new census took place to attribute supply cards (Sary, 1983, p.159). Nonetheless, following the initial raids in stores and closing of shops, supply of goods was sufficient at least until 1943 (Sary, 1983, p.168).

Theaters, another important propaganda tool, also resumed their activities, focusing on German creators such as Goethe, Kleist, Lessing, and Schiller and the museum was expanded. A new public library only containing German language book opened, since selling French language

books in bookstores was prohibited (Sary, 1983, p.157). Large manifestations were very frequent during the period: Marine day, Labor-service-volunteers day, Hitler Youth day, NSDAP celebrations (three between Nov 1942 and Sep 1943) (Sary, 1983, p.164). Sary (1983) gives the following description of the period: *"During fours years, the occupying authorities worked with determination to earn the sympathy of the population of Moselle. A situation and activity of quasi-normality was maintained in Metz, with an intense cultural life, several cultural events, and a supply of goods that was sufficient"* (Sary, 1983, p.169).

Another important part of the "nazification" process implemented by Brückel were deportations (Sary, 1983, p.152). The first deportations took place from July to October 1940 and concerned "Frenchmen from the interior" (*"Vollfranzosen"*), i.e. individuals that were not historically from Moselle. During this first wave of deportations, approximately 25,000 people from Moselle were sent to France, most of them to Lyon (Hiegel, 1982, p.185). On September 21, 1940, Brückel announced that he was planning a population exchange with France to *germanize* the Westmark *Gau*. This led to a second wave of deportations of non-German speaking inhabitants, from the 255 French speaking municipalities of Moselle, primarily to France, but also in the Wartheland *Gau* in Poland (Hiegel, 1982, p.186). During this second wave of deportations, that took place from November 11 to November 21, 1940, approximately 59,000 individuals were displaced (Hiegel, 1982, p.188). While the process slowed down after November 1940, deportations continued until 1943. In total, Hiegel (1982) reports that 99,523 individuals were officially deported to France, but that there might be up to 20,000 that did not figure out in the Gestapo lists, raising the total number to roughly 120,000 individuals (Hiegel, 1982, p.192).

At the same time, a process of deportation to the East also took place (the so-called *"Umsiedlungen"*). Approximately 10,000 individuals were displaced in eastern parts of the Reich: Thuringia, Silesia, Sudetenland, Austria, and Poland. This number should also be marked up by 2,000 to 3,000 individuals (Hiegel, 1982, p.196). In all, an estimated 110,000 to 123,000 individuals from Moselle were deported. In Alsace the total number of individuals deported were 25,000 in non-annexed France and 17,000 in eastern Germany (Hiegel, 1982, p.192-6).

Returning to France after the War – In the immediate aftermath of the War, a strong anti-Germanic feeling dominated the French society. The figure of the patriot resistant monopolized the collective memory. Wehrmacht conscription was thus incompatible with the post-WWII impersonation of heroism in France (Bludszus, 2014, p.142). The soldiers from Alsace and Moselle had to justify their involvement to a French public opinion that was not moved by their fate. During their return through Paris, conscripted soldiers were often insulted and spat on, Parisians not distinguishing between them and volunteers in the Nazi legion (Iung et al., 2012, p.127). The absence of an intervention from the French state contributed to the misconception of their role during the War; for much of the public, these men were traitors of the Nation, which was felt as an injustice by the Alsace and Moselle populations. Paul Durant, a WWII veteran, recalled that *"there was only bullying and persecution for the "Müss Preussen" (forced Prussians) soldiers that we were"*, while according to the memoirs of Madeleine Lemoine, *"the climate in the beginning of the liberation period was as painful as the Hitler climate"* (Bludszus, 2014, p.141).

In their view, the men conscripted were let down twice: firstly by the Vichy government that only protested mildly (and never publicly) against their incorporation into the Wehrmacht, and secondly by the newly-founded French state for not taking a public stance to defend them after the War. The ambiguous post-WWII position of the French state with respect to these soldiers is well illustrated by the "Bordeaux trial" that took place in 1953. This trial, whose purpose was to judge the perpetrators the 1944 Oradour-sur-Glane massacre, convicted 14 conscripts from the annexed regions. According to local newspapers, this process stigmatized all the *Malgré-nous* and was experienced as an "intolerable humiliation" by the population (*L'Aurore*, December 12, 1953, in Iung et al. (2012), p.131). The outcome of the trial led to an uproar of the local population, forcing the government to pass an amnesty law. This process was nonetheless seen by the local population as the result of the incomprehension by Frenchmen in the rest of the country of the Nazi annexation (Iung et al., 2012, p.133).

The veterans from Alsace and Moselle went on to form "Against our will" associations (*Malgré-nous*), a name that indicates the cynical view of their engagement.[16] The initial purpose of these

[16]Several books on conscription also evoke this feeling, such as "The great disgrace" by by

associations was the repatriation of war veterans still in captivity, but also the recognition of the status of these soldiers as war veterans to a full extend, and their compensation as such (Bludszus, 2014, p.151).[17] However, the war veterans from Alsace and Moselle did not form any political party, unlike the ones in Luxembourg that went on to form the Popular Independent Movement in the 1960s, which was considered an anti-establishment party without a clear program on wider issues (`https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popular_Independent_Movement`).

D.2 Conscription example: Camille L.

I interviewed Camille in Marmoutier, Alsace, in December 2014. Camille, a tailor prior to the War, was born in Marmoutier, Alsace, in 1922. He was thus part of the first cohort drafted into the Wehrmacht and was conscripted on October 12, 1942.

After passing the Review Board in Saverne, Alsace, he was sent to Innsbruck, Austria, for a brief training that lasted until November 24, 1942. On November 29, 1942, he was sent to Murmansk, Russia, to get his main training. Even though he could not ski prior to the War, Camille was allocated to the 139th Alpine Regiment. Furthermore, as he recalled, he was the only soldier from France, since the unit was solely composed of Austrians and Poles.[18] He was sent to the Kandalaktcha Front on May 14, 1943, where he fought until he was wounded on February 8, 1945.

Camille came back to France in September 1945. He had to walk through Lapland to a camp in Trondheim, Norway, where German soldiers were sorted depending on whether their enrollment

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Georges-Gilbert Nonnenmacher in 1965, "The shameful soldier" by Armand Zahner in 1972, or "The night of the pariahs" by Henry Allainmat and Betty Truck in 1975 (Iung et al., 2012, p.127).

[17] A list of the associations in Moselle (that also includes associations from Alsace) dating from September 1983, enumerates 57 associations and approximately 120,000 members (*Les Cahiers Lorrains*, 1984, *4*, p.385-391). The process of compensation began in 1958 and lasted until 2008 (Bludszus, 2014, p.433).

[18] A very similar story, that of Auguste Ritter, born in 1923 in Colmar, Haut-Rhin, can be found on http://www.memoire-orale.org/notice.php?id=156 (last accessed on Aug 17, 2016). As A. Ritter recalled, his unit was primarily composed of Austrians, only higher ranks being German.

Figure D.2 – Conscription example: *"Wehrdienst"* of Camille L.



was justified. He was then shipped to Le Havre, France, and from there to Chalon-Sur-Saône, where he was interrogated for three days and demobilized. He arrived in Strasbourg on September 29, 1945, where, after being interrogated for one more day, he was allowed to go home.

D.3 Departments' acquisition of powers

A twofold process of territorial and functional decentralization began in France with the creation of the departments. This process was revived by the 1982 Defferre laws, shortly after the 1981 presidential election. The Defferre law turned departments into a local authorities. This meant that the administration's supervision, exercised by the prefect, was abolished. The President of the General Council now held the department executive power and ensured the preparation and implementation of his department's budget. The General Councils were given new competences as well: social action, trade and fishing ports, school transport, and management of the high schools.

Between 2002 and 2004, Jean-Pierre Raffarin's government brought back the reform of the decentralization on the political agenda. Local authorities had a vocation to take on competencies that could be best implemented at their level (subsidiarity principle). A right of petition to seize a territorial assembly was granted to the voters of each territorial collectivity. From that point

on, local referendums and voter consultation could be organized in the event of changes in the boundaries of local authorities. By providing local authorities with a "decisive part" in their own resources and by accompanying any transfer of financial resources, the law recognized the "financial autonomy" of local and regional authorities. The law also provided "financial equalization schemes" between communities to correct resource inequalities.

The role and the responsibilities of the department in social and medico-social action were reinforced. It now took up the management of roads previously classified in the national public road domain. The departments were also transferred the recruitment and management of the technicians and workers in high schools, and took charge of social and occupational integration.

Between 2005 and 2008, new transfers of competences were carried out, particularly in the field of child protection (Law of the 5th of March 2007) and support for disabled people (Act of the 11th of February 2005). Finally, in 2014, the law on the modernization of territorial public action instructed the departments to coordinate the joint action of local authorities and inter-communal authorities for the exercise of powers relating to social action, social development and the contribution to the reduction of fuel poverty, autonomy of individuals and solidarity of territories.

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